Abolish CIA & FISA

https://americanmind.org/essays/abolish-the-cia/
The Claremont Institute

The American Mind

Essay

Abolish CIA & FISA=20
How to defend the Republic against the Deep State.

Angelo Codevilla
02.12.2020



This is the first in The American Mind=E2=80=99s new Rethinking Policy =
series. Throughout 2020 we are publishing essays that boldly reframe, =
reorder, and reprioritize our political goals in order to directly =
address the real challenges of our time. These essays are intended to =
spur clear, sharp discussions that rid us of obsolete ideological =
frameworks and point towards viable paths forward. Amid today=E2=80=99s =
realignment, we must discern and articulate vital principles and =
national purpose free of the ideological encumbrances of the past. =
=E2=80=94Eds.


America=E2=80=99s Intelligence agencies are the deep state=E2=80=99s =
deepest part, and the most immediate threat to representative =
government. They are also not very good at what they are supposed to be =
doing. Protecting the Republic from them requires refocusing them on =
their proper jobs.

Intelligence officials abuse their positions to discredit opposition to =
the Democratic Party, of which they are part. Complicit with the media, =
they leverage the public=E2=80=99s mistaken faith in their superior =
knowledge, competence, and patriotism to vilify their domestic enemies =
from behind secrecy=E2=80=99s shield.

Pretenses of superior knowledge have always tempted the Administrative =
State=E2=80=99s officials to manipulate or override voters. Hence, as =
Justice Robert H. Jackson (who served as chief prosecutor of the =
Nuremberg trials) warned, they often turn their powers against whomever =
they dislike politically, socially, or personally and try to minimize =
the public=E2=80=99s access to the bases upon which they act.

But only the Intelligence agencies have the power to do that while =
claiming that scrutiny of their pretenses endangers national security. =
They have succeeded in restricting information about their misdeeds by =
=E2=80=9Cclassifying=E2=80=9D them under the Espionage Act of 1921. Thus =
covered, they misrepresent their opinions as knowledge and their =
preferences as logic. Thus acting as irresponsible arbiters of truth at =
the highest levels of American public life, they are the foremost jaws =
of the ruling class vise that is squeezing self-rule out of America.

As Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) truly told President Trump, =E2=80=9CLet=
 me tell you, you take on the intelligence community, they have six ways =
from Sunday at getting back at you.=E2=80=9D As we shall see, =
Intelligence officials have proved Schumer correct.

What follows begins with an overview of the threats today=E2=80=99s =
intelligence agencies pose to self-government in America.

Next, it touches on U.S. intelligence=E2=80=99s dismal professional =
record, and suggests that the measures needed to refocus them on =
professional performance would also separate them from domestic =
politics.

In sum, we find:

	=E2=80=A2 CIA is obsolete. Cables show agents=E2=80=99 =
intelligence takes are inferior to diplomats=E2=80=99. Agent networks =
are unprotected by counterintelligence. FBI success at =
counterintelligence ended when the Bureau was politicized and =
bureaucratized in the 1970s. CIA bottlenecks and incompetently controls =
strategic intelligence, while the Army and Marines show demonstrable =
tactical superiority.
	=E2=80=A2 As a result, CIA is ideologically partisan. Its =
strength is in leading or joining domestic campaigns to influence public =
opinion. FBI has followed suit.
	=E2=80=A2 Senior intelligence officials were the key element in =
the war on Donald Trump=E2=80=99s candidacy and presidency. CIA used =
meetings that it manufactured as factual bases for lies about campaign =
advisors seeking Russian information to smear Hillary Clinton. =
Intelligence began formal investigation and surveillance without =
probable cause. Agents gained authorization to electronically surveil =
Trump and his campaign and defended their bureaucratic interests, =
sidelining Lieutenant General Michael Flynn and denying or delaying =
Trump appointments and security clearances.
	=E2=80=A2 Partisanship produces failure. FISA has incentivized =
political abuse. =E2=80=9CProfiling=E2=80=9D has failed repeatedly in =
high-profile cases like the Atlanta Olympics bombing and the anthrax =
mail attacks. Perjury trapping has become commonplace.
Finally, we outline the steps that presidents and Congress might take to =
improve matters:

	=E2=80=A2 FISA must be repealed legislatively or through =
Constitutional challenge in court. It unconstitutionally mingles =
judicial and executive power in secret. It gave Intelligence a blank =
check. Hardly =E2=80=9Can indispensable tool=E2=80=9D for national =
security, it is now indispensable for partisanship. Broad consensus =
exists for a legislative =E2=80=9Cfix,=E2=80=9D but none is possible. =
The secret court=E2=80=99s existence, the heart of the law, allows =
partisan bureaucrats and allied judges to do what they want in secret.
	=E2=80=A2 Functions currently performed by CIA should be sheared =
down. Data infrastructure and consultant networks should be eliminated. =
Bipartisan opposition to the Intelligence threat should use fierce =
resistance and lobbying from Intelligence as evidence of why cuts are in =
the national interest.
	=E2=80=A2 CIA must be disestablished. Its functions should be =
returned to the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury. FBI must be =
restricted to law enforcement. At home, the Agencies are partisan =
institutions illegitimately focused on setting national policy. Abroad, =
Agencies untied to specific operational concerns are inherently =
dangerous and low-value.
	=E2=80=A2 Intelligence must return to its natural place as =
servant, not master, of government. Congress should amend the 1947 =
National Security Act. The President should broaden intelligence =
perspectives, including briefs from State, Defense, and Treasury, and =
abolish CIA=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Ccovert action.=E2=80=9D State should be =
made responsible for political influence and the armed services for =
military and paramilitary affairs.
Sword and Shield

Roughly one third of the U.S government=E2=80=99s $80 billion annual =
budget for intelligence is devoted to the military=E2=80=99s =
=E2=80=9CIntelligence-Related Activities.=E2=80=9D These are technical =
programs to surveil military targets and connect the information to =
weapons. Generally speaking, their focus ensures their usefulness. =
Professional and political dysfunction, however, are rife in the other =
two thirds, the =E2=80=9CNational Intelligence Program.=E2=80=9D This is =
our subject.

Intelligence is an instrument of conflict. It is knowledge (or pretense =
thereof) that can help one force or team at the expense of another. But =
the gathering and management of secret information naturally tempts =
those in charge of it to marshal truths or lies to hurt competitors =
within their own side as well. That is why prudent statesmen have curbed =
such temptations by subordinating Intelligence to government operations =
that deal with foreigners.

By nature, Intelligence is not independent. It is a function defined by =
the operations it serves. That is why wise statesmen have considered =
Intelligence agencies that are un-tied to specific operational concerns =
to be inherently dangerous, as well as not so useful in foreign and =
military affairs. When the U.S. established CIA as an agency responsible =
only to the president, it broke new ground. Nothing concerned the =
authors of the 1947 National Security Act that established it so much as =
preventing it from interfering in domestic matters.

