[PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads
Bertrand Marquis <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.emulators.xen.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <1b483ce633bfa7d304cb78458ce029370691f00c.1787055320.git.bertrand.marquis@arm.com> |
Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
possible vulnerability.
ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
the live TX mapping.
For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
receiver's RX buffer.
The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
validation and use consume the same snapshot.
Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <[email protected]>
---
xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
@@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
/* create a copy of the message header */
memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
+ /*
+ * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
+ * again after this point.
+ */
+ barrier();
src_id = src_msg.send_recv_id >> 16;
dst_id = src_msg.send_recv_id & GENMASK(15,0);
--
2.53.0