More TLS-PSK issues

Stephen Hurd <[email protected]> Fri, 29 Aug 2014 03:50:12 -0700
Newsgroups gmane.comp.encryption.cryptlib
Message-ID <[email protected]>
So, it appears that the documentation is wrong where it states that
"Once a client has authenticated themselves using a shared key, you can
determine their identity by reading back the CRYPT_SESSINFO_USERNAME
attribute".

After a session is established, reading CRYPT_SESSINFO_USERNAME appears
to always return the first added valid username, even if a private key
was added and TLS-PSK wasn't even used.  Looking at the code, I'm not
sure exactly where the old CRYPT_SESSINFO_USERNAME attribute should be
deleted and when the one that was used should be added... the issue
would likely be simplified by using a different attribute for valid
usernames vs the authenticated username.

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