Re: Adding support for optimistic preauth to kinit
Sam Hartman <[email protected]> Mon, 26 Apr 2021 11:46:30 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.kerberos.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <010001790e0096af-45a15a4c-bb97-438a-8e6e-7e8015e4c2da-000000@email.amazonses.com> |
>>>>> "Ken" == Ken Hornstein <[email protected]> writes: >> I think the problem is both harder and easier than this. >> >> Each preauth mechanism works differently, and some lend >> themselves to optimistic preauth better than others: [...] Ken> That's all fair, and I admit that this is kind of the Ken> intersection of what's available in terms of the API and the Ken> complexity of the preauth code. Ken> Really, the REAL goal is to force a particular preauth Ken> mechanism. We have patches to kinit that make it so when kinit Ken> is called as "pkinit", it will try PKINIT by default. The way Ken> this is done is by setting the optimistic preauth list. But Ken> that has the sub-optimal behavior of making it that if PKINIT Ken> doesn't work, it falls back to a password prompt (well, that Ken> happens if PKINIT fails in the context of loading the plugin or Ken> some other initial setup fails). As part of designing FAST and the preauth framework, we kind of accepted that we were effectively killing off optimistic preauth. In the generalized case you might need either the hint data or some other information from the KDC to get started, and in the general case, once you've started you cannot really restart (without completily restarting over and possibly implementing lockout counters). Also, one of the goals of FAST was to get to a point where after you got the initial KDC reply you could present all the UI you would ever present. Feedback we got on the GUI side was thet models like PAM keyboard interactive didn't work welll. I think that having a list of preauth mechanisms the client hopes to use (or a single mechanism) makes sense, but trying to reduce round trips is close to incompatible with other design constraints that came up with FAST/the preauth framework. I don't think we forbid anything in the spec, but we definitely acknowledged that optimistic was going to be nearly impossible in the general case. --Sam _______________________________________________ krbdev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/krbdev