Re: how to detect breakage -- lures etc.??
John Gilmore <[email protected]> Thu, 02 Jan 2020 13:12:12 -0800
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
> The Enigma machine was /almost/ unbreakable. It took tremendous > cleverness and enormous resources to break it. A layer of modest > superencryption would have pushed it far, far out of reach of the > codebreaking technology of the day. It's well worth reading the books about the breaking of Enigma, like The Hut Six Story by Gordon Welchman. The key lesson is that breaking Enigma on an ongoing basis required breaking the very early versions, which were the least secure, and understanding how the Germans used them. The German military produced many variants of Enigma throughout the war, each one stronger than the previous ones. After a period of being able to read German traffic, everything would "go dark" when a new version of Enigma was deployed. Then the teams would feverishly work on figuring out what had been changed, for months, until occasional messages could be read, and eventually almost all messages. The small Polish team that first broke Enigma, broke the version with three rotors, and was able to read messages "almost every day" for most of a year, until December 15, 1938, when the Germans introduced two more rotors with different wiring, any three of which could be inserted into the machine in any order. The Poles were able to figure out the wiring of the two new rotors, but unable to put forth the effort to break the whole system, and their country was about to be attacked and overrun. So they handed over their work product to the UK and France, including working Enigma machines. The UK was able to build systems and procedures that could break the 5-rotor-in-3-slots Enigma, and begin reading German messages. Throughout the war, different, stronger variants of Enigma were used by different groups (e.g. the German Navy, the top generals, diplomats, etc). For example, a fourth rotor slot was added to some; and a plugboard was added to provide additional scrambling. Each variant had to be figured out. Knowing how the basic machine worked, and what the habits of the machine operators were, was essential in reducing the combinatorial space to something barely solvable. And even solving these required inventing and evolving brand-new code breaking machines unlike anything ever built before. The high order bit is: Break the easy, early systems; develop expertise in the communication habits of the enemy; and that gives you "cribs" (suspected plaintexts or somewhat visible correlations) that enable you to break the harder, later systems, which would otherwise be way beyond your capabilities. I suspect that this advice is still good. Which is why inventing and deploying cipher systems without also having a wiretapping, codebreaking operation close at hand, is such a chancy business. John _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography