Re: Re-encrypt on change of master key
Lars-Johan Liman <[email protected]> Wed, 15 Mar 2017 10:17:57 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.kerberos.heimdal.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi! This whole thread contains a lot of really good information. Is this all documented in a good way (preferrably with examples) somewhere? If so, pointer please. If not, can it please be? Cheers, /Liman #---------------------------------------------------------------------- # Lars-Johan Liman, M.Sc. ! E-mail: [email protected] # Senior Systems Specialist ! Tel: +46 8 - 562 860 12 # Netnod Internet Exchange, Stockholm ! http://www.netnod.se/ #---------------------------------------------------------------------- [email protected]: > On 3/14/2017 3:57 PM, Nico Williams wrote: >> On Tue, Mar 14, 2017 at 03:54:36PM -0700, Adam Lewenberg wrote: >>> If you use a master key and you back up all your files _except_ the master >>> key to some remote location, wouldn't that suffice to protect the database >>> in that remote location? >> >> No. The problem is that the master key is not used to bind principal >> keys to principal records. This means that a backup operator could give >> you back a dump where a user's keys are pasted into the krbtgt >> principal(s), and if you load this dump that user will now be able to >> mint tickets for any service as any user. (You might notice this >> attack, but probably not in time to stop it.) >> >> Nico > I see. > If I trust the backup operator (e.g., it's me), then it still might be > useful as at the very least it makes it harder for anyone who runs > across the database file to guess the passwords. On the other hand, > encrypting the entire file before backup, as you suggest, accomplishes > this _and_ removes the concern of getting back a compromised database. > Thanks for the enlightenment. > Adam Lewenberg