Re: [Spam] neodome [Spam] back [Spam] to [Spam] the [Spam] same [Spam] shit.

On 26 Oct 2025, Anonymous User <[email protected]> posted some
news:[email protected]: 

> Stupid Claas wrote:
>>A pretty much lying Fritz Wuehler user wrote:
>>> Nomen Nescio <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> > On 25 Oct 2025, Radio Eriwan <[email protected]> posted
>>> > some news:[email protected]: 
>>> > 
>>> > > Fritz Wuehler once wrote, without thinking too much beforehand:
>>> > > > Radio Claashole <[email protected]> sent:
>>> > > > > A stupid YAMN user wrote:
>>> > > > > > Nomen Nescio <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > On 24 Oct 2025, Anonymous <[email protected]>
>>> > > > > > > posted some
>>> > > > > > > news:[email protected]: 
>>> > > > > > > 
>>> > > > > > > > [Spam] same [Spam] censoring [Spam] shit [Spam]
>>> > > > > > > > different [Spam]. 
>>> > > > > > > > 
>>> > > > > > > > Apparently it's okay for a particular sporging asshole
>>> > > > > > > > to destroy groups and services for all, but not okay
>>> > > > > > > > to use YAMN / neodome to counter the jerk.
>>> > > > > > > 
>>> > > > > > > yamn is not so anonymous after all.  
>>> > > > > > > 
>>> > > > > > > what does that say about "anonymous messaging" hmm?
>>> > > > > > 
>>> > > > > > Tor is an unsecure real-time system.
>>> > > > > > Type I remailing fails to hide message size.
>>> > > > > > Only Type II remailing (Mixmaster / YAMN) is secure!
>>> > > > > > 
>>> > > > > 
>>> > > > > Did you know that YAMN/OmniMix users are the dumbest Usenet
>>> > > > > users? 
>>> > > > 
>>> > > >   We just know that you, fascist Claas, and your buddy GabX
>>> > > >   are the 
>>> > > > stupidest snake oil peddlers over here ignoring even the most
>>> > > > basic principles of secure anonymous remailing. Good luck to
>>> > > > your victims. 
>>> > > > 
>>> > > 
>>> > > Ah, ok. So pseudonymous remailing with Mixmaster and YAMN, in
>>> > > your eyes, is secure 'anonymous' remailing. Mind you, you must
>>> > > use Tor or you would shit in your pants without it. So much for
>>> > > TypeII 'anonymous' remailing. 
>>> > 
>>> > It all works with Tor.   No Tor, no work.  
>>> 
>>> Remailers don't need Tor at all.  Tor was developed long after the
>>> invention of anonymous remailing in order to have something similar
>>> for from the anonymity perspective inherently problematic real-time
>>> (web) communication.
>>> 
>>> You send some packets to the entry remailer and nobody can figure
>>> out which mail message at some exit remailer they represent, if any,
>>> as you just may have sent dummy packets. That isn't pseudonymity,
>>> it's true anonymity no matter what shithead Claas tells you.
>>> 
>>
>>I think you are the liar and real shithead! Why? Because these
>>pseudonymous remailers are publicity run and known as old fashioned
>>TypeII clearnet smtp networks where Eve and her friends only need to
>>append the secret keys from remailers, to decrypt the incomming
>>messages at an entry.  This can be done with gag orders. If you would
>>know how the internals work from such old and outdated TypeII
>>technology you would not speak such rubbish. 
> 
> The same BS once again?  Really?  For how long will you play that
> game? 
> 
> First of all, when you need your anonymizers to be anonymous
> themselves then you have a really severe problem.  And those who have
> to trust in your shadow gang are in even bigger trouble.
> 
> And how will you get the private keys and passphrases of all remailers
> worldwide to compromize remailer chains, as that's what you have to
> achieve?  Dumbo, with Type II remailing there are no timing or message
> size correlation attacks or further vulnerabilities your light-weight
> Tor network suffers from.
> 
>>
>>And secondly when looking at the pools Eve and her friends see in
>>clear the remailer packets and the To: header, 
> 
> The packet's To: header after removing the current remailer's
> encryption layer aka its next remailer stop has to be known.  How else
> will you forward it?

An IP packet doesn't have a "To:" header, it has source and destination
fields.

>> while messages at exits are held in an
>>decrypted state.
> 
> Once again, how can an exit remailer forward the original message to
> its final destination when it doesn't restore it?

The arriving message header is stripped, the destination retained.  The 
messge body remains encrypted.