[openssl/openssl] 80c15f: Reject oversized inputs in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy()

  Branch: refs/heads/openssl-3.5
  Home:   https://github.com/openssl/openssl
  Commit: 80c15faaf78042bbb8654a0e234c50c381732f74
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/80c15faaf78042bbb8654a0e234c50c381732f74
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Reject oversized inputs in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy()

In ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() the destination size for BMPSTRING and
UNIVERSALSTRING output was computed by a signed left shift on an
int:

    outlen = nchar << 1;        /* MBSTRING_BMP  */
    outlen = nchar << 2;        /* MBSTRING_UNIV */

For nchar large enough the result is not representable in int.  In
the worst case (nchar == 0x40000000) nchar << 2 wraps to zero,
OPENSSL_malloc(1) is called, and traverse_string() then writes
4*nchar bytes into the one-byte allocation: a heap buffer
overflow.  The MBSTRING_UTF8 path computes outlen by summing
per-character byte counts in out_utf8(), and that sum can overflow
the same int under similarly large inputs.

Neither path is reachable from code that processes X.509
certificates through the DIRSTRING_TYPE mask used by
ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(): UNIVERSALSTRING is absent from that
mask, and the UTF-8 sum requires inputs on the order of half a
gigabyte.  Reaching them needs an application that calls
ASN1_mbstring_copy()/ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() directly, or registers
a custom NID via ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(), with an oversized
attacker-controlled input.

Add range checks before each shift and in out_utf8(), raising
ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG at the point of detection.  Move the
existing ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING raise into out_utf8() too so
the two failure modes report distinct codes; the MBSTRING_UTF8
caller is left with cleanup only and now frees dest on error,
matching the BMP/UNIV branches.

Fixes CVE-2026-7383

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 13:59:47 2026
(cherry picked from commit d32350ae8ef7426718f5aa9e383d4b51398ee255)


  Commit: 715349a1d7c6db970e6815dafb90915f07307f98
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/715349a1d7c6db970e6815dafb90915f07307f98
  Author: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  cms: kek_unwrap_key: Fix out-of-bounds read in check-byte validation

the check-byte test in kek_unwrap_key() reads tmp[1] through tmp[6]
unconditionally, so the decrypted buffer must hold at least seven
octets. The pre-decryption size check enforces inlen >= 2 * blocklen,
which yields the required seven octets only when blocklen >= 4. For
a KEK cipher with a smaller block size, inlen can be as small as
2 * blocklen and the check-byte read overruns the inlen-sized tmp
allocation.

Reject blocklen < 4 in the early sanity check. All block ciphers
appropriate for CMS PasswordRecipientInfo key wrapping have a block
size of at least 8 octets (DES/3DES = 8, AES = 16), so this only
forbids ciphers that would not be valid KEK choices anyway, and the
existing inlen >= 2 * blocklen check then guarantees the seven-octet
lower bound the check-byte test relies on.

Fixes CVE-2026-9076
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:10:14 2026


  Commit: d7f6d25944e2498d0a054bc1d4fff945cfa85890
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d7f6d25944e2498d0a054bc1d4fff945cfa85890
  Author: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmsapitest.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t
    A test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi_data/cms_pwri_kek_oob.der

  Log Message:
  -----------
  cms: kek_unwrap_key: test for fix out-of-bounds read in check-byte validation

added EnvelopedData blob with a PasswordRecipientInfo using
id-alg-PWRI-KEK and an AES-128-CFB key encryption cipher. CFB's 1-byte
effective block size let the inlen >= 2 * blocklen guard in
kek_unwrap_key() accept a wrapped key shorter than the seven octets
the check-byte test reads from tmp[1..6]; the encryptedKey OCTET
STRING here is only two bytes.

Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:10:15 2026


  Commit: da5d62af75f69d6fbf7803743d7c56ac75461e43
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/da5d62af75f69d6fbf7803743d7c56ac75461e43
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Avoid length truncation in ASN1_STRING_set

The ASN1_STRING_set() function takes an `int` length, make sure the
argument is not inadvertently truncated when it is called from
asn1_ex_c2i().

Fixes CVE-2026-34180

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:13:56 2026
(cherry picked from commit 5f525cace61a53311ee533374919356c700847d9)


  Commit: 85dcbb3abaa4878af5c8fbbe11bce708fcf984a7
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/85dcbb3abaa4878af5c8fbbe11bce708fcf984a7
  Author: Alicja Kario <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
    A test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-key-len.p12
    A test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.good-shorter-key-len.p12

  Log Message:
  -----------
  pkcs12: verify that the pbmac1 key length is safe

Short mac keys (as short as 1 byte) can be used to probe the
system under attack to accept a PKCS#12 file created by an attacker
even if the attacker doesn't know the password used for MAC protection.

