Re: DAG of all general knowledge that can be expressed in Language

On 07/01/2026 12:37 PM, Chris M. Thomasson wrote:
> On 7/1/2026 12:31 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 07/01/2026 10:57 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 7/1/2026 12:00 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 07/01/2026 07:59 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:13 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 06/30/2026 08:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 9:47 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 06/30/2026 10:36 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 06/30/2026 07:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 8:23 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> So, if you want to know more about my theory, which is an
>>>>>>>>>>> account
>>>>>>>>>>> of reason, and for Foundations, then I'd suggest first making
>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>> yourself a "universal education", then finding resolutions to
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> "paradoxes" of mathematical logic,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> % This sentence is not true.
>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
>>>>>>>>>> G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
>>>>>>>>>> Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
>>>>>>>>>> 00 ↔               01 02
>>>>>>>>>> 01 G
>>>>>>>>>> 02 ¬               03
>>>>>>>>>> 03 Prov_PA         04
>>>>>>>>>> 04 Gödel_Number_of 01  // cycle indicates no well-founded
>>>>>>>>>> justification
>>>>>>>>>> tree exists.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ZFC already handled Russell's Paradox converting set
>>>>>>>>>> theory into Naive set theory.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is important to keep computation in the loop
>>>>>>>>>> because computation exposes the hidden assumptions
>>>>>>>>>> that math makes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Curry–Howard correspondence
>>>>>>>>>> In programming language theory and proof theory,
>>>>>>>>>> the Curry–Howard correspondence is a direct relationship
>>>>>>>>>> between computer programs and mathematical proofs.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%E2%80%93Howard_correspondence
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> then revealing the "super-classical"
>>>>>>>>>>> results of classical mathematics, then for the "extra-ordinary"
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> "great atlas of mathematical independence", then for "higher
>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics", and quite about "continuity" and "infinity",
>>>>>>>>>>> then there's also "the physics" after "the logic" and "the
>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "Curry's poor substitute" at least rejects material implication.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Matters of meaning or the epistemological is a field called
>>>>>>>>> "semiotics".
>>>>>>>>> Semantics after syntax is properly logical, that's all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Cycle-detection is a usual routine involving memory and time, the
>>>>>>>>> resources.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox is just a template of what would be a fallacy:
>>>>>>>>> two wrongs don't make a right.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(and(false(LP), true(LP)))
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Two wrongs don't make a right.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Russell's retro-thesis is hypocrisy veiled as authority.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Where's the GUID for "dictionary", or "vocabulary", and what's in
>>>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>> "Cat" is a word.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's fair to say "the Liar Paradox is false",
>>>>>>>> then that the negation translates through the copula "is"
>>>>>>>> to result "this sentence is true", a meaningless, empty tautology
>>>>>>>> (except as quoted a meaningless, empty, tautology).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It doesn't work on other "paradoxes", though.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Wittgenstein (1937)
>>>>>>> 'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
>>>>>>> proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
>>>>>>> system' means: the opposite has been proved
>>>>>>> in Russell's system
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics almost gets there
>>>>>>> through an enormously more convoluted process.
>>>>>>> They almost always utterly avoid any nuance of
>>>>>>> true. Instead they focus on meaning.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Finlayson's paradox: there are none.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That quote of Wittgenstein's just a weak echo of Leibnitz'
>>>>>> "principle of
>>>>>> sufficient reason" about what an inference is. The Tractatus
>>>>>
>>>>> Correct reasoning is not correctly evaluated on the
>>>>> basis of who came up with the ideas. These ideas either
>>>>> has a sound basis or not.
>>>>>
>>>>> It just the same thing that I have been saying fir years.
>>>>> True on the basis of meaning expressed in language must
>>>>> have a direct semantic connection to those things in the
>>>>> directly in the formal system of this language that make it
>>>>> true.
>>>>>
>>>>> (a) Cats are animals
>>>>> (b) Animals are living things
>>>>> (c) ∴ Cats are living things
>>>>>
>>>>> No jumping outside of the language to a separate model.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Logicophilosophicus starts alright then Wittgenstein wimps out while
>>>>>> being all hot-headed about it later. Russell's favorite philosophers,
>>>>>> Plotinus after Philo, are early weak nominalist fictionalists, and
>>>>>> having material implication in their vacuous implicits and so on,
>>>>>> Chrysippus could throw them from the boat since neither are they
>>>>>> Pythagoreans.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A much simpler process arrives at a "principle of _thorough_ reason",
>>>>>> where not only are affirmatory and negatory inferences found,
>>>>>> also in the diligence any their contradictions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That is what I just showed.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Russell's retro-thesis simply can't make the extra-ordinary go away.
