Re: Systemd, nightmare or opportunity?
Valerio Bellizzomi <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.capabilities.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Thu, 2014-09-25 at 09:42 +0100, Thomas Leonard wrote: > On 25 September 2014 08:33, Rob Meijer <rmeijer-qWit8jRvyhVmR6Xm/[email protected]> wrote: > > As those of you who use Linux may know, more and more Linux distributions > > are moving away from their init systems, and are moving to systemd. A > > consortium of interdependent system programs that replace not only > > init/startup, but a whole range of other functionality that were > > previously handled by independent software in the unix line (do one thing, > > do one thing good) that I feel loosely forms the philosophy that also > > underlies capability discipline. On one side, it would seem that a move > > away from this philosophy would be a move away from anything POLA related. > > On the other side however, this also might provide an > > opportunity/challenge for people concerned with least authority on the > > language level. If we could come up with a drop-in least authority rewrite > > of systemd in a capability secure language (David-Sarah might have a clue > > about what language to pick ;-) ), this could definetely become the basis > > for a much more robust version of Linux, that could easily be addapted by > > all those distro's now moving towards this horrible systemd architecture. > > > > Any thoughts? > > What exactly is "horrible" about the architecture? It introduces various configuration files that are located outside the /etc directory. > Before, SysVinit/Upstart ran everything as root, relying on each > program to open the sockets it desired and drop privileges. Now, > systemd opens all sockets and passes them (capability-style) to the > programs, which are run under a limited user account (there are also > quite a few sandboxing features offered, such as private /tmp, private > network namespaces, containers, etc). > > It also uses cgroups to group processes reliably (so killing a service > really does kill all its processes), and (I think) provides reliable > logging information (one service can't log messages appearing to be > from another service). > > Being written in C is disappointing, but I can't imagine that anything > else would have been politically acceptable. > >