Yet, ab initio, CIA=E2=80=99s founding generation concerned itself with =
making national policy, arguably more than with anything else, and =
transmitted that concern to its successors. Today=E2=80=99s meddling in =
elections and trying to overturn their results is a logical consequence.

Police Intelligence is analogous. Statesmen manage its temptations by =
keeping it focused on crimes defined by law. Until the 1960s, the =
FBI=E2=80=99s focus on investigating violations of statutes, and the =
=E2=80=9Ccop mentality=E2=80=9D with which it dealt with national =
security issues, limited its interference in politics to gathering bits =
of dirt on politicians. By the 1970s, however, the FBI was joining CIA =
in supporting the causes and prejudices of its political homologues.

Today these Agencies=E2=80=99 naked threat to the president of the =
United States, conveyed by the opposition party=E2=80=99s leader, shows =
a power grab so big that, unless crushed, it puts them on the path trod =
by the Roman Empire=E2=80=99s Praetorian guard. Like the Roman =
Emperor=E2=80=99s supposed guardians, they claim to protect the City. =
But, as Attorney General William Barr noted, they have come to identify =
=E2=80=9Cthe national interest with their own political preferences,=E2=80=
=9D feeling that =E2=80=9Canyone who has a different opinion=E2=80=9D is =
somehow =E2=80=9Can enemy of the state.=E2=80=9D They now support their =
party in seizing power, =E2=80=9C[convincing] themselves that what =
they=E2=80=99re doing is in the higher interest, the better good.=E2=80=9D=


In short, CIA and FBI have become instruments of partisan power.

None of this, of course, has anything to do with the natural, proper =
functions of Intelligence.

The Soviet Cheka (KGB), the Nazi Gestsapo, the Chinese Communists=E2=80=99=
 Intelligence service (which they called =E2=80=9Cthe teeth of the =
dragon=E2=80=9D) as well as their contemporary epigones, are not about =
knowledge=E2=80=94not even about discovering who the regime=E2=80=99s =
enemies are. They are weapons=E2=80=94what the Soviets called the =
Party=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Csword and shield,=E2=80=9D made to hurt =
whomever the Party designates as enemies. Because the power to hurt =
people unaccountably is tyranny=E2=80=99s quintessential tool, competent =
tyrants limit such agencies=E2=80=99 powers by periodically purging =
them.

Power in America

Although a growing amount of the U.S. Intelligence agencies=E2=80=99 =
power comes from the kind of identification with the ruling party and =
class that is characteristic of totalitarian regimes=E2=80=94media, =
judiciary, etc.=E2=80=94in America it is ultimately founded on the =
public=E2=80=99s, especially the conservative sector thereof=E2=80=99s, =
acceptance of them as expert, impartial, brave public servants.

Changing that perception is prerequisite to any and all reform.

The U.S. Intelligence agencies=E2=80=99 record shows that they are the =
opposite: professionally incompetent and politically dysfunctional. That =
record=E2=80=99s exposure, demystifying Intelligence, would make it =
possible to return the Agencies to their natural, proper functions.

To firmly subordinate foreign Intelligence to military and diplomatic =
operations we must disestablish CIA and return its functions to the =
Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury. Since the FBI=E2=80=99s =
involvement in politics=E2=80=94and especially its justification =
thereof=E2=80=94also follows to some extent from its involvement in =
foreign affairs via anti-terrorism, re-establishing the distinction =
between Intelligence and law enforcement is essential. We must also =
repeal some of the laws and regulations that lately have empowered the =
Agencies=E2=80=99 misbehavior, notably the 1978 Foreign Intelligence =
Surveillance Act.

All this is now possible because, in recent years, the Agencies=E2=80=99 =
behavior has raised opposition on the political Right as well as on the =
Left.

Professional Dysfunction

CIA never did and never could fulfill the expectations placed on it.

Nothing could be farther from the truth than the supposition that its =
agents penetrate the world and have access to its secrets. 98% of CIA =
=E2=80=9Ccase officers=E2=80=9D are under =E2=80=9Cofficial =
cover,=E2=80=9D=E2=80=94mostly pretending to be diplomats. Hence, they =
are known as collectors of information for the U.S. government, and are =
limited to the social circles of U.S. government employees. The other 2% =
pretend to be working for U.S. companies.

Studies of cables from CIA stations show that the persons these officers =
claim as =E2=80=9Cagents=E2=80=9D are no such thing, and that their =
=E2=80=9Ctake=E2=80=9D is inferior in quality to that of U.S. diplomats. =
Most important, these so-called agent networks are not protected by =
anything that respectable professionals would call =
=E2=80=9Ccounterintelligence,=E2=80=9D i.e., quality control. So eager =
is CIA for anything that looks like agent information that it takes =
literally anything that looks like agent information and calls it good.

Often, what it gets is deadly disinformation. Consider: In December =
2009, an =E2=80=9Cagent=E2=80=9D walked into a meeting of CIA case =
officers and blew everyone to kingdom come. For the previous year and a =
half, CIA had relied on this agent=E2=80=99s information to order drone =
strikes killing God knows how many people whom he had falsely fingered =
as America=E2=80=99s enemies.

CIA=E2=80=99s analytical acumen is worse than carelessness. So much does =
CIA concentrate on spinning information to serve its own policy =
preferences that it cares little for accuracy. The higher up the chain =
any of its products go, the less fact and the more spin they contain. I =
once attended one of its top-secret, codeword-protected briefings on the =
Iran-Iraq war, in which the briefers referred to a map of the region =
which mis-labeled Iraq and Syria. As usual, the facts were window =
dressing for the spin.

CIA jealously guards its prerogative to well-nigh monopolize the flow of =
Intelligence to the president, Congress, and (via leaks) the public. It =
sets the subjects of and has the final word on single =E2=80=9Cnational =
Intelligence estimates=E2=80=9D (NIEs)=E2=80=94official versions of =
foreign realities. Seasoned observers can safely bet that these will =
come at a time and be written in a manner to bolster the Democratic =
party=E2=80=99s position on pending foreign policy questions. Reality be =
damned.

Between 1963 and 1978 annual NIEs on Soviet strategic forces stated that =
the Soviets would not try to match U.S. missiles=E2=80=99 numbers. When =
they matched them, the NIEs stated that they would not exceed them =
substantially. When they exceeded them substantially, the NIEs said that =
they would not equip them for counterforce warfare. When they so =
equipped them, the NIEs said that this did not matter.

As the U.S. government debated what to do about Iran=E2=80=99s nuclear =
program, CIA promulgated a special NIE that said that Iran had given up =
work on nuclear weapons. The team specially selected to write it were =
persons with a history of advocating leniency to Iran. Nor is this bias =
new: In 1950, CIA weighed in against General Douglas MacArthur on Korea =
policy both within the U.S. government and by supplying material for =
columns against his views by the New York Times=E2=80=99s James Reston.

