Re: Existence - not "better" than never existing

On 11/28/2025 2:44 PM, T. Howard Pines, Jr. wrote:
> Coming into existence, or "getting to experience life", is not better 
> than never existing.  It can't be, because no such comparison can be 
> made.  Nor can existence be worse than never existing, for the same reason.
> 
> In order to say that anything is better or worse for an entity, one 
> necessarily is talking about two different states of welfare or well- 
> being for the entity. But an entity must exist in order to have a 
> welfare state of well-being.  Thus, the comparison between existence and 
> non-existence, from the perspective of the entity, cannot be made.  It 
> is absurd.
I agree with you on the narrow point that existence cannot be said to be
better or worse *for the resulting individual*, since non-existence does not
constitute a welfare state.

However, my objection to reproduction does not rely on a welfare comparison
between existence and non-existence at all.

The claim is instead consent-based.

Bringing a person into existence is an irreversible imposition that exposes
them to harm, constraint, and obligation without their consent. The fact 
that
the individual does not exist prior to the act does not nullify the 
absence of
consent; it merely guarantees it.

We routinely regard non-consensual impositions as morally suspect even when
the subject cannot consent at the time (e.g., irreversible medical decisions
made *for* someone). In those cases, the absence of consent is treated as a
moral problem, not a moral permission.

So the argument is not:
“Existence is worse than non-existence.”

It is:
“Imposing existence without the possibility of consent is morally
unjustifiable, regardless of whether the resulting individual later judges
their life positively.”

That conclusion follows without invoking welfare comparisons at all.