[openssl/openssl] 2647bf: Add test for CVE-2026-63076

  Branch: refs/heads/openssl-3.4
  Home:   https://github.com/openssl/openssl
  Commit: 2647bfe5d7e1868f436cb0d4bcb75d1822744b81
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2647bfe5d7e1868f436cb0d4bcb75d1822744b81
  Author: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-22 (Sat, 22 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmp_protect_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add test for CVE-2026-63076

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Sat Aug 22 06:11:44 2026


  Commit: a1f348ccb328c3afbd4ba6883f9b7c813c043259
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1f348ccb328c3afbd4ba6883f9b7c813c043259
  Author: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-22 (Sat, 22 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix Remote NULL deref in ossl_cmp_calc_protection() via crafted protectionAlg

ossl_cmp_calc_protection() only checked whether the protectionAlg parameter
(ppval) was NULL before treating it as a PBMParameter ASN1_STRING.

X509_ALGOR_get0() does not validate the ASN.1 type of the parameter against what
the caller expects. For id-PasswordBasedMAC, a crafted message can encode the
parameter as a BOOLEAN instead of the expected PBMParameter SEQUENCE. Because
the ASN1_TYPE value union overlays the boolean int on the pointer field, ppval
comes back as a bogus non-NULL pointer (e.g. 0xff).

Fixes CVE-2026-63076

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Sat Aug 22 06:11:45 2026


  Commit: c902e5f16d6a9e130e96d3ca6d8f64d71652e393
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c902e5f16d6a9e130e96d3ca6d8f64d71652e393
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M include/internal/quic_ackm.h
    M ssl/quic/quic_ackm.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_txp.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Don't store ACK-only frames in TX history for QUIC.

When QUIC sends an ACK-only frame, there is no expectation that the
peer will ack that ack (i.e. it is itself not ack-eliciting).  However,
our implementation stores these frames in the TX history regardless.  In and
of itself thats ok, but if a malicious client establishes a connection,
and then drives the connection such that ack-only frames are forced from
the peer (i.e. by sending numerous ping frames), and then withholding
any subseqent acks for ack-eliciting data, like legitimate data, said
malicious client can force inappropriate memory growth on the server,
leading to potential DOS attacks.

Don't store any ACK-only frames in the TX history to address this.  Record it in
our TX history so that the send window moves forward appropriately, but for
ack-only frames, immediately remove it, since we don't expect to get an ack for
them anyway.

Initially authored by Opal Wright <[email protected]>

The initial proposal had some shortcommings in which the highest pn
acked value was not accounted for which I have fixed with the assistance
of Claude

Assisted-by: Anthopic Sonnet 5

Fixes CVE-2026-63075

Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 12:28:10 2026


  Commit: d85920191aef53986725aec2bd66f94b65cbda80
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d85920191aef53986725aec2bd66f94b65cbda80
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/build.info
    A test/cmp_extracerts_dos_test.c
    M test/recipes/65-test_cmp_msg.t

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add a test for restricting growth in cmp cert cache

Test to ensure that if certs are rejected we don't add them unboundedly
to the cmp contexts cert cache.

Assisted-by: Claude sonnet 4.6
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 12:42:56 2026


  Commit: f636f9ca0fa1bae5b42f9e787f025c96fb09c43a
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f636f9ca0fa1bae5b42f9e787f025c96fb09c43a
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix unbounded cert cache growth in cmp

If a remote user sends cmp messages to a server with a list of
extraCerts and the message is rejected, the extraCerts from the message
remain in the server contexts untrusted certificate stack.  This exposes
servers with long lived ctx objects to denial of service attacks in
which an attacker sends messages intending to be rejected with a large
list of additional cerificated repeatedly, forcing the server to store
them indefinately.

Fix it by rolling back the added extra certs if the message is rejected,
using the same method we do when the context is configured to not do
caching at all.

Fixes openssl/srt#224

Fixes CVE-2026-63074

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 12:42:57 2026


  Commit: 1e8c398db67404babd3e5af999bb6bd86f720c76
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1e8c398db67404babd3e5af999bb6bd86f720c76
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M ssl/t1_lib.c
    M test/rpktest.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Handle signature_algorithms_cert extension in key-only context

Servers or clients that configure only a private key in
expectation of always negotiating use of RFC7250 raw public keys
failed to handle the "signature_algorithms_cert" extension.

The issue is now resolved and the RPK tests now check that
key-only configurations are robust also when the extension
is sent by the peer.

Key-only configurations are quite uncommon.  As a best practice,
RPK-capable servers and clients pair their private key with a
(possibly self-signed) certificate, enabling fallback to X.509
handshakes with non-RPK peers.

Fixes CVE-2026-14457

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 12:49:45 2026


  Commit: a7e5a6eea8fd3ccca6b6fbba031a5fbf8a3d93b4
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a7e5a6eea8fd3ccca6b6fbba031a5fbf8a3d93b4
  Author: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CMP unexpected sender DN used as format string in ERR_raise_data()

ossl_cmp_msg_check_update() converts an unexpected CMP response sender DN with
X509_NAME_oneline() and passes that peer-controlled string directly as the
format argument to ERR_raise_data(). Printable percent characters survive the
DN conversion, so a sender such as CN=%s%n reaches vsnprintf() as active format
syntax without matching varargs.

