Re: Suppressing conf/integ flags in krb5 GSS tokens
Simo Sorce <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.kerberos.devel,gmane.comp.encryption.kerberos.heimdal.general |
|---|---|
| Organization | Red Hat, Inc. |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mon, 2015-06-01 at 09:51 -0400, Simo Sorce wrote: > On Sun, 2015-05-31 at 23:03 -0500, Nico Williams wrote: > > On Sun, May 31, 2015 at 01:59:24PM -0400, Greg Hudson wrote: > > > Comments? > > > > Heimdal's SPNEGO implementation neither checks the the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG > > ret_flag, nor requests it as a req_flag. Heimdal's SPNEGO discovers > > integrity support by calling gss_get_mic(): if it returns GSS_S_UNAVAIL, > > then integrity support is not provided, otherwise it is. Heimdal also > > assumes that if a MIC is received then integrity support must be > > available. > > > > I believe calling GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() even when > > GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is not set in ret_flags is perfectly permissible in > > RFC2743. > > I think this is fine, and if you receive a MIC you have no other option > (well, except fail). > > > Disabling the MIC in SPNEGO when GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is not set in > > ret_flags, combined with the new cred options, is likely (I think) to > > fail to interop with Microsoft's SPNEGO when used in the application > > protocol in question. It ought to fail to interop, but who know, > > perhaps MSFT's SPNEGO will not require the MIC in this protocol because > > it's running over TLS, but I'd not bet on it. The Heimdal approach > > seems better. > > Keep in mind we tested this, with the patch we sent Greg. > It works with all flags turned off and no special handling for MIC, > today. I take this back, thinking again, the code where we exercised this uses its own SPNEGO layer :/ Simo. -- Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York _______________________________________________ krbdev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/krbdev