[PATCH v2 03/14] x86/mm: get_page_from_l1e() is PV-or-shadow-only

Otherwise the function is unreachable, violating MISRA C:2012 rule 2.1.
With the function compiled out, its dedicated XSM hook also becomes
unreachable, so it is similarly guarded.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>
---
It feels suspicious that the .priv_mapping() check is used for HVM guests
in shadow mode, but not for ones in HAP mode.
---
v2: Also conditionalize the declaration.

--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h
@@ -404,10 +404,13 @@ int  get_page_type(struct page_info *pag
 int  put_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page);
 int  get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type);
 int  put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v);
-int  get_page_from_l1e(
-    l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner, struct domain *pg_owner);
 void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner);
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_PV) || defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING)
+int get_page_from_l1e(
+    l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner, struct domain *pg_owner);
+#endif
+
 static inline struct page_info *get_page_from_mfn(mfn_t mfn, struct domain *d)
 {
     struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -836,6 +836,8 @@ static int cf_check print_mmio_emul_rang
 }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_PV) || defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING)
+
 /*
  * get_page_from_l1e returns:
  *   0  => success (page not present also counts as such)
@@ -1037,6 +1039,8 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
     return -EBUSY;
 }
 
+#endif /* CONFIG_PV || CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING */
+
 /*
  * The following flags are used to specify behavior of various get and
  * put commands.  The first is also stored in page->partial_flags to
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -701,12 +701,14 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_update_va_mapp
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_PV */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_PV) || defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING)
 static XSM_INLINE int xsm_priv_mapping(
     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *t)
 {
     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
     return xsm_default_action(action, d, t);
 }
+#endif
 
 static XSM_INLINE int xsm_ioport_permission(
     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, bool allow)
--- a/xen/include/xsm/hooks.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/hooks.h
@@ -141,7 +141,9 @@ XSM_HOOK(int, mmu_update, struct domain
 XSM_HOOK(int, mmuext_op, struct domain *, struct domain *)
 XSM_HOOK(int, update_va_mapping, struct domain *, struct domain *, l1_pgentry_t)
 #endif /* CONFIG_PV */
+#if defined(CONFIG_PV) || defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING)
 XSM_HOOK(int, priv_mapping, struct domain *, struct domain *)
+#endif
 XSM_HOOK(int, ioport_permission, struct domain *, uint32_t, uint32_t, bool)
 XSM_HOOK(int, ioport_mapping, struct domain *, uint32_t, uint32_t, bool)
 XSM_HOOK(int, pmu_op, struct domain *, unsigned int)
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -1829,10 +1829,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_update_va_mapp
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_PV */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_PV) || defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING)
 static int cf_check flask_priv_mapping(struct domain *d, struct domain *t)
 {
     return domain_has_perm(d, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__TARGET_HACK);
 }
+#endif
 
 static int cf_check flask_pmu_op(struct domain *d, unsigned int op)
 {