The CIA=E2=80=99s bias is not mere incompetence. For more than a =
decade=E2=80=94during which, thanks to the treason of its own Aldrich =
Ames, the entire U.S. agent network in Moscow was under KGB =
control=E2=80=94CIA analysts still passed the =E2=80=9Ctake=E2=80=9D =
from that network to the president because, according to the Inspector =
General=E2=80=99s report, the analysts thought that the president should =
be acting as if these reports were true.

This is the same CIA that insisted for years that the GDP of East =
Germany=E2=80=94where whole families used to have to share a single tea =
bag and bananas were luxuries=E2=80=94was equal to that of West Germany, =
and that the Soviet Union=E2=80=99s ratio of military spending to GDP =
was the same as America=E2=80=99s. It was at least five times ours.

All of this is to say that, as regards strategic intelligence, CIA is =
usually worse than useless. For tactical intelligence, it is largely =
irrelevant. Intercepts of foreign communications are the one most useful =
source of tactical intelligence. NSA and the military do that. CIA often =
gets in the way of the military=E2=80=99s own needs for intelligence. =
Over the years, CIA has successfully lobbied Congress to prevent the =
military services from developing their own human collection networks, =
despite the fact that CIA=E2=80=99s own human assets are almost =
completely irrelevant to military needs.

Probably the only good result of the =E2=80=9Cwar on terror=E2=80=9D has =
been the Army=E2=80=99s and Marines=E2=80=99 forced resumption of =
responsibility for their own Intelligence, although restricted to the =
places where they must fight. The military services were always better =
equipped for human Intelligence because their officers=E2=80=94but =
especially their enlisted=E2=80=94are far more diverse racially, more =
versatile linguistically, and incomparably more accepting of personal =
risk than CIA=E2=80=99s case officers. The disparity is such that, in =
the early 2000s, CIA simply took over Army personnel, individually and =
as units, and used them for infiltrations of various kinds that its own =
people could not do and would not risk.

What, then, is CIA good for?

Its founding myth combines a historical falsehood with reference to =
technical circumstances that have not existed for at least a generation.

In 1947 and since, CIA=E2=80=99s advocates have argued that the surprise =
of Pearl Harbor happened because=E2=80=94although the information to =
indicate that Japan would attack Hawaii at 7am on December 7 existed in =
many pieces=E2=80=94no agency existed to put them together, to =
=E2=80=9Cconnect the dots.=E2=80=9D Had a place of central analysis =
existed, the disaster would have been avoided. Nonsense.

Our Navy had broken the Japanese diplomatic code and, from a succession =
of Tokyo=E2=80=99s messages to its Washington embassy, had concluded =
that the attack would happen in the place and at the time when it did. =
The Navy warned the White House and the War Department in time. But the =
latter=E2=80=99s warning to Pearl Harbor was sent by routine, and sat in =
Admiral Kimmel=E2=80=99s mailbox as the attack took place.

The truth that analysis of Intelligence must include a multiplicity of =
sources, and that a central repository of information is needed for =
that, was always the strongest argument for the existence of some sort =
of central facility where =E2=80=9Call source analysis=E2=80=9D could be =
done. But, since at least the 1980s, computers have made it possible and =
imperative for all analysts, regardless of their location, to access =
everything securely. Nowadays, ironically, CIA=E2=80=99s insistence on =
managing the access and distribution of information is the biggest =
barrier to universal, all-source Intelligence analysis.

Today, CIA is good for confidential meetings with the New York Times, =
theWashington Post, NBC News, etc., through which it joins=E2=80=94if it =
does not lead=E2=80=94campaigns to shape domestic American opinion.

What is the FBI good for?

Once upon a time, FBI foreign counterintelligence officers were cops =
first. Like all good cops, they knew the difference between the people =
on whose behalf they worked, and those who threaten them. They had =
graduated from places like Fordham, a Catholic, blue-collar university =
in the Bronx. Like T.V.=E2=80=99s Sergeant Joe Friday, they wore white =
shirts and said yes, sir, yes, ma=E2=80=99am. Unlike CIA case officers, =
FBI officers mixed with the kinds of people they investigated, and often =
went undercover themselves. The FBI jailed Capone and dismantled the =
Mafia. Because it used to take counterintelligence seriously, it was =
able to neutralize Soviet subversion in the USA. The old joke was that, =
in any meeting of the U.S. Communist Party or of its front groups, a =
majority of attendees were FBI agents. The only U.S. Intelligence =
penetration of the Kremlin was the FBI=E2=80=99s recruitment of a U.S. =
labor activist whom high-level Soviets trusted.

In the late 1970s, that began to change. Director William Webster =
(1978-87) refused to back up the officers who had infiltrated and =
surveilled the New Left=E2=80=99s collaboration with the Soviets against =
America in the Vietnam War. Webster also introduced contemporary =
political correctness into the FBI. Asked by the Senate Intelligence =
Committee why his FBI had neither infiltrated nor disrupted the Jim =
Jones cult that resulted in the deaths of 900 Americans in Jonestown, =
Guyana, he answered that he would no more have interfered with that =
religion than with the Catholic Church. Not incidentally, the Jim Jones =
cult was associated with the Democratic party.

Thus FBI officers became standard bureaucrats who learned to operate on =
the assumption that all Americans were equally likely as not to be =
proper targets of investigation. They replaced the distinctions by which =
they had previously operated with the classic bureaucratic imperative: =
look out for yourselves by making sure to please the powerful.

Webster=E2=80=99s FBI joined the ACLU as the principal sponsor of the =
1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which judicially =
pre-cleared all electronic surveillance operations through ex parte =
secret proceedings, despite warnings that such pre-clearance amounts to =
warrants for warrantless surveillance, and hence that it incentivizes =
political abuse.

The directorships of William Sessions and Louis Freeh, ending in 2001, =
did nothing to slow the FBI=E2=80=99s evolution along these lines. =
Reliance on pseudo-scientific =E2=80=9Cprofiling=E2=80=9D vastly reduced =
the felt need for scruples.

Thus did the Bureau practically convict an innocent man, Richard Jewell, =
of having bombed the 1996 Atlanta Olympics.

=46rom the beginning, the FBI=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Cprofiling=E2=80=9D =
process concluded that no foreign government or entity had been =
responsible for the dispatch of letters from a post office near where =
the 9/11 hijackers had lived containing weapons-grade anthrax. Rather, =
they claimed the attacks that killed five and injured 17 Americans had =
been the work of a lone, white, conservative scientist.

