Xen Security Advisory 229 (CVE-2017-12134) - linux: Fix Xen block IO merge-ability calculation

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            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-12134 / XSA-229
                               version 3

            linux: Fix Xen block IO merge-ability calculation

UPDATES IN VERSION 3
====================

Public release.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

The block layer in Linux may choose to merge adjacent block IO requests.
When Linux is running as a Xen guest, the default merging algorithm is
replaced with a Xen-specific one.  When Linux is running as an x86 PV
guest, some BIO's are erroneously merged, corrupting the data stream
to/from the block device.

This can result in incorrect access to an uncontrolled adjacent frame.

IMPACT
======

A buggy or malicious guest can cause Linux to read or write incorrect
memory when processing a block stream.  This could leak information from
other guests in the system or from Xen itself, or be used to DoS or
escalate privilege within the system.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

All x86 Xen systems using pvops Linux in a backend role (either as
dom0, or as a disk device driver domain) are affected.  This includes
upstream Linux versions 2.6.37 and later.  Systems using the older
classic-linux fork are not affected.

All PV x86 domains doing block IO on behalf of a guest, including dom0
and any PV driver domains, are vulnerable.  (Any HVM driver domains
running are not vulnerable.)  This includes Xen vbd backends such as
blkback, but also direct IO performed for the guest via eg qemu.

ARM systems are not affected.

The vulnerability is only exposed if the underlying block device has
request merging enabled.  See Mitigation.

The vulnerability is only exposed to configurations which use grant
mapping as a transport mechanism for the block data.  Configurations
which use exclusively grant copy are not vulnerable.

MITIGATION
==========

Disable bio merges on all relevant underlying backend block devices.
For example,
  echo 2 > /sys/block/nvme0n1/queue/nomerges

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Jan H. Schönherr of Amazon.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.

xsa229.patch           Linux

$ sha256sum xsa229*
5f96c72c8c5a971d52f5540475a3fc6f4fef2071ec772ef21392fdc238eda858  xsa229.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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From 84882133e793299f685991e20a9631acfd0a5608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 15:01:00 +0100
Subject: xen: fix bio vec merging
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The current test for bio vec merging is not fully accurate and can be
tricked into merging bios when certain grant combinations are used.
The result of these malicious bio merges is a bio that extends past
the memory page used by any of the originating bios.

Take into account the following scenario, where a guest creates two
grant references that point to the same mfn, ie: grant 1 -> mfn A,
grant 2 -> mfn A.

These references are then used in a PV block request, and mapped by
the backend domain, thus obtaining two different pfns that point to
the same mfn, pfn B -> mfn A, pfn C -> mfn A.

If those grants happen to be used in two consecutive sectors of a disk
IO operation becoming two different bios in the backend domain, the
checks in xen_biovec_phys_mergeable will succeed, because bfn1 == bfn2
(they both point to the same mfn). However due to the bio merging,
the backend domain will end up with a bio that expands past mfn A into
mfn A + 1.

Fix this by making sure the check in xen_biovec_phys_mergeable takes
into account the offset and the length of the bio, this basically
replicates whats done in __BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE using mfns (bus
addresses). While there also remove the usage of
__BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE, since that's already checked by the callers
of xen_biovec_phys_mergeable.

Reported-by: "Jan H. Schönherr" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/xen/biomerge.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/biomerge.c b/drivers/xen/biomerge.c
index 4da69dbf7dca..1bdd02a6d6ac 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/biomerge.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/biomerge.c
@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ bool xen_biovec_phys_mergeable(const struct bio_vec *vec1,
 	unsigned long bfn1 = pfn_to_bfn(page_to_pfn(vec1->bv_page));
 	unsigned long bfn2 = pfn_to_bfn(page_to_pfn(vec2->bv_page));
 
-	return __BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE(vec1, vec2) &&
-		((bfn1 == bfn2) || ((bfn1+1) == bfn2));
+	return bfn1 + PFN_DOWN(vec1->bv_offset + vec1->bv_len) == bfn2;
 #else
 	/*
 	 * XXX: Add support for merging bio_vec when using different page
-- 
2.11.0 (Apple Git-81)