Re: Re: Invalid packet types in generated RSA PGP key
David Hook <dgh-rTAZ0PM/[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.bouncy-castle.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Actually, I think I'm confused. I was just rereading the commentary, if the s2k usage is 0, there shouldn't be sha-1 digest. I will have another look at this. Regards, David On 17/05/18 03:27, David Hook wrote: > > Ask them to read the last paragraph of Section 5.5.3 RFC 4880. > > " The two-octet checksum that follows the algorithm-specific portion is > the algebraic sum, mod 65536, of the plaintext of all the algorithm- > specific octets (including MPI prefix and data). With V3 keys, the > checksum is stored in the clear. With V4 keys, the checksum is > encrypted like the algorithm-specific data. This value is used to > check that the passphrase was correct. However, this checksum is > deprecated; an implementation SHOULD NOT use it, but should rather > use the SHA-1 hash denoted with a usage octet of 254. The reason for > this is that there are some attacks that involve undetectably > modifying the secret key." > > There is further discussion on this earlier in Section 5.5.3 as well. > > Regards, > > David > > On 16/05/18 22:15, Paul Schaub wrote: >> Hi! >> >> Am 15.05.2018 um 11:03 schrieb Paul Schaub: >>> I openend an issue on the pgpdump repo: >>> https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/pgpdump/issues/23 >> As Heiko Stamer and Kazu Yamamoto pointed out [1], BC 1.59 seems to >> append the SHA1 hash (20 bytes) instead of a 2 byte checksum after the >> secret key. Apparently that is against RFC-4880 and breaks pgpdump. >> >> [1]: >> https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/pgpdump/issues/23#issuecomment-389495218 >> > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlr8cgwACgkQbqHzoYMuRw7C0gEAkpnljH/xW36kH+x5wSdZlY0d HMRsH3dyVMD8Sb3doY4A/Rep4G7AHWwhBspdxfJC9swD7FHfPa0YOKc9iwpjEv/P =wOwd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----