Thus it pursued and nearly broke one Steven Hatfill, whose lawsuit the =
government subsequently settled for $5.8 million. The FBI then turned =
its attention to someone else who fit its profile, Bruce Edward Ivins, =
whom it never charged but whom it ruined and hounded into suicide. After =
which it declared him guilty, but refused to make public the evidence on =
which it had reached its conclusion. Classified, you know? No one was =
ever charged with the crime. This matter defined Robert Mueller=E2=80=99s =
(2001-13) directorship.

The Bureau=E2=80=99s increasing adoption of military weapons and tactics =
further tempted its officials to shortcut intelligence for the sake of, =
well, war against disfavored persons and movements. In 1992 the Bureau =
conducted an 11-day war against the Randy Weaver family in a remote =
Idaho cabin, in which one law enforcement officer was killed along with =
the Weavers=E2=80=99 14-year-old son, and which ended with an FBI sniper =
killing Mrs. Weaver with baby in arms=E2=80=94and with an angry jury =
acquitting Weaver. A year later, the FBI ran another war against a =
religious cult in Texas that cost four lives.

And, oh yes, the FBI has protected America against such dangerous =
characters as Martha Stewart, Lewis Libby, and General Michael Flynn, by =
perfecting the technique of =E2=80=9Cperjury trapping=E2=80=9D (accusing =
someone of perjury by contrasting the target=E2=80=99s recollections =
with someone else=E2=80=99s) whoever is foolish enough to speak with its =
Special Agents.

Thus did the FBI become the politically weaponized, domestic danger it =
is today.

Political Dysfunction

The Intelligence agencies were the key element of the ruling class=E2=80=99=
s support of the Democratic Party in the 2016 election. Its senior =
officers, regarding themselves as guardians of their class=E2=80=99s =
right to rule, waged war on Trump=E2=80=99s candidacy.

There being no facts on which to base charges of Trump=E2=80=99s =
illegitimacy in office, the Agencies strove instead to create =
=E2=80=9Cpredicates=E2=80=9D for investigations, the very existence of =
which would substitute for facts and provide the bases for media =
accounts of Trump=E2=80=99s villainy. Since Trump was elected, the =
Agencies have been the indispensable element of the ruling class=E2=80=99s=
 =E2=80=9Cresistance.=E2=80=9D Through the media, they have defamed him =
using their hoary ploy: You must believe us because what we say is based =
on classified information. For that reason, your demand for =
corroboration threatens National Security.

CIA was first and foremost. Circa April 2016, it =E2=80=9Cvectored=E2=80=9D=
 some of its longstanding assets, including Stefan Halper in Britain and =
Joseph Mifsud in Italy, to approach low-level Trump advisers Carter Page =
and George Papadopoulos, respectively. Note: these agents were not =
seeking information. The meetings they initiated served as the factual =
bases for the outright lie that these advisers, and hence Trump, were =
involved in obtaining information from Russia to smear Hillary Clinton. =
This is the =E2=80=9Cnarrative=E2=80=9D that CIA conveyed to the media, =
whose renditions thereof would serve as a =E2=80=9Cpredicate=E2=80=9D =
(i.e. as a watered-down substitute for =E2=80=9Cprobable cause) to begin =
a formal investigation that would lead to more stories and lend further =
public force to the =E2=80=9Cnarrative=E2=80=9D: Trump as a Russian =
agent.

That narrative having taken root in the media by the summer of 2016, the =
Agencies initiated a formal counterintelligence investigation of the =
Trump campaign, along with a criminal investigation of him. This =
involved authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of the =
campaign and of him. But by this time, Intelligence surveillance of =
Trump had already been going on for months under Sec. 702 of the 1978 =
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Using this legal vehicle, Trump =
had been the real target though the surveillance was aimed nominally at =
the Russians. This is what Admiral Mike Rogers, head of the National =
Security Agency, told the president-elect on November 16, 2016, that =
caused him to move his transition headquarters to his NJ golf club.

It is essential to note that well before Trump was elected the extensive =
surveillance to which his campaign had been subjected had proved to U.S. =
Intelligence that neither he nor his had ever dealt with the Russians in =
any way about the election. None of the subsequent =E2=80=9Cinvestigations=
=E2=80=9D have unearthed anything that the Agencies did not already know =
months before November 2016. Nevertheless, these =E2=80=9Cinvestigations,=E2=
=80=9D based on the =E2=80=9Cnarrative=E2=80=9D that Trump had colluded, =
continued. They were not discovering facts. They were providing pretexts =
for accusations.

The supposition that the evidence exists in classified form remains the =
official excuse for the ruling class=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Cresistance=E2=80=9D=
 to the Trump administration, and a feature of the Democrats=E2=80=99 =
impeachment of him. Obviously, such =E2=80=9Cinvestigations=E2=80=9D by =
=E2=80=9CIntelligence=E2=80=9D are about acting as the =E2=80=9Csword =
and shield=E2=80=9D of the ruling party and of the class it represents =
by spreading political lies.

The Intelligence agencies=E2=80=99 bureaucratic/corporate interests also =
contributed to their war on Trump.

Trump=E2=80=99s primary foreign policy adviser during the campaign, =
Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, had been director of the Defense =
Intelligence Agency. Like other directors of DIA, he had developed =
antipathy for CIA, and supported plans for removing it from its =
paramount role in the Intelligence Community. As Trump=E2=80=99s =
prospective National Security adviser, he would have implemented those =
ideas. Flynn was also privy to the details of the Obama =
administration=E2=80=99s clandestine activities in Libya that had led to =
the embarrassing destruction of the U.S. mission there with the loss of =
four American lives.

Whatever damage could be done to Trump=E2=80=99s election prospects or =
eventual legitimacy, =E2=80=9Cgetting=E2=80=9D Flynn was a priority unto =
itself. On November 10, 2016, in a highly unusual act of interference =
with a successor, and almost certainly at CIA Director John Brennan=E2=80=99=
s suggestion, Obama warned Trump against hiring Flynn. On January 24, =
just after the inauguration, FBI agents interviewed Flynn about a wholly =
legitimate conversation with the Russian ambassador and, with the =
transcripts of the intercepts thereof in hand, led him into =
recollections of that conversation inconsistent with the transcript=E2=80=94=
on the basis of which he was charged with lying to a federal =
investigator, ruined financially, and forced to plead guilty to save his =
son from indictment.

The intelligence agencies=E2=80=99 hostility, and the black eye of =
Flynn=E2=80=99 s indictment, impacted the first round of Trump=E2=80=99s =
personnel choices and forced him to look over his shoulder.

No sooner had Trump begun appointing officials than the CIA began to =
effectively veto his choices by denying them security clearances=E2=80=94i=
n the prototypical January 2017 case of NSC official Michael Townley, =
because he had been critical of the Agency. The FBI slow-walked =
investigations for security clearances.

No one disputes that any President has plenary authority to grant and =
remove clearances. But Trump chose to defer to the Agencies. Trump also =
deferred to the Agencies with regard to what documents are or are not =
legitimately classified, giving them free rein to =E2=80=9Cleak=E2=80=9D =
their versions thereof to the news media and to retreat behind security =
classification=E2=80=99s shield.