Fixes CVE-2026-34181

(also update the reference to the PBMAC1 PKCS#12 RFC)

Signed-off-by: Alicja Kario <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:20:38 2026
(cherry picked from commit ec36f2417c4ddd8cabce4b4a60a3d7a7365f2d81)


  Commit: 7947e6a81eb8776802f159fb6762cb7fcf7e34c7
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7947e6a81eb8776802f159fb6762cb7fcf7e34c7
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Reject potentially forged encrypted CMS AuthEnvelopedData messages

1. Adjust ossl_cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio to not accept non-AEAD
ciphers.

If a forged CMS message with AuthEnvelopedData is received with
a non-AEAD cipher specified, we silently accept that and decrypt
the message, skipping any authentication, which violates RFC 5083.

We also add checks to ensure we fail if we try to encrypt
AuthEnvelopedData without using an AEAD cipher.

2. Ensure that tag lengths on cms AEAD data is the recommended size.

RFC 5084 recommends that mac tags be at least 12 bytes for AES-GCM
and 4 bytes for AES-CCM on AuthEnvelopedData. As this code is not
algorith-specific we add a check for a minimal size and just use the
lower limit which is sufficient to prevent this attack.

Without this check, its possible to set the tag length to 1 and within
256 guesses, forge a CMS message.

Fixes CVE-2026-34182

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:29:17 2026


  Commit: 4105ad6d7f072f5b5c8ac913cea10f01d17c3156
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4105ad6d7f072f5b5c8ac913cea10f01d17c3156
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmsapitest.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add tests for CVE-2026-34182

Test to ensure that for a given CMS message:

1) We do not allow the creation of a CMS message containing
   AuthEnvelopedData with a non-AEAD cipher.
2) We do not accept a message containing AuthEnvelopedData with a
   non-AEAD cipher specified in the AlgorithmIdentifier.
3) We do not allow tag lengths less that 4 bytes.

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:29:19 2026


  Commit: 7d06955ebe0ecf8adfd4c1e92018586da47ef9ac
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d06955ebe0ecf8adfd4c1e92018586da47ef9ac
  Author: Alexandr Nedvedicky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M include/internal/quic_cfq.h
    M include/internal/quic_channel.h
    M include/internal/quic_fifd.h
    M ssl/quic/quic_cfq.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_channel.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_channel_local.h
    M ssl/quic/quic_fifd.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_rx_depack.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_txp.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  QUIC stack must limit the number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames processed in RX

Currently local QUIC stack allocates PATH_RESPONSE frame for every
PATH_CHALLENGE frame it receives in single packet from its remote peer.
The memory with PATH_RESPONSE frame is released after local QUIC stack
receives an ACK which confirms reception of PATH_RESPONSE by remote peer.
This gives remote peer too much control over memory resources local
QUIC stack may consume.

Quoting RFC 9000 section 9.2.1:
	...an endpoint SHOULD NOT send multiple
	PATH_CHALLENGE frames in a single packet.

Limiting the number of PATCH_CHALLENGE frames to 1 per QUIC packet received
helps to reduce heap memory overhead required to process PATH_CHALLENGE
frame.

Currently QUIC ACKM (ACK-manager) keeps all frames in retransmission
buffer until ACK is received. It can be changed such frames which
don't need to be ACKed don't need to be kept in retrans buffer,
those can be released right after transmission.

Fixes CVE-2026-34183

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:39:54 2026


  Commit: 3a6941e0b6925ad2f504b0522179021447c7226f
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/3a6941e0b6925ad2f504b0522179021447c7226f
  Author: Alexandr Nedvedicky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M include/internal/quic_channel.h
    M ssl/quic/quic_channel.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_channel_local.h
    M ssl/quic/quic_rx_depack.c
    M test/radix/quic_tests.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add test for path challenge flood mitigation

Client injects 16 path challenge frames. Those are received
by server. Only one challenge frame of 16 received triggers
path challenge response. Remaining challenge frames are
discrded/ignored.

Test introduces two counters to channel object:
  - path_challenge_rx which is bumped for every patch challenge
  frame received

  - path_response_tx which is bumped for every path response
  frame transmitted

Succesuful test verifies server receives 16 path challenge frames,
but sends just one path response frmae as response.

