Condo Wreckage Hints at First Signs of Possible Construction Flaw

"Leroy N. Soetoro" <[email protected]> Tue, 13 Jul 2021 17:40:59 -0000 (UTC)
Newsgroups alt.building.engineering,alt.engineering,fl.politics,alt.politics.democrats.d,sac.politics,alt.fan.rush-limbaugh,talk.politics.misc
Organization The next war will be fought against Socialists, in America and the EU.
Message-ID <[email protected]>
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/03/us/florida-condo-collapse-steel-
rebar.html

Engineers studying the collapsed Florida tower said there seemed to be 
less steel reinforcement in certain areas than would have been expected 
from the 1979 design drawings.

Engineers who have visited or examined photos of the wreckage of the 
Champlain Towers South condominium complex have been struck by a possible 
flaw in its construction: Critical places near the base of the building 
appeared to use less steel reinforcement than called for in the project’s 
original design drawings.

The observation is the first detail to emerge pointing to a potential 
problem in the quality of construction of the 13-story condo tower in 
Surfside, Fla., that collapsed last month, killing at least 24 and leaving 
up to 121 still unaccounted for.

Reached by phone, Allyn E. Kilsheimer, a forensic engineering expert hired 
by the town of Surfside to investigate the collapse, said the 
investigation was still in its early stages. But he confirmed there were 
signs that the amount of steel used to connect concrete slabs below a 
parking deck to the building’s vertical columns might be less than what 
the project’s initial plans specified.

“The bars might not be arranged like the original drawings call for,” Mr. 
Kilsheimer said in an interview. He said he would need to inspect the 
rubble more closely to determine whether in fact the slab-to-column 
connections contained less steel than expected.

R. Shankar Nair, a member of the National Academy of Engineering and 
former chairman of the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat, was 
among the other engineers who reviewed photographs and saw inconsistencies 
between the design and the steel that remained visible in the columns.

The investigation of the collapse could take months, so preliminary 
observations and findings could change. Some engineers said the possible 
shortfall in steel rebar in the relatively small part of the building they 
had examined should be seen not as a cause of the collapse, but it could 
potentially have been one of several factors that allowed whatever 
initiated the problem to accelerate into a catastrophic failure.

In raising questions about the amount of steel reinforcement in the 
building, engineers pointed to three damaged columns in a western section 
of the building that remains intact.

Those columns were part of an exterior deck that served as a ground-level 
parking area adjacent to a pool plaza. It is a key point of interest, 
because at least two witnesses have said they saw part of the deck 
collapse in the minutes before the building toppled.

The condo tower’s 1979 design drawings, provided by the town of Surfside 
and reviewed by structural engineers and The New York Times, indicate that 
the vertical columns in many parts of the building were supposed to 
provide a critical structural connection to horizontal slabs, embedded 
with eight rods of reinforcing steel — four in one direction, four in the 
other — near the tops of the slabs. But the reinforcing rods in the 
parking area, left exposed in many places after the parking deck slab 
slammed down to the lower level, appear to be fewer in number.

On most faces of the exposed slab, only two pieces of rebar can be seen, 
half of what would be expected. Three bars are visible on another.

Concrete can support tall buildings only when it is bolstered with steel 
reinforcement. Concrete is a strong material “in compression,” as 
engineers put it — in supporting weight above it, for example. But it is 
far less effective “in tension,” or holding things together when forces 
would tend to pull the concrete apart. Embedding steel adds that essential 
tensile strength, and sound design calculations, backed up by building 
codes, specify how much steel is needed, depending on the type, size and 
other features of a building.

Mr. Kilsheimer cautioned that it is common in construction for the final 
product to differ from drawn designs.

He also said more analysis would be needed to assess whether the amount of 
steel reinforcement used was a factor in the collapse. He is working on 
computer modeling to address that question, he said.

Some of the engineers who said there was less steel visible in the 
wreckage than would have been expected based their judgment on a close 
reading of the design documents for the building.

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Mr. Nair, who has over 50 years of design experience, said it was clear 
from images of the three damaged columns that the structures did not 
appear to contain the expected amount of steel.

The design, he said, called for running a number of steel bars through the 
slab of the parking deck, at least four of which would thread in each 
direction through each of the columns that held both the garage and the 
rest of the structure on their shoulders. But photos show far fewer 
passing through the columns, he said.

“There does not appear to be enough steel connecting the slab to the 
columns,” Mr. Nair said. “What we see out there seems inconsistent with 
what the drawings show.”

Engineers cautioned that investigators would need to examine the 
components more thoroughly to rule out the possibility that additional 
rebar was present but was sheared off in the fury of the collapse. Mr. 
Nair and other engineers also said it was possible that some bars could 
have been placed very close to the columns’ edges and left little or no 
trace that they had been present.

John Pistorino, a consulting engineer in the Miami area who has been in 
the industry for decades, said that in general, a city building inspector 
or someone hired by the builder would have examined the placement of steel 
before concrete was poured.

