Re: [Caja] Important new paper: The Need for Capability Policiies
Sandro Magi <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.capabilities.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 11/07/2013 10:41 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: > Its not clear that this is actually a bad thing - for example, the > experience with SELinux appears to be that detaching policy from code > leads to very complex policies that do not stay in step with code. It > could be argued that capability policies are less likely to suffer > from this problem, since they are more clearly aligned with the > objects in the code than the kinds of objects SELinux has to put up > with. But I think the jury is still out on that one. Ultimately, I think security policies will either need to be extractable from programs ala proof carrying code. Or the programming language must be sufficiently powerful that a program and its security policy can be extracted from it, ala Coq which can extract OCaml correct programs from its proofs. Sandro