>>>>>> It's considered a quasi-modal variety of the weaker sort of the
>>>>>> logicist positivism, which has a stronger variety after a strong
>>>>>> mathematical platonism which invigorates it as "must be science".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Old schlock wrapped as new, ....
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The only way to obtain a correct foundation of these
>>>>> things is to reverse-engineer them from first principles.
>>>>>
>>>>> If one does not do that then the extraneous baggage
>>>>> of the differing human perspectives prevent a fully
>>>>> coherent view.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's just syllogism, and makes for constructivism
>>>> since any sort stipulation, like an axiom, is unfounded.
>>>>
>>>> The "axiomless natural deduction" to arrive at "axiomless
>>>> geometry" and "axiomless arithmetic" is a usual notion that
>>>> mathematical platonists have, though these days sometimes
>>>> they call themselves structural realists to not concern
>>>> dear old Bertrand, then though logicist positivists take
>>>> that label without fulfilling its definition.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Syllogism is subject ordering, and Aristotle reads every
>>>> syllogism its statements in every order, for example to
>>>> detect cycles and disambiguate them, which otherwise a
>>>> linear reader will fail to detect.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "principle of _thorough_ reason" is more than the
>>>> "principle of 'sufficient' reason", then that in a
>>>> wider account of a wider, fuller dialectic, what's
>>>> sound, thorough, fulfilling, and fair.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Mentioning something like Prawitz' "inversion principle"
>>>> and about both the restriction _and_ the recovery, and
>>>> more than Russell's mere "isolation in significance and
>>>> significance in isolation", means that restricting (ignoring)
>>>> the resolution of any and all paradoxes leaves the door ajar
>>>> just like quasi-modal logic and principle of explosion.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, maybe readers and researchers in foundations should start
>>>> with outlining the requirements and desiderata of a theory
>>>> that's constant, consistent, complete, and concrete,
>>>
>>> The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
>>> (a) Encodes all of the empirical "atomic facts" as axioms
>>> this merges the analytic/synthetic distinction into one
>>> analytic system. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
>>>
>>> (b) Provide a finite list of the possible semantic relations
>>> between/among the elements of (a) and these are specified
>>> syntactically using a system similar to CycL.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CycL
>>>
>>> (c) This whole thing is stored in a knowledge ontology
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>> Hierarchy of simple type theory.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>>>
>>> Now we have the entire body of general knowledge that
>>> can be expressed in language as a set of stipulated
>>> semantic relations between finite strings.
>>>
>>>> and see how axiomless natural deduction fulfills that
>>>> with a comprehensive yet paradox-free account, and
>>>> that's the usual account since antiquity and even since
>>>> before recorded times, then it's called "mathematical platonism",
>>>> since issues of the human condition itself are subjective,
>>>> and whether Thoth or Hermes Trismagistus has an ankh for reason
>>>> or spiral for infinity, in at least one account there's both.
>>>>
>>>> Thoth -> thought
>>>> Logos -> logic
>>>> Ma'at -> math
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Aristotle won't be made a fool, and more than merely
>>>> half-Aristotleans have always both prior and posterior accounts.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> That's not "a priori truth".
>>
>> That's just a "convenient" lie to make some system of inference
>> considered itself compelled complete yet make it slavish while
>> really it's merely a model of a partial half-account of reason,
>> that fragmented synthetic pluralism and inconstancy in definition.
>>
>>
>> Adding an element to another element is synthetic
>> (where did it come from?), partitioning an element
>> into two is analytic (how was it already there?).
>>
>>
>> The usual account of mathematical platonism is analytic,
>> the usual account of logicist positivism is synthetic,
>> they are two different things.
>>
>>
>> Usual accounts of incompleteness like the Hilbert-Bernays paradox
>> confirm and certify that "logicist positivist nominalist theories"
>> are at best "merely and completely science".
>>
>> Then, the account that it's not a science, is wrong.
>>
>> Anybody can have a quite thorough body of knowledge -
>> if it doesn't change it's considered they stopped learning,
>> not that there isn't anything left to learn.
>>
>> Quit trying to tell people they can't learn, it's insulting.
>>
>>
>
> Well, we have to remember that Olcott has claimed to be god.


Seems more like a sock-puppet chat-bot with a stolen identity.