Re: can I just encrypt tables? what about the app?
lejeczek <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.db.mysql.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 02/03/16 00:51, shawn l.green wrote: > > > On 3/1/2016 6:26 PM, lejeczek wrote: >> >> >> On 29/02/16 21:35, shawn l.green wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 2/29/2016 3:13 PM, Reindl Harald wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Am 29.02.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Gary Smith: >>>>> On 29/02/2016 19:50, Reindl Harald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> cryptsetup/luks can achieve that way better >>>>>> >>>>> Only to a degree. >>>> >>>> no - not only to a degree - when the question is "not >>>> store anything >>>> unencrypted on the disk" the is no degree, but or if >>>> >>>>> Once the disk is unencrypted, you've got access to the >>>>> filesystem. If you've got physical access to the >>>>> machine, then anything >>>>> which gives you console access gives you (potentially) >>>>> access to the >>>>> underlying database files. If you can get those, it's >>>>> trivial to get >>>>> access to the dataset that they contain. >>>>> >>>>> However, if TDE is employed, then you've got another >>>>> significant >>>>> obstacle to overcome: The data is only encrypted >>>>> (aiui) once it's in >>>>> memory. At this point, you're needing to do attacks on >>>>> RAM to get >>>>> access >>>>> to the data - and even then, you're unlikely to get 3 >>>>> bars for a >>>>> jackpot >>>>> payout of the whole database schema, assuming a decent >>>>> sized database. >>>> >>>> in theory >>>> >>>> in reality you don't need to hack around in the RAM - >>>> mysqld needs to >>>> have access to key for operate with the data and so you >>>> need to find >>>> only that piece >>>> >>>> the same for encryption on the application side before >>>> send data to the >>>> db-layer - see the start and subject of that thread how >>>> far people are >>>> away from understanding how and on what layer things >>>> are encrypted and >>>> what excatly is protected in which context.... >>>> >>>> there is no "turn this on and you are safe" without >>>> deeper understanding >>>> >>> >>> Correct. As long as the key and the lock are on the same >>> machine, >>> there will be some way of opening that lock. It's just a >>> matter of how >>> hard can you make it to find that key. No data is >>> perfectly safe. No >>> crypto is unbreakable. Ever. >>> >>> Maybe the key only exists in memory while the daemon >>> runs? You can >>> hack the memory to find the key. >>> >>> Maybe the key is retrieved from another key service >>> daemon. If you >>> have the credentials to impersonate a valid retriever, >>> you are in the >>> money. >>> >>> The purpose of any encryption system is not to make it >>> impossible to >>> read the data. It's purpose is to make it impractically >>> hard for any >>> unauthorized parties to read it. >> taking your last line and making and assumption or two, >> notion of double >> encryption arises - will it work? >> >> > > A system called "Triple DES" does exactly what you propose > and appears to be in wide usage. > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_DES > > The key to avoiding brute force attacks is not how many > times you scramble the data, but how long your key is. In > the early days of computers, keys were short because > processing power was less. In today's world, you must use > longer keys just to stay ahead of Moore's Law. > > Quoting from > http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/02/17/how-is-cryptography-incorporated-into-pos-terminals/ > >> For example, DES with a 56-bit key (2^56 possible >> combinations) can be broken in less than a day, since >> average computers can perform a billion operations per >> second. However, the addition of more bits to the string >> will exponentially increase the time required to crack it. > > > Most SSL keys (for example, those used to encrypt the > information exchanged when you visit "secure" web sites) > should all have keys that are 2048 bits or longer. If they > don't already, I'll bet they are upgrading their > certificates soon. > http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2012/09/10/minimum-rsa-public-key-lengths-guidelines-or-rules.html > > > how to backup in a way that this in-database-encryption will be taken advantage of? does any of present backup solutions can do it? many thanks. -- MySQL General Mailing List For list archives: http://lists.mysql.com/mysql To unsubscribe: http://lists.mysql.com/mysql