Re: Fwd: Re: [Cryptography] Encryption opinion

On Thu, Aug 28, 2014 at 2:06 PM, <[email protected]> wrote:

> I wonder about the extent to which this kind of reasoning -- reasoning
> before the fact about the unconfined entities *to which* authority is
> granted -- would be an important part of a usably secure interface. Because
> our job is not merely to transfer capabilities at the behest of the
> end-user willy nilly. We are presumably building this whole infrastructure
> because there exist capabilities C and recipients R such that it is not a
> good idea to transfer C to R. How may that be represented?
>
> In reasoning about this de facto network of trust and suspicion among the
> actors represented by the objects with which an end-user interacts, is
> there a place for a trusted third party to which these decisions can be
> outsourced? Something like a Consumer Reports? Is that the place where the
> specific, day to day grunt work currently done by anti-virus companies can
> be better applied?
>
>
There are patterns by which we can restrict transfer of capabilities based
on 'proof of identity', where said identity might correspond to a
proof-of-work certificate, public key, and maybe a shorthand name (cf.
namecoin). The difficulty is 'investing' this identity in a useful way,
i.e. tying it to a reputation and history and endorsements.

You could create policies such as: "this resource is sensitive, but may be
transferred to entitites approved by __foogle__". You could model such
policies in a capability system in terms of handing foogle an unsealer that
it can pass to entities it approves.

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