Re: [PATCH] gpg: Exclude revoked UTKs from the key validation process.
Philip via Gnupg-devel <[email protected]> Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:14:05 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi, thank you for the report. On Sun, 7 Jun 2026 18:36:53 +0200 Glop via Gnupg-devel <[email protected]> wrote: > In order to reproduce this: > 1. Generate a new public/secret key pair (say, MyKey). > 2. Import a new public key in the keyring (say, OtherKey). > 3. Sign OtherKey using MyKey. > 4. Check that OtherKey has now `full` validity. > 5. Revoke MyKey. > 6. Run `gpg --check-trustdb` to forcefully update the trust DB. > 7. Check the validity of OtherKey: it still shows `full`, while > it should in fact be `unknown`, since MyKey's signature should > not be trusted anymore. > > I tried this on the GnuPG 2.4 and 2.5 branches, and both are impacted. I could not reproduce this with GnuPG 2.4.9 and 2.5.20. After Step 6 `gpg --check-trustdb` the formerly "[ full ]" trusted key is shown with "[ unknown]" trust. In your test, was the 'OtherKey' maybe signed by any other keys than 'MyKey'? Philip -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iJEEARYKADkWIQR0sOOYYQjr3oh+QUt7hfBywO1/7gUCai/sjRsUgAAAAAAEAA5t YW51MiwyLjUrMS4xMiwyLDIACgkQe4XwcsDtf+4dhAEAjYb4ooEWttws+l6Vm5Ow PFrXaxMp8Td1TMwlD0tVfx0A/0xHWtFrDY+Srov2xJwT2AohXJwL2Ca+ABK+qBoO IC4K =XtYK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----