krb5-1.21 is released

Greg Hudson <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.comp.encryption.kerberos.general
Message-ID <[email protected]>
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The MIT Kerberos Team announces the availability of MIT Kerberos 5
Release 1.21.  Please see below for a list of some major changes
included, or consult the README file in the source tree for a more
detailed list of significant changes.

RETRIEVING KERBEROS 5 RELEASE 1.21
==================================

You may retrieve the Kerberos 5 Release 1.21 source from the
following URL:

        https://kerberos.org/dist/

The homepage for the krb5-1.21 release is:

        https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.21/

Further information about Kerberos 5 may be found at the following
URL:

        https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/

and at the MIT Kerberos Consortium web site:

        https://www.kerberos.org/


PAC transitions
===============

Beginning with release 1.20, the KDC will include minimal PACs in
tickets instead of AD-SIGNEDPATH authdata.  S4U requests (protocol
transition and constrained delegation) must now contain valid PACs in
the incoming tickets.  Beginning with release 1.21, service ticket
PACs will contain a new KDC checksum buffer, to mitigate a hash
collision attack against the old KDC checksum.  If only some KDCs in a
realm have been upgraded across versions 1.20 or 1.21, the upgraded
KDCs will reject S4U requests containing tickets from non-upgraded
KDCs and vice versa.

Triple-DES and RC4 transitions
==============================

Beginning with the krb5-1.21 release, the KDC will not issue tickets
with triple-DES or RC4 session keys unless explicitly configured using
the new allow_des3 and allow_rc4 variables in [libdefaults].  To
facilitate the negotiation of session keys, the KDC will assume that
all services can handle aes256-sha1 session keys unless the service
principal has a session_enctypes string attribute.

Beginning with the krb5-1.19 release, a warning will be issued if
initial credentials are acquired using the des3-cbc-sha1 encryption
type.  Beginning with the krb5-1.21 release, a warning will also be
issued for the arcfour-hmac encryption type.  In future releases,
these encryption types will be disabled by default and eventually
removed.

Beginning with the krb5-1.18 release, all support for single-DES
encryption types has been removed.


Major changes in 1.21 (2023-06-05)
==================================

User experience:

* Added a credential cache type providing compatibility with the macOS
  11 native credential cache.

Developer experience:

* libkadm5 will use the provided krb5_context object to read
  configuration values, instead of creating its own.

* Added an interface to retrieve the ticket session key from a GSS
  context.

Protocol evolution:

* The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 or triple-DES session
  keys unless explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4 or
  allow_des3 variables respectively.

* The KDC will assume that all services can handle aes256-sha1 session
  keys unless the service principal has a session_enctypes string
  attribute.

* Support for PAC full KDC checksums has been added to mitigate an
  S4U2Proxy privilege escalation attack.

* The PKINIT client will advertise a more modern set of supported CMS
  algorithms.

Code quality:

* Removed unused code in libkrb5, libkrb5support, and the PKINIT
  module.

* Modernized the KDC code for processing TGS requests, the code for
  encrypting and decrypting key data, the PAC handling code, and the
  GSS library packet parsing and composition code.

* Improved the test framework's detection of memory errors in daemon
  processes when used with asan.
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