Re: [PR] fix: add bounds check before memcpy in apr_buffer.c [apr-util]

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Very similar to https://github.com/apache/apr/pull/73

I'm inclined to just close this as "by design". However it seems I'm not
able to close a PR in GitHub, I only have "comment". Is this just me? Maybe
that is because I've changed by GitHub username.

Cheers,
Daniel


Den tis 23 juni 2026 kl 04:10 skrev orbisai0security (via GitHub) <
[email protected]>:

>
> orbisai0security opened a new pull request, #16:
> URL: https://github.com/apache/apr-util/pull/16
>
>    ## Summary
>    Fix critical severity security issue in `buffer/apr_buffer.c`.
>
>    ## Vulnerability
>    | Field | Value |
>    |-------|-------|
>    | **ID** | V-001 |
>    | **Severity** | CRITICAL |
>    | **Scanner** | multi_agent_ai |
>    | **Rule** | `V-001` |
>    | **File** | `buffer/apr_buffer.c:240` |
>    | **Assessment** | Confirmed exploitable |
>
>    **Description**: Multiple memcpy operations in apr_buffer.c copy data
> without validating that the destination buffer has sufficient capacity. T=
he
> code assumes the allocated buffer is large enough but doesn't verify the
> size parameter against destination buffer bounds.
>
>    ## Evidence
>
>    **Exploitation scenario**: An attacker who can control the 'size'
> parameter or the source data passed to apr_buffer_arraydup() or other
> buffer functions can cause buffer overflow.
>
>    **Scanner confirmation**: multi_agent_ai rule `V-001` flagged this
> pattern.
>
>    **Production code**: This file is in the production codebase, not
> test-only code.
>
>    ## Threat Model Context
>
>    This is a local CLI tool - exploitation requires the attacker to
> control command-line arguments or input files.
>
>    ## Changes
>    - Security fix applied
>
>    > **Note**: The following lines in the same file use a similar pattern
> and may also need review: `buffer/apr_buffer.c:255`,
> `buffer/apr_buffer.c:299`, `buffer/apr_buffer.c:385`,
> `buffer/apr_buffer.c:390`, `buffer/apr_buffer.c:395`
>
>    ## Verification
>    - [x] Build passes
>    - [x] Scanner re-scan confirms fix
>    - [x] LLM code review passed
>
>    ## Security Invariant
>    > **Property**: The security boundary is maintained under adversarial
> input
>
>    <details>
>    <summary>Regression test</summary>
>
>    ```c
>    #include <check.h>
>    #include <stdlib.h>
>    #include <string.h>
>    #include "buffer/apr_buffer.h"
>
>    START_TEST(test_apr_buffer_arraydup_bounds_check)
>    {
>        // Invariant: apr_buffer_arraydup must not write beyond allocated
> destination buffer bounds
>        // regardless of input size values
>
>        // Payloads: exploit case (size causing overflow), boundary case
> (zero size), valid input
>        struct {
>            apr_size_t size;
>            int zero_terminated;
>            int nelts;
>            const char *description;
>        } test_cases[] =3D {
>            {SIZE_MAX, 1, 2, "exploit: size + zero_terminated causes
> overflow"},
>            {0, 0, 1, "boundary: zero size"},
>            {1024, 0, 3, "valid: normal operation"}
>        };
>
>        int num_cases =3D sizeof(test_cases) / sizeof(test_cases[0]);
>
>        for (int i =3D 0; i < num_cases; i++) {
>            // Create source buffer array
>            apr_buffer_t *src_array =3D malloc(test_cases[i].nelts *
> sizeof(apr_buffer_t));
>            ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(src_array);
>
>            // Initialize source buffers with test data
>            for (int j =3D 0; j < test_cases[i].nelts; j++) {
>                src_array[j].size =3D test_cases[i].size;
>                src_array[j].zero_terminated =3D
> test_cases[i].zero_terminated;
>
>                // Allocate source memory if size > 0
>                if (test_cases[i].size > 0) {
>                    src_array[j].d.mem =3D malloc(test_cases[i].size);
>                    ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(src_array[j].d.mem);
>                    memset(src_array[j].d.mem, 'A', test_cases[i].size);
>                } else {
>                    src_array[j].d.mem =3D NULL;
>                }
>            }
>
>            // Test the actual function
>            apr_buffer_t *dst_array =3D NULL;
>            apr_status_t result =3D apr_buffer_arraydup(&dst_array,
> src_array,
>
>  (apr_buffer_alloc)malloc, NULL,
>                                                      test_cases[i].nelts)=
;
>
>            // Property: Function must either succeed with valid buffers o=
r
> fail gracefully
>            // without writing beyond allocated memory bounds
>            if (result =3D=3D APR_SUCCESS) {
>                ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(dst_array);
>
>                // Verify each destination buffer was properly allocated
>                for (int j =3D 0; j < test_cases[i].nelts; j++) {
>                    if (test_cases[i].size + test_cases[i].zero_terminated
> > 0) {
>                        ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(dst_array[j].d.mem);
>                    }
>                    ck_assert_uint_eq(dst_array[j].size,
> test_cases[i].size);
>                    ck_assert_int_eq(dst_array[j].zero_terminated,
> test_cases[i].zero_terminated);
>                }
>
>                // Clean up destination
>                for (int j =3D 0; j < test_cases[i].nelts; j++) {
>                    if (dst_array[j].d.mem) {
>                        free(dst_array[j].d.mem);
>                    }
>                }
>                free(dst_array);
>            } else {
>                // If function failed, ensure no partial writes corrupted
> memory
>                ck_assert_ptr_null(dst_array);
>            }
>
>            // Clean up source
>            for (int j =3D 0; j < test_cases[i].nelts; j++) {
>                if (src_array[j].d.mem) {
>                    free(src_array[j].d.mem);
>                }
>            }
>            free(src_array);
>        }
>    }
>    END_TEST
>
>    Suite *security_suite(void)
>    {
>        Suite *s;
>        TCase *tc_core;
>
>        s =3D suite_create("Security");
>        tc_core =3D tcase_create("Core");
>
>        tcase_add_test(tc_core, test_apr_buffer_arraydup_bounds_check);
>        suite_add_tcase(s, tc_core);
>
>        return s;
>    }
>
>    int main(void)
>    {
>        int number_failed;
>        Suite *s;
>        SRunner *sr;
>
>        s =3D security_suite();
