Re: William T. Parry gets rid of Disjunction introduction

On 07/06/2026 08:28 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2026-07-06 21:12, olcott wrote:
>> On 7/6/2026 10:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2026-07-06 20:44, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 7/6/2026 9:41 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2026-07-06 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> ∀x(φ(x) ∧ ¬φ(x)) ⊢ ⊥
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>         Γ ⊢ ⊥
>>>>>> --------------------
>>>>>> derivation terminated
>>>>>
>>>>> That's simply gibberish.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How do you think that:
>>>>  From a contradiction nothing follows
>>>> should be encoded?
>>>
>>> Since you don't understand the formalism you're trying to use, why
>>> bother trying to formalize it?
>>
>> Both LLMs agree that I am already correct.
>
> LLMs carry no weight in my opinion. And since you can't clearly express
> yourself, it wouldn't be clear exactly what they were agreeing with
> anyways.
>
>>> You can simply state it in English. but what you're stating is simply
>>> false.
>>
>> I am overriding and superseding the psychotic break
>> from reality of the principle of explosion.
>> Numerous famous logicians have done this same
>> thing in several different ways.
>
> They've done it by adopting paraconsistent logics which raise their own
> set of problems. Most importantly, though, none of them have claimed to
> have removed the principle of explosion from classical logic.
>
>>> The fact that *anything* follows from a contradiction
>>
>> Is totally fucked up nonsense that only a psychotic
>> would not reject in less than three seconds.
>
> Since the overwhelming majority of logicians accept this having spent
> far more than three seconds contemplating it, you might want to
> reconsider your position. You really should contemplate the possibility
> that you have misunderstood the topic.
>
>>> isn't some axiom that can be removed from standard logic and replaced
>>> with something else. It's a consequence of the basic definitions used.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> That breaks the coherence notion of truth.
>
> No, it does not.
>
> André
>

I do, I say that classical logic since Chrysippus, with Aristotle,
is a modal, temporal, relevance logic: that "classical quasi-modal
logic" since Philo and Plotinus and usually in the classroom since the
20'th century is _not_.

Somebody like Richard McKeon reflects on this in his account of Aristotle.


Then, "paraconsistent" or "non-classical logics" have that the
di-aletheic is just an account of a setting for resolving inductive
paradox, not accommodating it. I.e., when "non-classical" or
"synthetic" or "pluralistic" logics are mutually inconsistent,
they're mutually inconsistent.



I've never accepted material implication since Philo and Plotinus,
and direct implication from the likes of Augustus de Morgan is
quite suitable for all logical purposes.


So, here there's a principle of inversion, sort of like what's
suggested by the recent talk about Prawitz and inversion principle,
and not tertium-non-datur and excluded-middle, since there are
non-binary propositions, and the account of weighing alternatives
itself is tertium-datur.


Then, there's a principle of thorough reason, beyond a principle
of "sufficient" reason, that like inverse subsumes and is sublime,
per Kant, for non-contradiction, then the thorough is: sufficient.


So, I remove the "quasi-modal" from classical logic,
and explosion goes with it.