Re: Have you ever disabled IPv6 for privacy (to prevent IP leaks)?
Maria Sophia <[email protected]> Mon, 20 Jul 2026 01:57:18 -0400
| Newsgroups | alt.comp.os.windows-10,alt.comp.microsoft.windows,alt.comp.os.windows-11 |
|---|---|
| Organization | BWH Usenet Archive (https://usenet.blueworldhosting.com) |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Holy shit!. This is profound... topology determines privacy!
Chrome, Firefox, Edge, whatever... all are IPv6-first nowadays.
Yet those browsers can only leak IPv6 if the client has a global IPv6
address. A bridged router ensures it never does.
Modern web browsers can directly use our PCs IPv6 address such that
a. A PC web browser using its own Wi-Fi NIC can leak IPv6, but...
b. A PC web browser using a router-as-Wi-Fi bridge cannot leak IPv6!
Jesus Christ. This is really big in terms of instant IPV6 privacy!
The IPV6 privacy comes from architecture, not configuration.
I only just now realized this stupendous revelation after digging through
the wreckage, that if we simply pair our PC RJ45 with a router acting as a
wireless bridge (instead of using the internal wi-fi card), I think we may
instantly solve the IPV6 privacy problem without the complexity of 0x20
DisabledComponents.
By using RJ45 for Wi-Fi, the PC no longer has a Wi-Fi IPv6 stack to leak!
The PC web browser cannot leak IPv6 because the browser cannot see IPv6.
It sees only IPv4, Ethernet and fe80:: (local-only, which is unusable).
*There is nothing for the PC web browser to leak* .
Even taking the specific case of torrrenting over VPN leaking an IPv6
address, the leak happens when the PC has a global IPv6 address coupled
with a free VPN that does not tunnel IPv6, tied to a torrent client that
uses IPv6 anyway.
In that scenario, the real IPv6 address escapes outside the VPN tunnel.
The *source* of those leaks, interestingly, is the internal Wi-Fi NIC.
Wi-Fi interfaces in Windows automatically generate:
a. global IPv6 addresses
b. temporary IPv6 privacy addresses
c. IPv6 DNS queries
d. IPv6 fallback routes
e. IPv6 autoconfiguration
f. IPv6 neighbor discovery
g. IPv6 tunnels (Teredo, ISATAP, 6to4)
Such that, even if we think we're not using IPv6, Windows is.
With an Ethernet-connected-router acting as a wireless bridge, the PC
thinks it's using Ethernet only, and Ethernet IPv6 is:
a. link-local only (fe80::)
b. not routable
c. not global
d. not visible outside our LAN
e. not used by VPNs
f. not used by torrent clients
g. not used by browsers
Hence, as far as I know, a link-local IPv6 address cannot leak.
And, in my case, the circa 2007 DD-WRT router (WNR834Bv2) is too old to
support real IPv6 so it is physically incapable of participating in IPv6.
No global IPv6 on the client means no IPv6 leak.
A bridge guarantees exactly that.
What's philosophically brilliant is that even with a fully intact IPv6
stack, and even with a modern router acting as a wireless bridge, the same
privacy advantage still holds.
This is a deep lesson to be learned when it comes to IPv6 Wi-Fi privacy.
Even if we use a modern router as a Wi-Fi bridge, our PC will not leak IPv6
(even if our PC's IPv6 stack is fully enabled and untouched) because the
router becomes the IPv6 endpoint, not the PC.
The PC instantly becomes an IPv4-only box behind the router's decisions.
This is the surprisingly elegant architectural magic of bridging.
We achieve privacy not by fighting complexity, but by employing simplicity.
--
Windows IPv6 leaks vanish when the PC stops participating in IPv6 routing.