It is not clear from immediately available records whether the original 
design of the building met or exceeded building code standards at the time 
of construction in 1981. Most codes around the country have been 
strengthened since then, requiring more steel reinforcement.

Florida’s inspection standards were bolstered in the 1980s after the 
collapse of a building under construction in the city of Cocoa Beach, near 
Orlando. The standards now require the hiring of an independent inspector 
for larger buildings.

The development of the Champlain Towers South project was led by Nattel 
Construction, a firm that has been defunct for 20 years. The company’s 
leader, Nathan Reiber, died in 2014.

In recent years, the Champlain Towers South complex had been in line for 
extensive renovations, with a 2018 engineering report identifying rusting 
steel, crumbling concrete and a flawed pool deck design that would cost 
millions to fix.

So deteriorated was some of the concrete that during an initial repair 
project in October, crews were unable to complete scheduled work around 
the pool. Deterioration had penetrated deep into some components, and 
excavating it could have affected the stability of that part of the 
structure, according to a report from the engineering firm Morabito 
Consultants.

During the collapse, the slab in question at Champlain Towers South, which 
was suspended in part on the three damaged columns that are still visible, 
fell to the parking level, one floor below ground level. Inadequate steel 
“could explain a slab failure — the slab letting go and dropping down,” 
Mr. Nair said. But he said he did not believe the tumbling slab could have 
been the initial cause of the larger collapse.

Still, attention has focused on the area around the parking garage slab 
and pool deck. Video of the collapse suggests that the initial failure 
occurred somewhere near the bottom of the building, where the garage and 
deck are located.

In addition, other video from outside the building, taken shortly before 
the collapse, shows gushing water and what appears to be rubble near the 
entry ramp to the parking garage.

Gabriel Nir, who lived in Apartment 111, on the first floor of the portion 
of the building that collapsed, said he came home before 1 a.m. and 
noticed water pooling at the base of the entry ramp, although that was not 
uncommon. He did not see any rubble at that point, he said in an 
interview.

When he and his mother entered their apartment, they heard banging noises 
that sounded as if they were coming from above.

“We thought people were doing construction,” Mr. Nir said. They initially 
shrugged it off, but it continued for several minutes, growing more 
intense.

Mr. Nir said his mother went to the lobby to complain about the noise. He 
was in the kitchen making food when he heard loud rumbling and saw a cloud 
of dust coming from the area of the pool deck. He and his sister hurried 
to the lobby to join their mother and encouraged a security guard to call 
911.

Then, walking outside, Mr. Nir saw that a part of the ground-level portion 
of the parking garage and pool deck — the part that engineers are now 
scrutinizing — had dropped. He also saw pipes bursting, he said, followed 
eventually by the collapse of about half the building. He and his family 
members ran from the site, surviving even as their condominium was crushed 
at the base of the collapse.

Engineers said it seemed unlikely that having less rebar would trigger a 
collapse in and of itself, even factoring in significant deterioration 
over many years. An inherent safety factor built into most projects would 
mean that a slight reduction in steel content would not necessarily lead 
to disaster.

The rebar in the Champlain Towers South slabs is a complex mesh, with 
crisscrossing sets of long, parallel bars set into a plane near the top of 
the slab and more reinforcement close to the bottom.

Because it is difficult to say which of the lower segments of rebar would 
have gone through columns, and would therefore be visible in the wreckage 
after the slab dropped, some engineers have focused so far on the upper 
bars. The most important clues to what happened are probably still buried 
in the rubble.

“We have a whole bunch of issues that we think might be part of or the 
trigger of what happened,” Mr. Kilsheimer said.

The unexpectedly low amount of rebar visible after the collapse of the 
parking slab was not the only potential problem with steel reinforcement 
that engineers noticed in their initial reviews.

Dawn E. Lehman, a professor of structural engineering at the University of 
Washington, noted that rebar could be seen dangling from parts of the 
remaining structure, pulled clean from the concrete. She said that could 
indicate that in some places, the concrete was damaged and the steel might 
not have had a sufficient bond with the concrete. This could have several 
explanations, she said, including corrosion, concrete deterioration, shear 
damage to the concrete or the use of a type of reinforcing rebar with 
weaker bonding properties.

Mr. Kilsheimer said he hoped to get a closer look at the remainder of the 
building in the coming days, to better assess its components. There have 
been concerns that the remaining structure is a hazard. Mr. Kilsheimer 
said a computer analysis suggested that the northern part of it could be 
at risk of collapse in high winds.

Concrete and steel in the building will eventually be tested, Mr. 
Kilsheimer said, and investigators will go below ground to examine the 
soil and test the area with borings. They will model the building with 
computers and piece together components recovered from the rubble at an 
off-site storage facility.

Solving the mystery, he said, is like starting with several puzzles, 
“throwing them up in the air, mixing them up with a broom, and then trying 
to figure out which piece goes to which puzzle.”



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