Re: [friam] Google Vault and "capabilities"
Norman Hardy <norm-vN3M59HtaNxWk0Htik3J/[email protected]> Sat, 30 May 2015 21:22:50 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.capabilities.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Keykos can run much legacy machine language code (compilers, X11) without even recompiling. Intel’s SGX cannot. I suspect the CHERI can run gcc and quite a few other legacy apps with replacement only of libc. We shall see. Keykos is designed to protect the interests of multiple stake holders on one machine. SGX seems designed, as far as I can tell, to protect the interests of the CPU manufacturer, system manufacturers and IP holders. Keykos, as implemented, trusts whoever has physical access to the system. On 2015 May 30, at 11:31 , Carl Hewitt <[email protected]> wrote: > For better or worse our legacy is also our mainstream future ;-) > > The challenge is to add the following to the Intel and ARM architectures: > · RAM-processor package encryption (SGX is a start) > · Every-word-tagged architecture (as you mentioned, CHERI could be adapted) > > _______________________________________________ cap-talk mailing list [email protected] http://www.eros-os.org/mailman/listinfo/cap-talk