[PATCH 5/7] cipher-gcm: assert 32 KiB input cap in gcm_ctr_encrypt

* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (gcm_ctr_encrypt): Assert input length cap that
keeps CTR-wrap chunk math from overflowing.
--

gcm_ctr_encrypt handles the 32-bit CTR wrap by computing a chunk size
in u32 arithmetic that could overflow for a single multi-gigabyte
input. This was reported as a reachable assertion failure, but sole
caller gcm_crypt_inner caps input at 32 KiB for cache locality, so
num_ctr_increments and the chunk length stay small and the overflow
is unreachable. Assert the cap to document that instead of changing
the arithmetic.

Reported-by: JEAN Jeremy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]>
---
 cipher/cipher-gcm.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/cipher/cipher-gcm.c b/cipher/cipher-gcm.c
index c04683f8..e6a4df0f 100644
--- a/cipher/cipher-gcm.c
+++ b/cipher/cipher-gcm.c
@@ -815,6 +815,11 @@ gcm_ctr_encrypt (gcry_cipher_hd_t c, byte *outbuf, size_t outbuflen,
 {
   gcry_err_code_t err = 0;
 
+  /* Input is capped to 32KiB by gcm_crypt_inner() for better cache
+   * locality.  As side-effect, CTR overflow checks below do not
+   * overflow. */
+  gcry_assert(inbuflen <= 32 * 1024);
+
   while (inbuflen)
     {
       u32 nblocks_to_overflow;
-- 
2.53.0