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:39:56 2026


  Commit: 5e3ed291b8af0b03d5d3b9e56a1da69a187e9729
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/5e3ed291b8af0b03d5d3b9e56a1da69a187e9729
  Author: Alexandr Nedvedicky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M ssl/quic/quic_port.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix NULL dereference in QUIC address validation

QUIC server crashes when address validation (RFC 9000, Section 8.1)
is disabled and client sends initial packet with invalid token.

Issue reported and fix submitted by Sunwoo Lee (KENTECH),
Hyuk Lim (KENTECH) and Seunghyun Yoon (KENTECH)

Fixes CVE-2026-42764

Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:50:48 2026
(cherry picked from commit e74289062ca6ff778807aa79c03eae4cfc9635b7)


  Commit: 056d06c1918fafbb98c1c85a02e4c47cc4e199ce
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/056d06c1918fafbb98c1c85a02e4c47cc4e199ce
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix potential NULL dereference processing CMS PasswordRecipientInfo

Avoid NULL dereferencing when keyDerivationAlgorithm is absent
in CMS PasswordRecipientInfo.

Fixes CVE-2026-42766

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 18:57:52 2026
(cherry picked from commit f019b72c589071a73acda9812775389a857884c9)


  Commit: 6064724ad3d9af8de353c7ea5ded170312f55be0
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/6064724ad3d9af8de353c7ea5ded170312f55be0
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    A test/cms-msg/make_missing_kdf_der.py
    A test/cms-msg/missing-kdf.der
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Test for CVE-2026-42766

The script make_missing_kdf_der.py was developed by Mayank Jangid
and Kushal Khemka.

Co-Authored-by: Mayank Jangid <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-by: Kushal Khemka <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 18:57:53 2026
(cherry picked from commit 7020987c162fe81e12e10101dd32f57bdfc7ff5e)


  Commit: bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54d
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54d
  Author: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_env.c
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
    M doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/PKCS7_decrypt.pod

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Enforce implicit rejection for CMS/PKCS#7 decryption

Drop the disablement of the implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
decryption.

Fixes CVE-2026-42768

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alicja Kario <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 19:49:19 2026
(cherry picked from commit 33def545a0c173aec43891f24c3df4f7d2e4fd87)


  Commit: 54d0989997e5fc26057009a9782c3441ce3842fb
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/54d0989997e5fc26057009a9782c3441ce3842fb
  Author: Bob Beck <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_genm.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Use the correct issuer when validating rootCAKeyUpdate

This correctly uses the existing root, and not the same certificate
as the root of the chain to validate.

While we are here, we also turn on self signed certificate signature
checking as this case is actually bringing in trust anchors as
self signed certs, and fix a possible NULL deref.

Fixes CVE-2026-42769

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 19:54:01 2026
(cherry picked from commit 8b6c5dacb6ade54f30778cf344600d4a9df1f032)


  Commit: ca2237ab5615641b662183b077f62c08d75e8070
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ca2237ab5615641b662183b077f62c08d75e8070
  Author: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Match the local q DHX parameter against the peer's q

As FFC/DH peer public key validation uses the peer's q value instead
of checking against the local q, we must also check that these
q values match when setting the peer's public key.

Fixes CVE-2026-42770

Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 19:56:27 2026
(cherry picked from commit 29b9df160cc5f20ee3907cce0cb271b982846bce)


  Commit: 983d54b5cce8d16147548ed1a37892d1720bbab6
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/983d54b5cce8d16147548ed1a37892d1720bbab6
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_ocb.c
    M test/evp_extra_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Apply the buffered IV on the AES-OCB EVP_Cipher() path

aes_ocb_cipher(), the OCB provider's OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER slot,
processed input without flushing the buffered IV into the OCB
context.  Effective nonce was 0 regardless of the caller's IV;
EVP_*Final_ex() then emitted a tag depending only on (key, iv).
This gave (key, nonce) reuse and single-query universal forgery on
the EVP_Cipher() path.

Apply update_iv() at the head of aes_ocb_cipher() to mirror the
streaming handler.  The matching GCM one-shot does this already.

Add a cross-driver round-trip test for AES-{GCM,CCM,OCB} and
ChaCha20-Poly1305 in test/evp_extra_test.c.  Each cipher is
exercised with and without AAD; the no-AAD case is needed because
any prior EVP_CipherUpdate(NULL, aad, ...) routes through the
streaming handler and applies the IV itself, masking the bug.

