Re: RINA and capabilities

On 11/08/13 21:32, Will Pearson wrote:
> I've just come across the idea of the Recursive Internetwork 
> Architecture and thought it had a number of properties that might 
> interest capability folk, if only for an idea to riff off of.
> 
> To quote from here:
> http://irati.eu/the-recursive-internetwork-architecture/


> RINA takes as a point of departure the basic premise that “networking
> is inter-process communication (IPC) and only IPC”. Networking
> provides the means by which processes on separate computer systems
> communicate, generalizing the model of local inter-process
> communications.

I've bought and read the book in one go. Mr Day really puts the finger
on the sore spot of networking. His networking model to me is that of an
idealized network. The current implementations of networks deviate and
where these deviate, they create pain.

In Day's model, I could start a service, give it a name and attach it to
a DIF. The DIF assigns the address and provides a mapping from my name
to the DIF-assigned address. Every other system in the DIF can query the
name and retrieve the address. My service determines if that other party
has authorization.

Sytems outside the DIF have no way of querying the name of my server and
hence cannot connect to my service at all.

The current Internet, is one big DIF. Every VPN (closed network) on top
of it could be seen as its own DIF.

The ADSL-ATM connection between my modem and the ISP's head end could
bee seen as a DIF underneath the Internet.

It's a must read. It really opens your eyes on how clumsy the current
internet protocols are. And where all the security and ddos-problems
come from.


> I find it a very nice model. It almost like objectifying the
> network. The red light from from a capability based point of view
> is "determining permissions". Now the security model isn't set, apart
> from some form of authentication when joining a DIF. Is there an even
> nicer model that uses capabilities to avoid confused deputy and other
> such issues? And is anyone working on it?

The thing to keep in mind is that RINA leaves the authentication and
authorization to be defined by the DIF. Be it MAC, DAC or a hybrid.

There is also the 'problem' of how to become part of a DIF so you can
reach a service inside that DIF. This is where capabilities might shine.


The riff to take home is that there is no important difference between
IPC inside a local trusted domain (a single host/application/vat) and
network(ing). Only the timing parameters change.


Regards, Guido Witmond.

_______________________________________________
cap-talk mailing list
[email protected]
http://www.eros-os.org/mailman/listinfo/cap-talk

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Icedove - http://www.enigmail.net/
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=qnGf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----