Presidential policies are only words, unless implemented by people =
committed to them. But as a result of this deference to his enemies, =
three years into the Trump administration only a fourth of presidential =
positions have been filled and Trump hops on one leg instead of running =
on four. At this rate, the Trump administration is sure to end without =
ever really having existed=E2=80=94which is the idea.

In sum, it is difficult to overstate the effect of the intelligence =
agencies=E2=80=99 participation in the =E2=80=9Cresistance.=E2=80=9D Why =
Trump has suffered their behavior is irrelevant.

FISA and Official Secrets

The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is not least among the =
incentives that have contributed to the U.S. Intelligence agencies=E2=80=99=
 professional and political dysfunction. One of the unintended =
consequences of secret judicial imprimaturs on investigations is that =
the FISA courts confer the status of official secrets on the results. At =
the same time, the U.S. government has been claiming that the Espionage =
Act demands that classified information be afforded something like the =
deference mandated by Britain=E2=80=99s Official Secrets Act. All this =
has empowered and emboldened bureaucrats.

By the late 1970s the intelligence bureaucracies=E2=80=94CIA, FBI, =
NSA=E2=80=94had become leery of conducting any electronic surveillance, =
even of Soviet Bloc embassies and persons, because some American =
leftists who had worked with said embassies against the U.S. in the =
Vietnam war had filed lawsuits against prominent individuals in these =
bureaucracies. Hence the agents clamored for judicial warrants to =
protect them from lawsuits in national security cases in the same way =
they are protected in cases of wiretaps for domestic criminal purposes.

Trouble was=E2=80=94and is=E2=80=94that to ask a judge for a warrant in =
any ordinary court is eventually to reveal the surveillance to the =
objects thereof. The bureaucracies asked Congress to square the circle =
by establishing a court to rule ex parte, secretly. But FISA, by =
providing judicial pre-authorization for many of our national security =
bureaucracies=E2=80=99 actions, is perverting the American legal system =
and fostering a secret body of common law hostile to civil liberties.

Prior to FISA, the intelligence bureaucracies=E2=80=99 actions, although =
unquestionable a priori because undertaken secretly, could always be =
questioned openly and thoroughly ex post facto. Once FISA became law =
however, the defense that any given act was good because it was lawful =
made substantive questioning far more difficult. It is also more =
difficult because the information=E2=80=99s classified status now enjoys =
judicial approval.

In 1978, the American Bar Association invited me to debate the issue =
with professor Antonin Scalia at the University of Chicago=E2=80=99s law =
school. I said that requiring judicial authorization for an executive =
action in pursuit of national security is an unconstitutional =
obstruction of the president=E2=80=99s power as commander-in-chief. =
Scalia agreed, but pointed out that the president, i.e., the =
bureaucracies, had agreed to support involving judges in national =
security because they realized that the obstruction is theoretical =
rather than practical: FISA=E2=80=99s secret court, having no basis for =
judging what is or is not required for national security, would merely =
give the Agencies the confidence to do their jobs. I countered that this =
very confidence would be problematic: although strictly speaking the =
court could confer only a procedural imprimatur, in practice that =
imprimatur would shield the bureaucracies=E2=80=94and the =
President=E2=80=94from having to defend the substantive value, and the =
propriety, of any act of surveillance.

I also pointed out that ex parte secrecy had been the defining feature =
of England=E2=80=99s infamous =E2=80=9CStar Chamber=E2=80=9D=E2=80=94the =
very negation of Anglo-Saxon due process. Scalia agreed, but pointed out =
that the FISA court=E2=80=99s jurisdiction would be very limited. I =
countered that Congress could expand that foreign body, and that it =
would expand in practice. Scalia said that we were debating only the law =
then proposed, as indeed we were.

But the law=E2=80=99s logic asserted itself. Already in the 1980s the =
Intelligence Committees were receiving requests to place authorization =
for FBI infiltration of domestic groups =E2=80=9Cof national security =
interest=E2=80=9D within the FISA system. In 2001 Congress and the =
President enacted section 702, which effectively authorizes all manner =
of warrantless surveillance of Americans so long as it is excused as =
=E2=80=9Cincidental=E2=80=9D to collection on foreigners.

FISA became law because the Intelligence Agencies=E2=80=99 (primarily =
FBI=E2=80=99s) concerns dovetailed with those of the sincere =
ACLU-variety liberals of that time. The liberals then believed that =
involving the judiciary in decisions to wiretap foreigners, and drafting =
guidelines severely to limit the retention and use of data collected =
incidentally about =E2=80=9CU.S. persons,=E2=80=9D would gradually =
extend the Fourth Amendment=E2=80=99s standards of =E2=80=9Cprobable =
cause=E2=80=9D plus warrants to foreign Intelligence. At the time, I =
warned fellow Senate staffer John Elliff and other liberal drafters =
agonizing over the rules=E2=80=99 minutiae that their words were not =
housebreaking Intelligence, but rather giving bureaucrats the means of =
covering political surveillance with a cloak of pretend =
legality=E2=80=94providing them with temptations they eventually could =
not resist. They were legalizing Watergate.

Watergate, recall, was an attempt by two of President Nixon=E2=80=99s =
staffers to gather information about the opposition party=E2=80=99s 1972 =
presidential campaign. That anyone connected with the U.S. government =
should use government resources to disadvantage a political opponent was =
scandalous. Barriers to investigating it were judged just as scandalous, =
and all involved in Watergate were punished severely.

As noted above, U.S. government Intelligence began electronic =
surveillance of Trump as soon as it became possible that he would be the =
Republican nominee. In the spring of 2016 it also infiltrated his =
campaign with its agents and instituted =
investigations=E2=80=94counterintelligence and criminal=E2=80=94soon =
thereafter. This was Watergate on a massive scale.

By October, the surveillance and investigations had turned up nothing =
that substantiated the notorious =E2=80=9CSteele Dossier=E2=80=9D that =
the media had been touting since summer. Never mind the charges that =
Trump was beholden to Russia=E2=80=94they failed to turn up anything =
that would derail Trump upon release. Hence, when it began to seem =
possible that Trump might win, the bureaucrats who had ordered the =
surveillance and investigations faced the possibility of having to =
explain by what right they had done it.

FISA was available for legal cover. In a nutshell: they re-packaged the =
Steele Dossier on which the public charges had been based and presented =
it to the FISA court, nominally to get a warrant for surveillance of =
low-level Trump adviser Carter Page and the rest of the campaign. They =
did this in late October=E2=80=94far too close to the election to obtain =
any information useful in that regard. The Agencies having surveiled =
Trump for seven months, the warrant served neither the gathering of =
information nor any offensive purpose.