>        sr =3D srunner_create(s);
>
>        srunner_run_all(sr, CK_NORMAL);
>        number_failed =3D srunner_ntests_failed(sr);
>        srunner_free(sr);
>
>        return (number_failed =3D=3D 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
>    }
>    ```
>
>    </details>
>
>    This test guards against regressions =E2=80=94 it's useful independent=
 of the
> code change above.
>
>    ---
>    *Automated security fix by [OrbisAI Security](https://orbisappsec.com)=
*
>
>
>
> --
> This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service.
> To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the
> URL above to go to the specific comment.
>
> To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected]
>
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>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Very similar to <a href=3D"https://github.com/apache/=
apr/pull/73">https://github.com/apache/apr/pull/73</a></div><div><br></div>=
<div><span style=3D"background-color:transparent">I&#39;m inclined to just =
close this as &quot;by design&quot;. However it seems I&#39;m not able to c=
lose a PR in GitHub, I only have &quot;comment&quot;. Is this just me? Mayb=
e that is because I&#39;ve changed by GitHub username.</span></div><div><br=
></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Daniel</div><div><br></div></div><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_at=
tr">Den tis 23 juni 2026 kl 04:10 skrev orbisai0security (via GitHub) &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
orbisai0security opened a new pull request, #16:<br>
URL: <a href=3D"https://github.com/apache/apr-util/pull/16" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/apache/apr-util/pull/16</a><br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0## Summary<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Fix critical severity security issue in `buffer/apr_buffer.c`.=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0## Vulnerability<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0| Field | Value |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0|-------|-------|<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0| **ID** | V-001 |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0| **Severity** | CRITICAL |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0| **Scanner** | multi_agent_ai |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0| **Rule** | `V-001` |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0| **File** | `buffer/apr_buffer.c:240` |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0| **Assessment** | Confirmed exploitable |<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0**Description**: Multiple memcpy operations in apr_buffer.c co=
py data without validating that the destination buffer has sufficient capac=
ity. The code assumes the allocated buffer is large enough but doesn&#39;t =
verify the size parameter against destination buffer bounds.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0## Evidence<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0**Exploitation scenario**: An attacker who can control the &#3=
9;size&#39; parameter or the source data passed to apr_buffer_arraydup() or=
 other buffer functions can cause buffer overflow.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0**Scanner confirmation**: multi_agent_ai rule `V-001` flagged =
this pattern.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0**Production code**: This file is in the production codebase, =
not test-only code.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0## Threat Model Context<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This is a local CLI tool - exploitation requires the attacker =
to control command-line arguments or input files.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0## Changes<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0- Security fix applied<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; **Note**: The following lines in the same file use a simi=
lar pattern and may also need review: `buffer/apr_buffer.c:255`, `buffer/ap=
r_buffer.c:299`, `buffer/apr_buffer.c:385`, `buffer/apr_buffer.c:390`, `buf=
fer/apr_buffer.c:395`<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0## Verification<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0- [x] Build passes<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0- [x] Scanner re-scan confirms fix<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0- [x] LLM code review passed<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0## Security Invariant<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; **Property**: The security boundary is maintained under a=
dversarial input<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;details&gt;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;summary&gt;Regression test&lt;/summary&gt;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0```c<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0#include &lt;check.h&gt;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0#include &lt;string.h&gt;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0#include &quot;buffer/apr_buffer.h&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0START_TEST(test_apr_buffer_arraydup_bounds_check)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0{<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Invariant: apr_buffer_arraydup must not write=
 beyond allocated destination buffer bounds<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// regardless of input size values<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Payloads: exploit case (size causing overflow=
), boundary case (zero size), valid input<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0struct {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0apr_size_t size;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0int zero_terminated;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0int nelts;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0const char *description;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0} test_cases[] =3D {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0{SIZE_MAX, 1, 2, &quot;exploit: si=
ze + zero_terminated causes overflow&quot;},<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0{0, 0, 1, &quot;boundary: zero siz=
e&quot;},<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0{1024, 0, 3, &quot;valid: normal o=
peration&quot;}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0};<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0int num_cases =3D sizeof(test_cases) / sizeof(te=
st_cases[0]);<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0for (int i =3D 0; i &lt; num_cases; i++) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Create source buffer array<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0apr_buffer_t *src_array =3D malloc=
(test_cases[i].nelts * sizeof(apr_buffer_t));<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(src_array);<=
br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Initialize source buffers with =
test data<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0for (int j =3D 0; j &lt; test_case=
s[i].nelts; j++) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0src_array[j].size =
=3D test_cases[i].size;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0src_array[j].zero_te=
rminated =3D test_cases[i].zero_terminated;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Allocate source m=
emory if size &gt; 0<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0if (test_cases[i].si=
ze &gt; 0) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0src_ar=
ray[j].d.mem =3D malloc(test_cases[i].size);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ck_ass=
ert_ptr_nonnull(src_array[j].d.mem);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0memset=
(src_array[j].d.mem, &#39;A&#39;, test_cases[i].size);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0} else {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0src_ar=
ray[j].d.mem =3D NULL;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Test the actual function<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0apr_buffer_t *dst_array =3D NULL;<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0apr_status_t result =3D apr_buffer=
_arraydup(&amp;dst_array, src_array, <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0(apr_buffer_alloc)malloc, NULL, <b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0test_cases[i].nelts);<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Property: Function must either =
succeed with valid buffers or fail gracefully<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// without writing beyond allocate=
d memory bounds<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0if (result =3D=3D APR_SUCCESS) {<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ck_assert_ptr_nonnul=
l(dst_array);<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Verify each desti=
nation buffer was properly allocated<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0for (int j =3D 0; j =
&lt; test_cases[i].nelts; j++) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0if (te=
st_cases[i].size + test_cases[i].zero_terminated &gt; 0) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(dst_array[j].d.mem);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ck_ass=
ert_uint_eq(dst_array[j].size, test_cases[i].size);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ck_ass=
ert_int_eq(dst_array[j].zero_terminated, test_cases[i].zero_terminated);<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Clean up destinat=
ion<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0for (int j =3D 0; j =
&lt; test_cases[i].nelts; j++) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0if (ds=
t_array[j].d.mem) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0free(dst_array[j].d.mem);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0free(dst_array);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0} else {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// If function faile=
d, ensure no partial writes corrupted memory<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ck_assert_ptr_null(d=
st_array);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// Clean up source<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0for (int j =3D 0; j &lt; test_case=
s[i].nelts; j++) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0if (src_array[j].d.m=
em) {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0free(s=
rc_array[j].d.mem);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0free(src_array);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0END_TEST<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Suite *security_suite(void)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0{<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Suite *s;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0TCase *tc_core;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0s =3D suite_create(&quot;Security&quot;);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0tc_core =3D tcase_create(&quot;Core&quot;);<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0tcase_add_test(tc_core, test_apr_buffer_arraydup=
_bounds_check);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0suite_add_tcase(s, tc_core);<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0return s;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0int main(void)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0{<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0int number_failed;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Suite *s;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0SRunner *sr;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0s =3D security_suite();<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0sr =3D srunner_create(s);<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0srunner_run_all(sr, CK_NORMAL);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0number_failed =3D srunner_ntests_failed(sr);<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0srunner_free(sr);<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0return (number_failed =3D=3D 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS :=
 EXIT_FAILURE;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0```<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;/details&gt;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This test guards against regressions =E2=80=94 it&#39;s useful=
 independent of the code change above.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0---<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0*Automated security fix by [OrbisAI Security](<a href=3D"https=
://orbisappsec.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://orbisappse=
c.com</a>)*<br>
<br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div>

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