in defense of SELinux

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 2:09 AM, Jed Donnelley <capability-iCFHVraI1K1Wk0Htik3J/[email protected]>wrote:
>
> ---  Just a mild style comment on the talk:  Dr. Watson seems very
> deferential in his discussion of comparisons with MAC mechanisms - such
> as SELinux.  I have to admit that I have an automatic gag reflex
> whenever I write or speak the word SELinux, but I think that even
> objectively Dr. Watson didn't make clear just how problematic the global
> policy mechanisms of something like SELinux are.  It's like trying to be
> God or a Communist government developing a 10 year plan and tracking,
> via explicit policy, everything that goes on in a computer system (not
> to mention network).  Things change too quickly.  It simply can't be
> done.   With capabilities (access control objects) you allow the
> programmers to manipulate access control where it makes sense through
> the communication channels between what he refers to as "sandboxes" (in
> other contexts processes or domains).  I believe this distinction is
> significantly more than religion.
>

SELinux is appropriate for locking down production systems, and for that
purpose it works as designed.


-- 

The one L lama, he's a priest
The two L llama, he's a beast
And I will bet my silk pyjama
There isn't any three L lllama. -- Ogden Nash

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