Re: A new type of phishing attack

On 09/13/14 12:10, James A. Donald wrote:
> On 2014-09-13 19:43, Guido Witmond wrote:
>> On 09/13/14 01:03, Sandro Magi wrote:
>>> If some authentication step is required to obtain your root cap URL,
>>> this attack could still be successful against enough people to make it
>>> worth the effort. I don't think webkeys alone would suffice, unless caps
>>> are all that a user has, so a login prompt isn't even an option.
>>
>>
>> As long as people provide static credentials (like a password) to a
>> remote end of a socket, the phishing problem stays.
>>
>> Taking the login prompt away from the html page and into the browser is
>> a good thing to do.
>>
>> A capability is a static token that can be copied. Once copied by
>> someone who you don't intend to have it, it is game over.
> 
> 
> Zero knowledge password proof.

A ZKP solves password problem above. It stops people from handing over
the credentials. It was not the problems that I addressed,


Anyway the problem I addressed is this:

I hold a capability to an item at a service, say an email at a mailbox.
My problem is making sure I present it to the correct mailbox-service of
all those billion hosts out there. If I connect to the wrong host, the
email might end up at the front page of a newspaper...

The question is: how do I identify the correct service before invoking
the capability?

My answer uses public key cryptography to provide a solution.


There is another question:

How can I be sure that a recipient of a capability I hold won't
accidentally leak it after I gave it to them?

For example: I hold a capability to a document. I trust Bob with it.
However he is no too smart with computers (just a normal user). I ask
him if he runs CromeZilla 15 that implements
Guidos-Crazy-Crypto-Identity-Protocol. If so I'm reasonable assured he
doesn't accidentally leak my document to phishers.


Guido.

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