Re: [PATCH 0/5] more hardening fixes for s390

Am 27.07.26 um 17:06 schrieb Cornelia Huck:
> On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>> Am 27.07.26 um 14:14 schrieb Cornelia Huck:
>>> On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Cornelia, Eric, Matt,
>>>>
>>>> here are 5 more fixes for hardening QEMU against invalid input. Nothing
>>>> is strictly a security issues as defined in the policy. For example
>>>> https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/system/security.html says assert /
>>>> abort: If triggering the code path requires kernel privileges (or root
>>>> account access) in the guest, asserts/aborts in QEMU are a self
>>>> inflicted denial of service. These will not be treated as security
>>>> flaws, at most hardening bugs.
>>>> And if anyone can provide invalid boot loader content it can provide
>>>> anything to boot if secure boot is not available.
>>>> We should fix those anyway, probably even for 11.1
>>>
>>> Fixing: yes. For 11.1: how easy are they to trigger? For the bios fixes,
>>> I assume you need a broken/crafted disk image; I assume that for the
>>> other two, you need some buggy/misbehaving guest. Did you actually
>>> manage to trigger this via some kind of test case?
>>
>> Easy to trigger, but only with modified guests or modified zipls. Normal
>> guests will not trigger those.
> 
> Ok, so I think these would be suitable for the next release, but maybe
> with a cc:stable.
Ok with me.