Re: how to detect breakage -- lures etc.??
Arnold Reinhold via cryptography <[email protected]> Tue, 7 Jan 2020 16:44:50 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
--===============5029139443265217125== Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_76D58B6B-C4FE-420F-9E43-1F4CF2952E49" --Apple-Mail=_76D58B6B-C4FE-420F-9E43-1F4CF2952E49 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 On Mon, 6 Jan 2020 20:45 Bob Wilson asked: > In the photograph of a KL-7 device, link embedded in >> https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kl7 = <https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kl7> >=20 > I am surprised by the "Confidential" markings on several labels. I = would=20 > expect the device itself to be classified much more securely than = that.=20 > I realize those labels are not official classification markings, but=20= > they might mislead someone into divulging details that were intended = to=20 > be more highly ranked. > Or was all of the "more critical" stuff contained in removable parts=20= > such as rotors, with some scheme to make sure their higher=20 > classification was separately recognized? Those are the official classification markings and yes, they only refers = to "more critical" stuff contained in the removable subassembly, which = if you look carefully is marked KLK-7/TESC, with a =E2=80=9CReg. No.=E2=80= =9D The base of the KL-7 does not have the Confidential label and its = serial number is marked =E2=80=9CNon-Reg No.=E2=80=9D The U.S. practice = of having removable rotor assemblies with a higher classification goes = back to to at least the SIGABA, which was designed in the 1930s. = Security is primarily provided by the keys, per Kirckhoffs. One hint as to why the KL-7 rotors had such a low classification is in = the NSA 1969 Cryptologic Damage Assessment from the North Korean=E2=80=99s= capture of the USS Pueblo = (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/docs/doc25.pdf = <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/docs/doc25.pdf> ). One of = the crypto machines on board was a KL-47, a variant of the KL-7. The NSA = concluded that it was highly likely that KL-47s had been compromised in = the past since: "many thousands of equipments have been in use = world-wide for more than a decade, including about 10,000 functionally = identical KL-7 equipments held by NATO countries. The equipment, = associated maintenance manuals, and operating instructions have been = exposed to possible compromise a number of times over the years. In = recent intelligence operations, the USSR has made efforts to obtain key = lists and rotors, but have shown no interest in the equipment itself or = its supporting documents. Damage to SIGINT interests as a result of loss = of the KL-47 to the USSR is also judged to be negligible.=E2=80=9D Given = that the KL-7 was intended for widespread field use, it's low = classification would seem to make sense. The Cryptologic Damage Assessment has lots of interesting stuff, = including accounting of the various key lists on the Pueblo, along with = many that were offloaded before it left port, that give a sense of how = complex the U.S. military communications networks were.=20 Arnold Reinhold --Apple-Mail=_76D58B6B-C4FE-420F-9E43-1F4CF2952E49 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 <html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; = -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div = class=3D"">On Mon, 6 Jan 2020 20:45 Bob Wilson asked:</div><div = class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" = class=3D"">In the photograph of a KL-7 device, link embedded in<br = class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><a = href=3D"https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kl7" = class=3D"">https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kl7</a><br = class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I am surprised by the = "Confidential" markings on several labels. I would <br = class=3D"">expect the device itself to be classified much more securely = than that. <br class=3D"">I realize those labels are not official = classification markings, but <br class=3D"">they might mislead = someone into divulging details that were intended to <br = class=3D"">be more highly ranked.<br class=3D"">Or was all of the "more = critical" stuff contained in removable parts <br class=3D"">such as = rotors, with some scheme to make sure their higher <br = class=3D"">classification was separately recognized?</blockquote><br = class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Those are the official classification = markings and yes, they only refers to "more critical" stuff contained in = the removable subassembly, which if you look carefully is marked = KLK-7/TESC, with a =E2=80=9CReg. No.=E2=80=9D The base of the KL-7 does = not have the Confidential label and its serial number is marked = =E2=80=9CNon-Reg No.=E2=80=9D The U.S. practice of having removable = rotor assemblies with a higher classification goes back to to at least = the SIGABA, which was designed in the 1930s. Security is primarily = provided by the keys, per Kirckhoffs.</div><div class=3D""><br = class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">One hint as to why the KL-7 rotors had = such a low classification is in the NSA 1969 Cryptologic Damage = Assessment from the North Korean=E2=80=99s capture of the USS Pueblo (<a = href=3D"https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/docs/doc25.pdf" = class=3D"">https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/docs/doc25.pdf</a>&= nbsp;). One of the crypto machines on board was a KL-47, a variant = of the KL-7. The NSA concluded that it was highly likely that KL-47s had = been compromised in the past since: "many thousands of equipments = have been in use = world-wide for more than a decade, including = about 10,000 functionally identical KL-7 equipments held = by NATO countries. The equipment, = associated maintenance manuals, and = operating instructions have been = exposed to possible compromise a number of = times over the years. In recent intelligence operations, = the USSR has made efforts to obtain = key lists and rotors, but have shown = no interest in the = equipment itself or its supporting = documents. Damage to SIGINT interests as a = result of loss of = the KL-47 to the USSR is also judged&nb= sp;to be negligible.=E2=80=9D Given that the KL-7 was intended = for widespread field use, it's low classification would seem to make = sense.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The = Cryptologic Damage Assessment has lots of interesting stuff, including = accounting of the various key lists on the Pueblo, along with many that = were offloaded before it left port, that give a sense of how complex the = U.S. military communications networks were. </div><div class=3D""><br= class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div = class=3D"">Arnold Reinhold</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div = class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>= --Apple-Mail=_76D58B6B-C4FE-420F-9E43-1F4CF2952E49-- --===============5029139443265217125== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography --===============5029139443265217125==--