Re: mod_replace and mod_random
Dirk-Willem van Gulik <[email protected]> Sun, 2 Nov 2025 19:26:13 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.apache.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 2 Nov 2025, at 10:46, Christian Folini via dev <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sun, Nov 02, 2025 at 02:10:27AM +0000, Emmanuel Dreyfus wrote: >> mod_random seems to extend mod_unique_id, by making the random >> data more random (using apr_generate_random_bytes instead of >> ap_random_insecure_bytes) and with a configurable length. Here >> again, you could extend mod_unique_id, by adding directives so >> that the administrator can set true or insecure randomness, >> chose generated data length, and environment variable name. > > "Real" entropy in mod_unique_id would be very interesting. OWASP CRS, an OWASP > flagship project, abuses mod_unique_id to get a bit of entropy to run a WAF > sampling mode. It's good enough, but removing the wild hack in order to get a > cleaner interface to entropy via an env variable would be so much easier. > > And integrating it into mod_unique_id (already a prerequisite for > ModSecurity, the engine for OWASP CRS) would be far better than adding > another module that we have to tell our users('s hosting company) to add. From my practical experience -- I use the two quite differently - the unique_id one in cases were I want something very cluster wide, guaranteed unique (& basically predicatable). Whereas the random one is more where you want some sort of cryptographic `guarantee' -- e.g. at least N bytes of randomness or whatever easily maps to SOGIS.eu or other compliance expectations. And the fact that you can `set' this is really helpful in that context. So I would say - they are complimentary. Dw