Instead, through the Carter Page warrant, the FBI got the Court to =
warrant, by political implication, the surveillance that had begun in =
April under Section 702, as well as the counterintelligence/criminal =
investigation (initiated formally on July 31, but actually begun in =
April). FBI officials were able to do this because at least some of the =
federal judges who staff the FISA Court had become part of the same =
political party.

In 1972 nobody had to ask whether or not the president=E2=80=99s men who =
burglarized the DNC suite at the Watergate Hotel were committing the =
(only in America) high political crime of using government power against =
the opposition candidate. The only question was =E2=80=9Cwhat did the =
president know, and when did he know it?=E2=80=9D Nor were there any =
legal obstacles to obtaining any documents or testimony regarding who =
had done what. Since a crime was involved, the courts struck down the =
president=E2=80=99s claim of executive privilege.

But in 2016, when the president=E2=80=99s men used the full power of the =
FBI and CIA to surveil and defeat the opposition candidate and then to =
de-legitimize the election=E2=80=99s winner, they were confident knowing =
they had acted with the FISA Court=E2=80=99s imprimatur, and that the =
bureaucratic machine=E2=80=94Inspectors General, etc.=E2=80=94would =
agree that that their request to the Court had been properly =
=E2=80=9Cpredicated.=E2=80=9D They turned out to be correct.

Since early 2017, as first a trickle and then a flood of evidence has =
become public that all four of the FISA court=E2=80=99s approvals of =
surveillance warrants were based essentially on political lies, no judge =
has hauled in any bureaucrat to face comeuppance for contempt of court. =
Nor have any judges complained of having been fooled. Only in 2020, =
after the Justice Department officially informed the FISA Court that at =
least two of the warrants it had issued were based on fraudulent =
presentations, did the Court acknowledge that these warrants had been =
issued invalidly.

Moreover, since the bureaucrats=E2=80=99 submissions to the Court were =
classified, the CIA, FBI, and Justice Department bureaucracies refused =
even Congress=E2=80=99s and the new president=E2=80=99s demands to see =
them, unredacted. Classified, you know?

But why give implicit respect to claims of classification?

Under the Espionage Act, Federal officers can classify the information =
they generate as =E2=80=9Cconfidential=E2=80=9D if, according to their =
judgment, its publication would =E2=80=9Charm=E2=80=9D the United =
States; as =E2=80=9Csecret=E2=80=9D if they think the harm would be =
=E2=80=9Cserious=E2=80=9D; and as =E2=80=9Ctop secret=E2=80=9D if they =
judges the prospective harm =E2=80=9Cespecially serious.=E2=80=9D =
Classification being merely the classifier=E2=80=99s opinion, =
publication or release of classified information is not a crime in =
America, unless it can be shown that it was harmful, and that the person =
either knew it would do harm or acted recklessly.

But now, because of ruling class solidarity and bureaucratic =
self-interest, a classified stamp increasingly endows documents with the =
status of Official Secrets, and the documents=E2=80=99 possessor with =
the authority to withhold them =E2=80=93 while briefing the press on his =
version of them with impunity.

In sum, FISA=E2=80=99s judicial involvement in national security affairs =
made Watergate-type operations into lawful tools of government power. =
But also, by the logic of power and class solidarity, it has contributed =
to making the protection of security into a system that allows the =
well-connected to make accusations anonymously while making it =
impossible for those accused to fully defend themselves on substance. =
FISA has helped make National Security secrecy the last refuge of =
scoundrels.

Remedies

Americans, ruling class included, share an interest in removing the =
Intelligence Agencies from domestic politics and refocusing them on =
their natural functions. Yes, they have served, and are serving now as =
the ruling class=E2=80=99s sword and shield. Yet this class=E2=80=99s =
members know that Praetorians=E2=80=99 natural tendency is to govern on =
their own account. Knowledge of Intelligence=E2=80=99s power to =
arbitrate intra-ruling class struggles is the reason why Stalin purged =
and killed KGB chief Nikolai Yezhov and Khrushchev did the same to =
Lavrentiy Beria, why Mao did it to Kang Sheng, and why Fidel Castro =
executed General Arnaldo Ochoa S=C3=A1nchez on trumped-up charges.

Without switching allegiances, the Sword and Shield=E2=80=99s handlers =
can ruin their patrons merely by taking sides in their internecine =
quarrels. In fact, the U.S. Agencies=E2=80=99 outsized impact on the =
2016 election and aftermath began when someone hacked into the DNC=E2=80=99=
s e-mails, the publication of which showcased that the Party hierarchy =
had taken Hillary Clinton=E2=80=99s side against insurgent Bernie =
Sanders. The FBI, by not pressing an investigation into who had done the =
hacking while espousing the baseless narrative that =E2=80=9Cthe =
Russians=E2=80=9D had done it to help Trump, helped avert intra-Democrat =
bloodletting while boosting Clinton. When the next internal clash comes, =
the Agencies could well decide the contest.

Here is a sketch of the major measures by which any president and =
Congress could help guard the Republic against the Agencies, in =
ascending order of importance and difficulty.

Repeal FISA

Were the executive branch to challenge FISA in court, it is difficult to =
imagine the argument by which to sustain the constitutionality of =
involving the Judiciary in national security surveillance.

Neither Professor Scalia nor anyone else made any such arguments in =
1978. At the time, civil libertarians accepted in good faith the =
immunities that FISA was giving the Agencies in exchange for their =
good-faith promise to take seriously the parchment barriers contained in =
the law. The Justice Department winked at this accord=E2=80=99s patent =
un-constitutionality because it removed objections to needed =
surveillance of foreigners while posing no immediate threats. Hence, =
FISA became known as =E2=80=9Can indispensable tool=E2=80=9D for =
national security=E2=80=94as if needed surveillance had never been done =
before FISA and could not take place without it. But as the years wore =
on, good faith succumbed to partisanship, and tolerating little =
violations of the Constitution for noble purposes had its usual effects.

Today, there is no more good faith.

Today, FISA=E2=80=99s existence (and expansion under Section 702) having =
facilitated gross U.S. governmental interference in our political =
process, there is broad consensus on the need for =E2=80=9Ca legislative =
fix.=E2=80=9D But because the problem lies in FISA=E2=80=99s very =
premise=E2=80=94the secret mingling of judicial and executive power=E2=80=94=
no such fix is possible. This being so, any legislative remedies=E2=80=94m=
ore elaborate standards and procedures, maybe even mandating a =
=E2=80=9Cdevil=E2=80=99s advocate=E2=80=9D=E2=80=94must be equally as =
vulnerable to partisan re-interpretation as the ones that John Elliff =
and friends elaborated in 1978. Parchment barriers notwithstanding, =
purpose-driven bureaucrats and friendly judges acting together in secret =
can do whatever they want.

