Re: Wishlist: credential file update/access collision avoidance?

> Well, given that the historical best practices for Kerberos tickets
> was to put addresses in them, I think that we can see that they
> were not meant to be shared between computers without actually
> being explicitly forwarded from one computer to the other.

And some of us still try to put adresses into the tickets, because we
are - conservative? So yes, in my perspective that ticket cache is
local. Isn't it endian dependent as well?

> I think that this is still widely held as best practice.  IIRC,
> addressless tickets were defined as the norm, not so that you could
> put your ccaches on distributed file systems but rather because
> addresses cause many issues with NAT and multi-homed host but do
> not provide a terribly strong additional security component.

So how "terribly strong" is it in reality? Where can one read up on that?
 
>> So I do not suggest putting ccaches on distributed file systems as a
>> default, this should be done with great care, but nothing says
>> that it is impossible, never useful or inherently insecure.

The likelyhood that such a credential is snatched from the user is
much higher, isn't it? Even if you can ensure that your network file
system has "sufficient" encryption.

Just as a side track: What about using Linux keyrings as credential
caches for computers which do not have any local file system and where
you don't want to have a tmpfs just for credential caches?

Harald.