Fixes CVE-2026-45445

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:02:00 2026
(cherry picked from commit 50c95c5d1e83f4f46a555dfa7fd9c632d3eba9dc)


  Commit: 7fe3f33a3b3a4c487aa4dcdbc87057f66ffd2b85
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7fe3f33a3b3a4c487aa4dcdbc87057f66ffd2b85
  Author: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_siv_hw.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
    M test/evp_extra_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix handling of empty-ciphertext messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV

AES-GCM-SIV: EVP_DecryptFinal_ex Accepts All-Zero Tag for Empty-Ciphertext
Messages.

AES-SIV: EVP_DecryptUpdate_ex Accepts All-Zero Tag for Empty-Ciphertext
Messages on context reuse.

Fixes CVE-2026-45446

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:12:25 2026
(cherry picked from commit aeb5000b0c66772bad600e9cc241a4c902e6d8b9)


  Commit: 7d4a980c62258c5910cc883936e0c8dbab4d75a8
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d4a980c62258c5910cc883936e0c8dbab4d75a8
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix possible use-after-free in OpenSSL PKCS7_verify()

Fixes CVE-2026-45447

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:22:50 2026
(cherry picked from commit b4fbcf9fd25f781b17b763e3ec84d6b6dc096f6e)


  Commit: d5eb84a454304b4bb87227cd5ef194d354388a18
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d5eb84a454304b4bb87227cd5ef194d354388a18
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
    A test/smime-eml/pkcs7-empty-digest-set.eml

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Test for CVE-2026-45447 (UAF in PKCS7_verify)

The test data were created with a tool developed by
Thai Duong <[email protected]>.

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:22:52 2026
(cherry picked from commit a60763a01490bd747ab716342b87d55bd0a27a39)


  Commit: 810b722f772652ad48042bcc7ab07e3414b11d0f
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/810b722f772652ad48042bcc7ab07e3414b11d0f
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix potential NULL dereference in OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_decrypt()

Check that 'parameter' != NULL before dereferencing in
OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_decrypt().

Fixes CVE-2026-42767

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:38:27 2026
(cherry picked from commit 309db711d13a6fdc6f8a719d8b4415a04dbf3bc5)


  Commit: 7d8df29987e6fa55d681da27a997a34ca3e29b49
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d8df29987e6fa55d681da27a997a34ca3e29b49
  Author: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CHANGES.md, NEWS.md: update for 3.5.7

3.5.7 CHANGES.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-7383, CVE-2026-9076, CVE-2026-34180, CVE-2026-34181,
   CVE-2026-34182, CVE-2026-34183, CVE-2026-42764, CVE-2026-42766,
   CVE-2026-42767, CVE-2026-42768, CVE-2026-42769, CVE-2026-42770,
   CVE-2026-45445, CVE-2026-45446, CVE-2026-45447
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30626
   "TLSv1.3: Fix server not sending NewSessionTicket after ciphersuite mismatch"
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31058
   "Validate that a PSK identity is at least one byte long"
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31146
   "ktls: Fix invalid memory access on retry with moving write buffer"

3.5.7 NEWS.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-7383, CVE-2026-9076, CVE-2026-34180, CVE-2026-34181,
   CVE-2026-34182, CVE-2026-34183, CVE-2026-42764, CVE-2026-42766,
   CVE-2026-42767, CVE-2026-42768, CVE-2026-42769, CVE-2026-42770,
   CVE-2026-45445, CVE-2026-45446, CVE-2026-45447

Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 11:20:24 2026


  Commit: 512b62fd2438f95f5ebc77aa353d2cf920a137ab
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/512b62fd2438f95f5ebc77aa353d2cf920a137ab
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M .github/workflows/oss-fuzz.yml
    M Configure
    M apps/enc.c
    M apps/list.c
    M apps/skeyutl.c
    M apps/speed.c
    M apps/testdsa.h
    M apps/testrsa.h
    M crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl
    M crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
    M crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
    M crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
    M crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
    M crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
    M crypto/bio/bss_dgram_pair.c
    M crypto/bn/bn_const.c
    M crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
    M crypto/cast/cast_s.h
    M crypto/chacha/asm/chachap10-ppc.pl
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_genm.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_env.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
    M crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
    M crypto/des/fcrypt.c
    M crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
    M crypto/ec/curve448/scalar.c
    M crypto/ec/curve448/word.h
    M crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
    M crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c
    M crypto/ec/ecp_sm2p256.c
    M crypto/evp/asymcipher.c
    M crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
    M crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
    M crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c
    M crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
    M crypto/ml_dsa/ml_dsa_key.c
    M crypto/modes/wrap128.c
    M crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
    M crypto/objects/obj_lib.c
    M crypto/param_build_set.c
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
    M crypto/rc2/rc2_skey.c
    M crypto/slh_dsa/slh_dsa_key.c
    M crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c
    M crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c
    M crypto/x509/v3_ist.c
    M demos/cipher/aeskeywrap.c
    M demos/cipher/ariacbc.c
    M demos/digest/EVP_MD_demo.c
    M demos/encrypt/rsa_encrypt.h
    M demos/mac/cmac-aes256.c
    M demos/mac/hmac-sha512.c
    M demos/signature/EVP_EC_Signature_demo.h
    M doc/man1/openssl-pkcs8.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-rehash.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-s_client.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-s_server.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-smime.pod.in
    M doc/man3/BIO_s_bio.pod
    M doc/man3/BN_add.pod
    M doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_REQ_CTX.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_parse_url.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_transfer.pod
    M doc/man3/PKCS7_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod
    M doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod
    M doc/man7/EVP_CIPHER-AES.pod
    M doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
    M doc/man7/provider-signature.pod
    M fuzz/dtlsserver.c
    M fuzz/server.c
    M include/crypto/riscv_arch.h
    M include/internal/cryptlib.h
    M include/internal/quic_cfq.h
    M include/internal/quic_channel.h
    M include/internal/quic_fifd.h
    M include/internal/quic_stream_map.h
    M include/internal/rcu.h
    M include/openssl/bn.h
    M include/openssl/ssl.h.in
    M include/openssl/x509_acert.h.in
    M providers/defltprov.c
    M providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_hw_rv64i.inc
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_siv_hw.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
    M providers/implementations/encode_decode/ml_dsa_codecs.c
    M providers/implementations/encode_decode/ml_dsa_codecs.h
    M providers/implementations/encode_decode/ml_kem_codecs.h
    M providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c
    M providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
    M providers/implementations/keymgmt/ecx_kmgmt.c
    M providers/implementations/keymgmt/mlx_kmgmt.c
    M providers/implementations/macs/poly1305_prov.c
    M providers/implementations/signature/slh_dsa_sig.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_ackm.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_cfq.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_fifd.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_port.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_record_rx.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_record_tx.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_txp.c
    M ssl/record/methods/ktls_meth.c
    M ssl/ssl_ciph.c
    M ssl/ssl_rsa.c
    M ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c
    M ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
    M ssl/statem/statem.c
    M ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
    M ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
    M ssl/t1_trce.c
    M test/bad_dtls_test.c
    M test/bio_tfo_test.c
    M test/chacha_internal_test.c
    M test/cipherlist_test.c
    M test/destest.c
    M test/dsatest.c
    M test/ectest.c
    M test/endecode_test.c
    M test/enginetest.c
    M test/evp_extra_test2.c
    M test/evp_kdf_test.c
    M test/evp_libctx_test.c
    M test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c
    M test/evp_skey_test.c
    M test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
    M test/hpke_test.c
    M test/ideatest.c
    M test/ml_kem_evp_extra_test.c
    M test/param_build_test.c
    M test/pbetest.c
    M test/pkcs12_format_test.c
    M test/quic_record_test.c
    M test/quic_txp_test.c
    M test/quic_wire_test.c
    M test/radix/quic_tests.c
    M test/radix/terp.c
    M test/siphash_internal_test.c
    M test/stack_test.c
    M test/x509_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Copyright year updates


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 11:52:21 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 8d6fdde49c481bf4d3c8626f264c4aaaba78fa65
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8d6fdde49c481bf4d3c8626f264c4aaaba78fa65
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/fips-sources.checksums
    M providers/fips.checksum
    M providers/fips.module.sources

  Log Message:
  -----------
  make update


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 11:54:25 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 8cf17aaeb4599f8af87fefd810b5b5fee90fe69e
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8cf17aaeb4599f8af87fefd810b5b5fee90fe69e
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for release of 3.5.7


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 11:54:26 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 85e3440a27a55359f5da53837e463a6f5476ea76
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/85e3440a27a55359f5da53837e463a6f5476ea76
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for 3.5.8


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 11:54:39 2026
Release: yes


Compare: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/0f4a54d79a0c...85e3440a27a5

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