[Stable-11.0.4 106/120] vhost-user-gpu: fix integer overflow in buffer allocation

From: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>

A malicious guest can trigger a heap buffer overflow in the
vhost-user-gpu backend by sending a VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_CREATE_2D
with large width and height values (e.g. 65537x65537). The allocation
size width * height * 4 silently wraps in uint32_t arithmetic,
resulting in a much smaller allocation than expected. Subsequent
VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_TRANSFER_TO_HOST_2D writes past the heap buffer.

The in-tree virtio-gpu device (hw/display/virtio-gpu.c) already handles
this via calc_image_hostmem() with uint64_t arithmetic and an overflow
check. Apply the same approach to the vhost-user-gpu contrib backend:

- Add an overflow check in vugbm_buffer_create() rejecting dimensions
  where width * height * 4 exceeds UINT32_MAX
- Promote the size arithmetic to uint64_t in mem_alloc_bo() and
  udmabuf_get_size()
- Check the return value of vugbm_buffer_create() in
  vg_resource_create_2d(), which was previously ignored

Fixes: CVE-2026-15264
Reported-by: "Vulnerability Report" <[email protected]>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3940
Signed-off-by: Marc-Andre Lureau <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit a113e0c53fb50d78529fd5ea79e3b8313a7ddcaa)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>

diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
index bb41758e345..ee9858c397c 100644
--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
+++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
@@ -388,7 +388,13 @@ vg_resource_create_2d(VuGpu *g,
         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
         return;
     }
-    vugbm_buffer_create(&res->buffer, &g->gdev, c2d.width, c2d.height);
+    if (!vugbm_buffer_create(&res->buffer, &g->gdev, c2d.width, c2d.height)) {
+        g_critical("%s: buffer creation failed %d %d %d",
+                   __func__, c2d.resource_id, c2d.width, c2d.height);
+        g_free(res);
+        cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+        return;
+    }
     res->image = pixman_image_create_bits(pformat,
                                           c2d.width,
                                           c2d.height,
diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vugbm.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vugbm.c
index 503d0a4566f..710d5452977 100644
--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vugbm.c
+++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vugbm.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 static bool
 mem_alloc_bo(struct vugbm_buffer *buf)
 {
-    buf->mmap = g_malloc(buf->width * buf->height * 4);
+    buf->mmap = g_malloc((uint64_t)buf->width * buf->height * 4);
     buf->stride = buf->width * 4;
     return true;
 }
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ struct udmabuf_create {
 static size_t
 udmabuf_get_size(struct vugbm_buffer *buf)
 {
-    return ROUND_UP(buf->width * buf->height * 4, qemu_real_host_page_size());
+    return ROUND_UP((uint64_t)buf->width * buf->height * 4,
+                    qemu_real_host_page_size());
 }
 
 static bool
@@ -293,6 +294,12 @@ bool
 vugbm_buffer_create(struct vugbm_buffer *buffer, struct vugbm_device *dev,
                     uint32_t width, uint32_t height)
 {
+    uint64_t size = (uint64_t)width * height * 4;
+    if (size > UINT32_MAX) {
+        g_warning("buffer dimensions too large: %ux%u", width, height);
+        return false;
+    }
+
     buffer->dev = dev;
     buffer->width = width;
     buffer->height = height;
-- 
2.47.3