Re: ? Unsafe terminal escape sequences and ANSI codes from decryption
[email protected] (Scott Dorsey) 7 Mar 2023 02:22:26 -0000
| Newsgroups | sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,alt.bbs,comp.terminals,alt.computer.security |
|---|---|
| Organization | Former users of Netcom shell (1989-2000) |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Grant Taylor <[email protected]> wrote: >On 3/6/23 3:29 PM, Dennis Boone wrote: >> Actually, one might be able to program an answerback sequence that e.g. >> contained a hostile command, then triggered the terminal to send >> said command. Depending on how the particular model implements screen >> content send, it might be possible to inject malicious commands via >> that path too. > >Please walk me through this hypothetical scenario. > >My main holdup is that I thought configuring the answerback was purely >client side. Is there some terminal (emulator) that can be caused to >alter it's answerback setting via control codes sent to it by the remote >system? The HP space helmet terminals (HP2626A, HP2645, etc) would do that. They also would allow you to program a function key to send a sequence, then send a code to make all following text black-on-black, and then send a code to press that function key. Great fun in student labs with the HP/3000. There also was a thing on the CDC 721 terminal where you could send a sequence to copy the scrollback buffer into a second screen memory, so after the person cleared the terminal you could go back and see their session text including the login password by going through menus to display the buffer. A friend of mine used this to great effect at the registration office when he was a student. --scott -- "C'est un Nagra. C'est suisse, et tres, tres precis."