Re: "The" answer? Or...?

On Sunday, November 6, 2022 at 9:16:50 PM UTC+1, One more stroke or seizure and I've had it wrote:
> On 11/19/2017 10:19 PM, Rupert wrote: 
> > The central assumption of consequentialism is that outcomes for the whole world can be compared.
> No - outcomes for all welfare-bearing entities *in* the world. That welfare 
> experience is still at an individual level. You can count the number of people 
> made better off and worse off, and you can speculate about *how much* better off 
> or worse off someone is, but you can't measure the welfare changes, and you 
> can't calculate a net welfare change for "the world."

It's delightful to hear from you again.

You're thinking of a highly specific form of consequentialism. I characterized consequentialism correctly. However, the point you're making is about inability to give precise cardinal measures of utility. I wonder if you could be kind enough to remind me how this pertains to the 2017 discussion, which I can't be bothered re-reading.


> >>> Huh? When did I agree that is impossible? I was curious for you to tell me more about it. See the example I gave above. 
> >> 
> >> That wasn't any example of cardinal utility. 
> > 
> > It could be considered an example of imposing a burden of yourself to spare another individual a greater burden.
> You're trying to substitute "burden" for cardinal utility. You can't measure 
> the burden, either. It may seem obvious that the burden to a child of having 
> malaria exceeds the burden to you of forking over 3000 euros, but you still 
> aren't assigning an absolute, measurable value to the burden. In addition, most 
> comparisons of burden or utility are not so obvious. 

Right. So we lack precise measures of cardinal utility for the purposes of measuring inter-personal trade-offs, and again, you would need to remind me how this bears on the 2017 discussion. Are you suggesting I made a claim that we currently know how to do such measurements precisely? 

> >>>> No one cares about total utility, given its inherently unmeasurable 
> >>>> aspect. The only thing that matters is *changes* in utility, and the 
> >>>> only thing that matters is changes in ordinal utility to entities that 
> >>>> already exist. 
> >>> 
> >>> All right. But as I say, I would like to see this view defended in more detail, by engaging with my example. 
> >> 
> >> Your example was not of cardinal utility. The child is better off, as 
> >> is your conscience, but neither welfare improvement can be given an 
> >> absolute value. 
> > 
> > So that last point needs to be argued. Why should I believe that?
> Feel free to give it a value. Show your work.

Saying that I don't have the means to give a precise quantitative measurement right now and saying that it is in principle absolutely impossible are two different claims, right? Are you familiar with how they measure QALY's?

If you could just clarify your central thesis here. I don't know how to assign it a precise numerical value right now, no, you got me there.

> > Remember it's not just about denying that you can put a number on it, you're denying that the two burdens can even be compared. Or maybe I was confused about that?
> See above about certain obvious comparisons. However, I think the vast majority 
> of comparison cannot be made. 

I see. Sort of makes me wonder, of which space of "possible comparisons" exactly are you taking the vast majority here. 

Would you maybe wish to give an example of a trade-off where the comparison cannot be made?

I get that you're saying economists have concluded you can get an adequate basis for the theorizing they want to do from ordinal utility alone and they think that's more rigorous. You would just need to remind me of what exactly I said that made you feel the need to go on about it at such great length.