With regard to Intelligence surveillance as with anything else, the =
Constitution makes it possible for the Judiciary to restrain the =
Executive by forcing each to work by their own rules. The Executive may =
work in secret. But the Judiciary may choose to examine that secret work =
in its own public sphere. The very possibility of a public hearing is =
greater incentive for the Executive to adhere to its own rules than =
submitting applications to an ex parte court in secret. Separation of =
powers=E2=80=94each branch concentrating on fulfilling its own =
responsibilities=E2=80=94is the U.S. Constitution=E2=80=99s genius.

Repealing FISA outright is as simple as the removal of a priori =
justification would be sobering. Minus FISA, the Agencies would find =
malfeasance more hazardous and more difficult to hide. Only Congress can =
repeal it. But the president can achieve the same effect by challenging =
FISA=E2=80=99s constitutionality in the Supreme Court, while ordering =
the Agencies not to submit any applications to the FISA Court. But =
changing the CIA=E2=80=99s and FBI=E2=80=99s habit of acting as partisan =
policymakers and, most recently, of throwing their weight around in =
domestic politics, will require reducing the Agencies=E2=80=99 size, =
resources, and pretenses.

Shear

The U.S. Intelligence community=E2=80=99s size=E2=80=94some $58 Billion =
annually for the National Intelligence Plan=E2=80=94ensures that those =
who administer it control a lot of careers, contracts, consultancies, =
and high-level contacts. That much money and power, added to the =
capacity to shield the basis of its pronouncements, comports prestige in =
spite of substantive incompetence.

Wasteful activity is the least of the problem. Much of what happens =
within Intelligence is counterproductive. Worse, the sense of power that =
comes from managing such big things=E2=80=94while having near-total =
control of how their own management is explained=E2=80=94accustoms its =
officials to a ruinous sense of entitlement to having their own way. As =
the Intelligence community has grown in size=E2=80=94nearly doubling =
since 9/11=E2=80=94it is becoming ever more a political force that =
pursues its own objectives.

Hence, shearing U.S. Intelligence=E2=80=94cutting down or out functions =
that are wasteful or dysfunctional=E2=80=94is an indispensable means to =
refocusing the Agencies on their proper functions. Shearing also creates =
opportunities for replacing the officials whom the bureaucracy had =
selected as its champions with ones chosen to do what they should while =
eschewing domestic politics. Nothing quite so focuses bureaucrats=E2=80=99=
 minds as the clear and present possibility of reductions in force.

This is truest regarding CIA, the Community=E2=80=99s most politicized =
part, which wields outsized influence in Washington and in the media. =
=46rom the beginning, the Agency took on a peculiar socio-political =
character and gathered its personnel=E2=80=99s allegiance to itself =
rather than to the president=E2=80=94or to the United States. Legally, =
shearing CIA is the easiest of tasks because, by the law that =
established it, its employees may be hired, managed, and fired strictly =
at the president=E2=80=99s pleasure.

The candidates for shearing include major technical Intelligence =
programs that have become known to their targets, and which hence have =
become potential avenues of disinformation. Many of CIA=E2=80=99s human =
Intelligence operations should also be considered for shearing because =
of their structural operational insecurity. Since lack of operational =
security and quality control is arguably U.S. Intelligence=E2=80=99s =
major shortcoming, lack of these features in any given programs should =
put it on the chopping block.

The gargantuan amounts of metadata of U.S. telephone calls and emails =
have been judged useless and worse: the infrastructure for storing them =
should be eliminated.

Much if not most of the Community=E2=80=99s vast network of consultants =
has always been a kind of echo chamber and welfare system for the =
well-connected, and should be eliminated.

CIA=E2=80=99s Directorate of Intelligence, vastly overstaffed and =
specializing in groupthink, tries to be the U.S. government=E2=80=99s =
official interpreter of foreign reality=E2=80=94a worse than useless =
function. The Community=E2=80=99s very size has occasioned the =
establishment of support structures, such as the National Intelligence =
University, to prepare persons for service in it. Surely, these should =
be abolished.

Not least of the benefits from the cuts would come from explaining to =
the public how they remedy wrongs and improve performance. Such =
explanations would also temper the resistance they would generate.

Since the reduction and possible elimination of programs impacts the =
interests of well-connected officials=E2=80=94and especially of =
corporate contractors=E2=80=94resistance and lobbying are sure to be =
fierce. But the personal, private motivation of these factional =
interests can serve as an argument for why the cuts are in the national =
interest. Each cut should be made in ways that de-mystify Intelligence, =
and put it in its natural place as the servant rather than the master of =
government.

Getting It Right

The trope that knowledge of others=E2=80=99 secrets is prerequisite to =
understanding how we should deal with them is the reverse of the truth. =
In fact unless we know who we are and what=E2=80=99s good for us; unless =
ordinary intercourse has taught us what others are about; unless we use =
our intelligence in the ordinary sense of the word, secret Intelligence =
can only confuse us. And in fact, though the United States has never =
suffered because our officials lacked knowledge of others=E2=80=99 =
secrets, the American people have suffered much from their willful =
ignorance of the realities against which they continue to stub our toes.

All too often, they have used Intelligence to counter common sense. =
During the Cold War, arguments over secret tidbits about Soviet weapons =
allowed policymakers to sidestep the question before them: how shall we =
defend America? More recently, arguments about Iraq=E2=80=99s and =
Iran=E2=80=99s Weapons of Mass Destruction obscured the real question: =
what is our interest in the Middle East, and how shall we serve it?

Intelligence being policy=E2=80=99s natural servant, it cannot carry any =
policy=E2=80=99s burden. Intelligence can help intelligently conceived =
policy to succeed. But it cannot rescue congenitally dumb policy. Asked =
to address students at the National Intelligence University who were =
asking what they could do to help our troops in Afghanistan, I could =
only set their consciences at ease: No amount of Intelligence could help =
distinguish between friendly Youssef and unfriendly Ahmed, never mind =
turn the latter into the former.

At home as well, it turns out that lack of intelligence is more =
troublesome than lack of Intelligence. Almost all acts of terrorism are =
perpetrated by persons already well known to local law enforcement or to =
the FBI. The perpetrators are not =E2=80=9Clone wolves=E2=80=9D out of =
nowhere, but known wolves, known to Intelligence but not to =
intelligence. At home like abroad, our real need is for ordinary =
intelligence, along with ordinary virtues.

Hence, as we reshape U.S. Intelligence to better serve the Republic, we =
need not fear that we will deprive ourselves of knowledge for our own =
protection.

Function and Intelligence

Secrets help refine plans for action. They do not define action=E2=80=99s =
parameters. Their value depends on the difference they make to the =
plans=E2=80=99 success. That is why Intelligence is normally =
subordinated to operations. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Diplomatic service =
used to collect such secrets as they needed. Specific supply followed =
specific demand. But by establishing CIA as the central organ of U.S. =
intelligence, the 1947 National Security Act reversed this natural =
order.

