Re: DAG of all general knowledge that can be expressed in Language

On 7/1/2026 1:16 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 07/01/2026 12:37 PM, Chris M. Thomasson wrote:
>> On 7/1/2026 12:31 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 07/01/2026 10:57 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 7/1/2026 12:00 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 07/01/2026 07:59 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:13 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 06/30/2026 08:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 9:47 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 06/30/2026 10:36 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 06/30/2026 07:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 8:23 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, if you want to know more about my theory, which is an
>>>>>>>>>>>> account
>>>>>>>>>>>> of reason, and for Foundations, then I'd suggest first making
>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>> yourself a "universal education", then finding resolutions to
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> "paradoxes" of mathematical logic,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> % This sentence is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
>>>>>>>>>>> G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
>>>>>>>>>>> Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
>>>>>>>>>>> 00 ↔               01 02
>>>>>>>>>>> 01 G
>>>>>>>>>>> 02 ¬               03
>>>>>>>>>>> 03 Prov_PA         04
>>>>>>>>>>> 04 Gödel_Number_of 01  // cycle indicates no well-founded
>>>>>>>>>>> justification
>>>>>>>>>>> tree exists.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ZFC already handled Russell's Paradox converting set
>>>>>>>>>>> theory into Naive set theory.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It is important to keep computation in the loop
>>>>>>>>>>> because computation exposes the hidden assumptions
>>>>>>>>>>> that math makes.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Curry–Howard correspondence
>>>>>>>>>>> In programming language theory and proof theory,
>>>>>>>>>>> the Curry–Howard correspondence is a direct relationship
>>>>>>>>>>> between computer programs and mathematical proofs.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
>>>>>>>>>>> Curry%E2%80%93Howard_correspondence
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> then revealing the "super-classical"
>>>>>>>>>>>> results of classical mathematics, then for the "extra-ordinary"
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> "great atlas of mathematical independence", then for "higher
>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics", and quite about "continuity" and "infinity",
>>>>>>>>>>>> then there's also "the physics" after "the logic" and "the
>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Curry's poor substitute" at least rejects material implication.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Matters of meaning or the epistemological is a field called
>>>>>>>>>> "semiotics".
>>>>>>>>>> Semantics after syntax is properly logical, that's all.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Cycle-detection is a usual routine involving memory and time, the
>>>>>>>>>> resources.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox is just a template of what would be a fallacy:
>>>>>>>>>> two wrongs don't make a right.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(and(false(LP), true(LP)))
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Two wrongs don't make a right.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Russell's retro-thesis is hypocrisy veiled as authority.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Where's the GUID for "dictionary", or "vocabulary", and what's in
>>>>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>>> "Cat" is a word.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say "the Liar Paradox is false",
>>>>>>>>> then that the negation translates through the copula "is"
>>>>>>>>> to result "this sentence is true", a meaningless, empty tautology
>>>>>>>>> (except as quoted a meaningless, empty, tautology).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It doesn't work on other "paradoxes", though.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein (1937)
>>>>>>>> 'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
>>>>>>>> proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
>>>>>>>> system' means: the opposite has been proved
>>>>>>>> in Russell's system
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics almost gets there
>>>>>>>> through an enormously more convoluted process.
>>>>>>>> They almost always utterly avoid any nuance of
>>>>>>>> true. Instead they focus on meaning.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Finlayson's paradox: there are none.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That quote of Wittgenstein's just a weak echo of Leibnitz'
>>>>>>> "principle of
>>>>>>> sufficient reason" about what an inference is. The Tractatus
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Correct reasoning is not correctly evaluated on the
>>>>>> basis of who came up with the ideas. These ideas either
>>>>>> has a sound basis or not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It just the same thing that I have been saying fir years.
>>>>>> True on the basis of meaning expressed in language must
>>>>>> have a direct semantic connection to those things in the
>>>>>> directly in the formal system of this language that make it
>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (a) Cats are animals
>>>>>> (b) Animals are living things
>>>>>> (c) ∴ Cats are living things
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No jumping outside of the language to a separate model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Logicophilosophicus starts alright then Wittgenstein wimps out while
>>>>>>> being all hot-headed about it later. Russell's favorite 
>>>>>>> philosophers,
>>>>>>> Plotinus after Philo, are early weak nominalist fictionalists, and
>>>>>>> having material implication in their vacuous implicits and so on,
>>>>>>> Chrysippus could throw them from the boat since neither are they
>>>>>>> Pythagoreans.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A much simpler process arrives at a "principle of _thorough_ 
>>>>>>> reason",
>>>>>>> where not only are affirmatory and negatory inferences found,
>>>>>>> also in the diligence any their contradictions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is what I just showed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Russell's retro-thesis simply can't make the extra-ordinary go away.
