Re: KDC TGT enctype selection question
Ken Hornstein via krbdev <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2023 17:23:17 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.kerberos.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
>I would go even further and say that it is a design assumption of MIT krb5 >that all KDCs are just separate instances of the same logical instance and are >assumed to behave "identically" (i.e., with identical configuration). I'm going to reiterate my earlier statement: THIS IS NOT AN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION. >As Nico says, this particular case seems like the KDC knowing that the enctype >list is sorted strongest-to-weakest, and also knowing that "the KDC" is the >only entity that can create this ciphertext, so enforcing that the strongest >key is being used and preventing by construction any brute-force or other >attacks on krbtgt keys of other enctypes. I'm a little unclear how you could try brute-forcing the "wrong" TGT key in this situation without submitting 2^keylength TGT requests. Again, it is possible I am missing something. --Ken _______________________________________________ krbdev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/krbdev