CIA was to be responsible for no operations except for such covert =
activities as the President might order.

The Act granted CIA a near monopoly on human collection and =
communication with the president and Congress on Intelligence matters. =
It subordinated the Intelligence activities of the government=E2=80=99s =
operating departments to CIA supervision. These departments now keep =
control of Intelligence in which CIA is uninterested and get most of the =
Intelligence they need from or through CIA. Hence, they get what the CIA =
system produces, given its own interests and capacities, regardless of =
their own needs. Because the Agency soon developed its own particular =
predilections, the gap between what the operators need and what CIA has =
available has always been wide. U.S. Intelligence became controlled by =
the producers of secret information=E2=80=94not by its consumers. The =
results have been comparable to those of other producer-dominated =
systems.

CIA was created specifically and primarily to serve the president of the =
United States. Informing him is its primary job. But, from the =
beginning, CIA officers crossed the line between informing the president =
and claiming the right to form his mind=E2=80=94as well as the rest of =
the government=E2=80=99s mind. Ever less subtly, CIA has claimed that it =
is improper, even illegitimate, for anyone in the U.S. government, =
including the president, to act or even to think about foreign affairs =
contrary to its own supremely authoritative judgments. Over the decades, =
the media have echoed CIA=E2=80=99s complaints whenever presidents have =
acted regardless of or against CIA=E2=80=99s recommendations.

This is doubly wrong. Yes the president, constitutionally responsible as =
he is for the conduct of the armed forces and foreign relations, must =
have an architectonic view of what he is up against. But that does not =
mean that his advisers can know the military=E2=80=99s and the diplomats =
needs for information. Much less does it authorize the standard CIA view =
that its job =E2=80=9Ccomprises all the major evaluative and predictive =
functions=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cleaves the policy-maker little or =
nothing in the decision-making process except the ceremonial finale.=E2=80=
=9D But this has been the basis for its attempts to substitute =
bureaucratic authority for that of officials responsible to voters. =
CIA=E2=80=99s complaints are another instance of our ruling class=E2=80=99=
s attempt to push aside representative government in favor of the =
Administrative State.

In sum, since 1947, U.S. Intelligence=E2=80=99s basic structure has =
separated the collection and analysis of secrets from the functions they =
should serve. Having created a presidential Agency with no functions to =
fulfill for which it may be held responsible has encouraged that =
Agency=E2=80=94and others by imitation=E2=80=94to presume presidential =
powers. A non-responsible agency became irresponsible. We should reverse =
the process.

Responsibilities

Congress, being beholden to the Agencies=E2=80=99 contractors, enmeshed =
with their bureaucracy, and ignorant of their failings given their =
oversight Committees=E2=80=99 unserious oversight, (Devin Nunes=E2=80=99s =
2015-19 chairmanship on the House side and Malcolm Wallop=E2=80=99s =
1981-85 budget chairmanship on the Senate side excepted) will not amend =
the 1947 National Security Act until it learns that it should. The =
president can help it learn by exercising his substantial authority to =
subordinate Intelligence to the government functions it is supposed to =
serve. Exercising that authority requires more attention to Intelligence =
than presidents heretofore have wanted to devote. But, the Agencies =
having played such a prominent part in the Resistance against President =
Trump, neither he nor any future president can afford not to force them =
out of politics while focusing them on their jobs.

The President should end the CIA=E2=80=99s monopoly on providing =
Intelligence to himself and the NSC; demand to receive his Intelligence =
briefings from State, Defense, and Treasury as well; order CIA to stop =
characterizing the documents that it produces as authoritatively and =
exclusively of =E2=80=9Cnational=E2=80=9D status and encourage other =
agencies to create whatever documents and briefings might flow from =
their expertise. By doing so the president would broaden the =
perspectives to which the top levels of government are exposed, =
introduce open intellectual competition in the analysis of Intelligence, =
and remove Intelligence officers=E2=80=99 temptation to substitute their =
judgment for that of responsible officials. Top officials, and the =
president himself, having become habituated to receiving just one =
perspective, would feel the weight of additional responsibility.

This would also be a first step in the parceling out of CIA=E2=80=99s =
functions, and a demonstration of the benefits thereof.

The President should also end the CIA=E2=80=99s near monopoly on human =
Intelligence. The need for Intelligence from persons under covers other =
than the ones CIA provides is undeniable. CIA did not object to the =
creation of a corps of undercover agents in the Justice Department=E2=80=99=
s Drug Enforcement Agency because its own people would not even try to =
do that dirty, dangerous work. Heretofore, however, it has objected to =
the military running its own deep cover agents. The president should =
override those objections and direct OMB to budget funds for such human =
Intelligence as the Services think necessary for military operations. =
Broadening the Services=E2=80=99 collection would also enrich the =
DOD=E2=80=99s analytical products.

Most of the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance =
Office are properly run by the military for military needs. But =
substantial technical systems that are aimed at political Intelligence =
are planned and controlled by CIA. Since the =E2=80=9Ctake=E2=80=9D =
therefrom is useful primarily for foreign relations, the State =
Department is best fit to judge what it needs from them. The President =
should decide to reorganize accordingly.

The covert exercise of political and paramilitary influence was not =
least of the reasons for CIA=E2=80=99s establishment. But international =
law does not treat threats, blandishments, support, or opposition any =
differently if done with greater or lesser degrees of secrecy. In =
retrospect, influence on other countries being the proximate purpose of =
foreign relations, the benefits of maintaining the =E2=80=9Cplausible =
deniability=E2=80=9D (utter secrecy of actions being inherently =
impossible) of U.S. influence are difficult to understand.

Subsequent experience makes it more difficult to avoid the conclusion =
that covert action=E2=80=99s covertness was always meant to allow the =
U.S. government to avoid publicly confronting the question =E2=80=9Cwhat =
are we doing in the world on whose behalf?=E2=80=9D because it is the =
flip side of the core domestic question: =E2=80=9Cwho and what among us =
is right, and wrong?=E2=80=9D

CIA=E2=80=99s covert actions=E2=80=99 covertness within the U.S. =
government resulted in not sufficiently thinking through their =
consequences. Worse, covertness allowed the U.S. government to defer =
basic choices between foreign policy alternatives. Often, while the =
State Department pursued option A, the government would keep option B =
alive through CIA. Multi-track policy has also been instrumental in =
erasing the distinction between war and peace.

The president should decide to abolish the ruinous category =E2=80=9Ccover=
t action=E2=80=9D and hence make the State Department responsible for =
the exercise of all manner of political influence abroad, and the =
military services responsible for military and paramilitary affairs.

The President of the United States should control Intelligence by the =
very means by which he controls all other parts of the National Security =
establishment: The National Security Council. That is, assuming that he =
controls it, and not the other way around.=