Re: [v3,0/3] boot: fit: authenticate the dm-verity roothash
Simon Glass <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.boot-loaders.u-boot |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAFLszTgMxNnShY+WrNXxTwuZ2RMoqXDj7L5f0CofcDwNeehJOw@mail.gmail.com> |
Hi Daniel, On 2026-07-21T02:34:47, Daniel Golle <[email protected]> wrote: > v3: address comments by Simon Glass Thanks for the rework - the doc additions in signature.rst and dm-verity.rst read well, and the test fix is a good catch. I still think we should state the compatibility break explicitly somehow: because U-Boot rebuilds the node list rather than trusting hashed-nodes, an image signed by an older mkimage that carries a dm-verity subnode stops verifying under this fix, and an image signed by the new mkimage does not verify on an older U-Boot. The new language in dm-verity.rst documents the security property (the roothash can no longer be swapped out), but it doesn't warn that deployed images must be re-signed after upgrading and that mixed old/new fleets need care. The break is unavoidable I think and I may be overthinking all this, but it would be nice to avoid people getting confused. Regards, Simon