Re: Advocacy journalism
Noah Sombrero <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | alt.buddha.short.fat.guy |
|---|---|
| Organization | Noah's Kitchen |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Sun, 16 Aug 2026 20:37:09 -0400, Wilson <[email protected]> wrote: > >A large part of the mainstream press no longer seems to believe that its >primary responsibility is to report what happened, present competing >arguments fairly, investigate the powerful and allow readers to reach >their own conclusions. Increasingly, journalists have assigned >themselves a different job. They arenÂt merely reporting on society. >They are helping society move toward what they believe it ought to become. > > >Modern advocacy journalism has increasingly attached itself to a >collection of moral and political causes: climate activism, transgender >ideology, racial equity, DEI, expansive immigration, abortion rights, >hostility toward traditional religious morality, suspicion of >nationalism, and enthusiasm for international institutions and >technocratic government. These positions differ from newsroom to >newsroom, and certainly not every journalist subscribes to all of them. >But taken together, they form a remarkably consistent worldview. > >The problem isnÂt that journalists hold these beliefs. They are entitled >to them. The problem is that many journalists have ceased to recognize >them as political beliefs at all. They have been elevated into moral >truths. Climate policy isnÂt a political dispute; one side is Âdenying >science. Gender ideology isnÂt a political or scientific dispute; one >side is attacking Âtrans rights. Mass immigration isnÂt a legitimate >disagreement over national interest, labor, culture and sovereignty; >opposition becomes Âanti-immigrant. Traditional Christianity isnÂt >simply another moral framework; increasingly it becomes ÂChristian >nationalism. National sovereignty becomes Ânationalism. Populism >becomes a Âthreat to democracy. > >Once you have classified your own political preferences as morally >correct rather than politically contestable, objectivity becomes almost >impossible. Why would you give equal consideration to people who are >wrong? Worse, why give a platform to people whose ideas you believe >cause harm? > >There is an arrogance buried inside advocacy journalism that rarely gets >discussed. It assumes that the journalist is not merely better informed >than the reader, but morally better equipped to determine which >political outcomes are acceptable. The reader becomes less a citizen to >be informed than a subject to be guided. > >And that is precisely where the intellectual justification for advocacy >journalism enters. The old journalistic aspiration toward objectivity >has increasingly been attacked as Âbothsidesism, false balance or the >Âview from nowhere. Prominent journalists and journalism scholars have >argued instead for Âmoral clarity, an explicitly Âmoral voice, and >journalism committed to defending an egalitarian conception of democracy >and confronting structural inequities. > > >Whether immigration levels are too high, whether biological sex matters >in womenÂs athletics, whether national sovereignty should supersede >decisions made by unelected transnational institutions, whether energy >policy should favor nuclear power, whether parents should have greater >authority over schools, whether marriage and family deserve special >protection, or whether a nationÂs government owes a greater duty to its >own citizens than to people who arrived yesterday are political >questions. They are supposed to be debated. > >Instead, an extraordinary number of these questions have migrated from >the category of political disagreement into the category of extremism. >That migration may be one of the most consequential stories American >journalism has failed to cover, perhaps because journalists themselves >helped make it happen. > >Consider Germany. Pick up almost any Reuters or Associated Press story >about Alternative für Deutschland and you do not merely encounter the >partyÂs name. You encounter Âthe far-right Alternative for Germany. >Again and again. Reuters used the formulation this month while reporting >that AfD is polling around 41 percent in Saxony-Anhalt and 36 percent in >Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. The label arrives before readers learn what the >party actually proposes. > >Think about what that language tells an American reader before he or she >learns anything else about the party. Germany. Far right. Rising >rapidly. You do not need a degree in neurolinguistic programming to >understand the association being planted. AfD becomes associated first >with extremism, and only afterward with policy. > >When Reuters calls a political party Âfar-right in virtually every >article, most readers are not reaching for Cas MuddeÂs academic >definition of the European populist radical right. They hear something >much simpler: extremist. > >And then something remarkable happens. Policies that would have been >recognizably conservative, or even mainstream, within living memory now >serve as evidence for the label. Now, policies such as reducing mass >immigration, deporting people who are in the country illegally, >protecting the traditional family, restoring nuclear power, resisting >further transfer of national sovereignty to the European Union, >preserving German culture, and putting German national interests first >all become Âfar-right. > > >Again, proportionality matters. Journalism is not obligated to pretend >that every fringe theory has equal evidentiary support. But who decides >when a political view no longer deserves equal coverage? The reporter? >The editor? The owner? The journalism professor? The NGO that has >labeled an organization extremist? The government agency supplying the >reporter with information? > >This becomes particularly dangerous when journalists overwhelmingly >inhabit the same political, educational and cultural ecosystem. They >cease to recognize their worldview as a worldview. It simply becomes >reality. Everyone else has an ideology. They have facts. > >Two events happened that the transatlantic political and media >establishment clearly did not expect: Brexit and Donald Trump. Millions >of ordinary people rejected policies endorsed by nearly every >prestigious institution available to instruct them. The newspapers told >them. The economists told them. The universities told them. The >celebrities told them. The NGOs told them. The intelligence >establishment told them. The European establishment told them. > >And the voters said no. > >That should have produced a period of intense institutional >introspection. Why donÂt these people believe us? Why donÂt they want >what we are selling? What are we missing? > >Instead, much of the establishment settled on another explanation. The >voters had been manipulated. Russian disinformation. Facebook. Cambridge >Analytica. Fake news. Misinformation. Disinformation. Malinformation. >Algorithms. Populism. Extremism. > >Suddenly, the problem was not that citizens had looked at establishment >policies and rejected them. The problem was that citizens had been >exposed to the wrong information. > >This distinction matters enormously. Once the political problem is >defined as bad information causing bad democratic choices, information >control begins to look like defending democracy. Journalists become >natural partners in the project. > >The change in language is impossible to miss. Protecting democracy >increasingly came to mean protecting institutions from the choices >voters might make. There is a rather large philosophical problem hiding >in there. > > >The purpose of a free press is not to ensure that citizens reach the >correct political conclusion. It is to give citizens the information >they require to reach their own conclusions. > >If you believe people are entitled to vote only after receiving >information curated to produce an acceptable result, then what you >actually believe in is something quite different. You believe in managed >democracy. > >The institutions decide the acceptable boundaries. The media enforce >them. The fact-checkers police them. The algorithms amplify them. The >public gets to choose from what remains. Then everyone congratulates >themselves for having saved democracy. The latest news from the far right advocacy journalism group. >https://www.malone.news/p/saving-democracy-from-democracy -- Noah Sombrero mustachioed villain Don't get political with me young man or I'll tie you to a railroad track and <<<talk>>> to <<<YOOooooo>>> Who dares to talk to El Sombrero? dares: Ned does not dare: Julian shrinks in horror and warns others away