RE: Data integrity check in CIPE - Please explain me the necessityor benefit of a larger checksum.
"Mark Smith" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.cipe |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <000001c38681$f01447f0$d100010a@lyta> |
(PLEASE, everyone, when replying send only to list, not to person and list - I get two copies) > * Existing packets: possible within the lifetime of the dynamic key (15 > minutes IIRC, so 7 min. on average) It will be seen as duplicated packets > within the tunnel traffic. If this were part of a complete sequence, replaying it a few seconds later could be catastrophic. Even if it were TCP, a new connection faked correctly could cause, for example, a database transaction to be repeated, or worse. Replay is an issue - not just duplicate packets sent at the same time. Coupled with the checksum issue, as one of those packets may even have been modified, and you're looking at a vulnerability that can be used by someone capable of sniffing and introducing their own packets into the stream. > * Impossible IMHO, since it is computed from the encrypted packet. Could the payload be altered to include such a CRC, and compare both the new and existing checksums to determine if the packet has been altered? -- Mark Smith - Avco Systems Ltd email: [email protected] Tel: +44 (0)1784 430996 Fax: +44 (0)1784 431078 -- Message sent by the [email protected] mailing list. Unsubscribe: mail [email protected], "unsubscribe cipe-l" in body Other commands available with "help" in body to the same address. CIPE info and list archive: <URL:http://sites.inka.de/~bigred/devel/cipe.html>