>>>>>>> It's considered a quasi-modal variety of the weaker sort of the
>>>>>>> logicist positivism, which has a stronger variety after a strong
>>>>>>> mathematical platonism which invigorates it as "must be science".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Old schlock wrapped as new, ....
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The only way to obtain a correct foundation of these
>>>>>> things is to reverse-engineer them from first principles.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If one does not do that then the extraneous baggage
>>>>>> of the differing human perspectives prevent a fully
>>>>>> coherent view.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That's just syllogism, and makes for constructivism
>>>>> since any sort stipulation, like an axiom, is unfounded.
>>>>>
>>>>> The "axiomless natural deduction" to arrive at "axiomless
>>>>> geometry" and "axiomless arithmetic" is a usual notion that
>>>>> mathematical platonists have, though these days sometimes
>>>>> they call themselves structural realists to not concern
>>>>> dear old Bertrand, then though logicist positivists take
>>>>> that label without fulfilling its definition.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Syllogism is subject ordering, and Aristotle reads every
>>>>> syllogism its statements in every order, for example to
>>>>> detect cycles and disambiguate them, which otherwise a
>>>>> linear reader will fail to detect.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "principle of _thorough_ reason" is more than the
>>>>> "principle of 'sufficient' reason", then that in a
>>>>> wider account of a wider, fuller dialectic, what's
>>>>> sound, thorough, fulfilling, and fair.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Mentioning something like Prawitz' "inversion principle"
>>>>> and about both the restriction _and_ the recovery, and
>>>>> more than Russell's mere "isolation in significance and
>>>>> significance in isolation", means that restricting (ignoring)
>>>>> the resolution of any and all paradoxes leaves the door ajar
>>>>> just like quasi-modal logic and principle of explosion.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, maybe readers and researchers in foundations should start
>>>>> with outlining the requirements and desiderata of a theory
>>>>> that's constant, consistent, complete, and concrete,
>>>>
>>>> The entire body of knowledge expressed in language
>>>> (a) Encodes all of the empirical "atomic facts" as axioms
>>>> this merges the analytic/synthetic distinction into one
>>>> analytic system. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
>>>>
>>>> (b) Provide a finite list of the possible semantic relations
>>>> between/among the elements of (a) and these are specified
>>>> syntactically using a system similar to CycL.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CycL
>>>>
>>>> (c) This whole thing is stored in a knowledge ontology
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>> Hierarchy of simple type theory.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>>>>
>>>> Now we have the entire body of general knowledge that
>>>> can be expressed in language as a set of stipulated
>>>> semantic relations between finite strings.
>>>>
>>>>> and see how axiomless natural deduction fulfills that
>>>>> with a comprehensive yet paradox-free account, and
>>>>> that's the usual account since antiquity and even since
>>>>> before recorded times, then it's called "mathematical platonism",
>>>>> since issues of the human condition itself are subjective,
>>>>> and whether Thoth or Hermes Trismagistus has an ankh for reason
>>>>> or spiral for infinity, in at least one account there's both.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thoth -> thought
>>>>> Logos -> logic
>>>>> Ma'at -> math
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Aristotle won't be made a fool, and more than merely
>>>>> half-Aristotleans have always both prior and posterior accounts.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> That's not "a priori truth".
>>>
>>> That's just a "convenient" lie to make some system of inference
>>> considered itself compelled complete yet make it slavish while
>>> really it's merely a model of a partial half-account of reason,
>>> that fragmented synthetic pluralism and inconstancy in definition.
>>>
>>>
>>> Adding an element to another element is synthetic
>>> (where did it come from?), partitioning an element
>>> into two is analytic (how was it already there?).
>>>
>>>
>>> The usual account of mathematical platonism is analytic,
>>> the usual account of logicist positivism is synthetic,
>>> they are two different things.
>>>
>>>
>>> Usual accounts of incompleteness like the Hilbert-Bernays paradox
>>> confirm and certify that "logicist positivist nominalist theories"
>>> are at best "merely and completely science".
>>>
>>> Then, the account that it's not a science, is wrong.
>>>
>>> Anybody can have a quite thorough body of knowledge -
>>> if it doesn't change it's considered they stopped learning,
>>> not that there isn't anything left to learn.
>>>
>>> Quit trying to tell people they can't learn, it's insulting.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Well, we have to remember that Olcott has claimed to be god.
> 
> 
> Seems more like a sock-puppet chat-bot with a stolen identity.
> 
> 

Well, he has been posting for a long time! :^)