Fixes: CVE-2026-63073

Original patch by: Filipe Casal of Trail of Bits in collaboration with OpenAI

Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 13:02:29 2026


  Commit: 196a4b978499604b2ddb875e967bf3aaa49dd4ef
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/196a4b978499604b2ddb875e967bf3aaa49dd4ef
  Author: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmp_vfy_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add test for CVE-2026-63073

Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 13:02:30 2026


  Commit: 945a57b06f9158be59b5fec61e238cc67e6f98dd
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/945a57b06f9158be59b5fec61e238cc67e6f98dd
  Author: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmsapitest.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add test for CVE-2026-63072

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Dinh <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 14:44:05 2026


  Commit: 9ec2f6d2ae2bcad907cf7ee38584855bafe4979a
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9ec2f6d2ae2bcad907cf7ee38584855bafe4979a
  Author: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_kari.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix heap buffer overflow (8-byte OOB write) in AES-WRAP-PAD unwrap

On its integrity-failure paths that primitive writes and cleanses up to inlen
bytes of the output buffer. Size the buffer for that worst case so a failed
unwrap cannot write past the allocation.

Fixes CVE-2026-63072

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Dinh <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 14:44:05 2026


  Commit: 7110cb2f75806d0bf809eb2f90790d477900be40
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7110cb2f75806d0bf809eb2f90790d477900be40
  Author: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M ssl/record/methods/dtls_meth.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Avoid full read buffer allocation when buffering DTLS next-epoch records

dtls_rlayer_buffer_record() buffers records that arrive early for the
next epoch while a handshake is in progress. It did this by taking
ownership of the entire live read buffer (sized for the largest
possible record, ~16.7KB) and allocating a brand new one to carry on
reading, regardless of how small the buffered record actually was.
With the queue capped at 100 entries, a peer could send around 100
tiny bogus next-epoch records (~14 bytes each on the wire) and force
around 1.7MB of heap allocation per connection.

Instead, copy only the record's own on-wire bytes (header and
ciphertext) into the queue entry, and leave the live read buffer
untouched. Memory use is now proportional to what the peer actually
sends.

Fixes CVE-2026-54874

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Dinh <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 15:39:09 2026


  Commit: a9388ffa703625e5e1361c992ac2883e86877424
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a9388ffa703625e5e1361c992ac2883e86877424
  Author: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M ssl/record/methods/dtls_meth.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  ssl/record/methods/dtls_meth.c: lower the unprocessed_rcds queue limit

100 buffered next-epoch records is far more than a normal handshake
ever needs. A peer that has already completed its side of the epoch
transition may send more than one record under the new epoch before
we catch up and bump our own receive epoch - for example, application
data sent immediately once the peer considers the handshake done -
but real-world bursts like that are still small. Now that each entry
only costs as much memory as the record actually received, the limit
mainly serves as a ceiling on worst-case per-connection memory use, so
lower it to 16 to keep that ceiling smaller while still leaving ample
headroom over legitimate usage.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Dinh <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 15:39:10 2026


  Commit: dd9048b5e520d9411acea72be99da7d2b9e2bd2f
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd9048b5e520d9411acea72be99da7d2b9e2bd2f
  Author: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-24 (Mon, 24 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M ssl/record/methods/dtls_meth.c
    M ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h

  Log Message:
  -----------
  ssl/record: remove dead DTLS processed_rcds record queue

rl->processed_rcds and the functions that serviced it
(dtls_copy_rlayer_record(), dtls_retrieve_rlayer_buffered_record())
were unreachable: nothing in the codebase ever inserted a record into
that queue, so the only consumer of it - the check at the top of
dtls_get_more_records() - always saw an empty queue. The real
mechanism for handing buffered next-epoch records to the next epoch's
record layer is the unrelated forwarding code in dtls_free(), which
pushes the raw bytes from rl->unprocessed_rcds onto rl->next.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Dinh <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Mon Aug 24 15:39:11 2026


  Commit: 46fbd9dc042d15c486f4302b356649a082283b67
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/46fbd9dc042d15c486f4302b356649a082283b67
  Author: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-25 (Tue, 25 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CHANGES.md: rephrase TLS 1.3 ticket lifetime cap change log record

Complements: 601399c31b43 "Enforce RFC 8446 ticket lifetime limit for TLS 1.3 client"
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Tue Aug 25 11:37:40 2026


  Commit: 618369fa587c2224b2348906438081911505260f
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/618369fa587c2224b2348906438081911505260f
  Author: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-25 (Tue, 25 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CHANGES.md, NEWS.md: reorder HollowByte change log record, add missing period

Move HollowByte change log record after records with assigned CVE
numbers and severity ratings, add period at the end of the lead
sentence, add a link to the PR in the comment.

Complements: c500fbd8a446 "Update CHANGES/NEWS to mention the HollowByte fix"
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Tue Aug 25 11:37:41 2026


  Commit: 3f4d9fa0a489aeff3e42245a10d9a33370144a91
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/3f4d9fa0a489aeff3e42245a10d9a33370144a91
  Author: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-25 (Tue, 25 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CHANGES.md, NEWS.md: update for 3.4.7

3.4.7 CHANGES.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-14457, CVE-2026-54874, CVE-2026-63072, CVE-2026-63073,
   CVE-2026-63074, CVE-2026-63075, CVE-2026-63076, CVE-2026-75803
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31174
   "Enforce RFC 8446 ticket lifetime limit for TLS 1.3 client"
   (already present)
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31572
   "[4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4] Add icx compiler version support in perl asm scripts"
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/32416
   "[3.5,3.4] Reject explicitly supplied invalid tags and generate tags for empty AEAD messages"
   (included as CVE-2026-75803)
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/32427
   "Backport #32256 openssl 4.0 to 3.0"

3.4.7 NEWS.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-14457, CVE-2026-54874, CVE-2026-63072, CVE-2026-63073,
   CVE-2026-63074, CVE-2026-63075, CVE-2026-63076, CVE-2026-75803
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/32416
   "[3.5,3.4] Reject explicitly supplied invalid tags and generate tags for empty AEAD messages"
   (included as CVE-2026-75803)
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/32427
   "Backport #32256 openssl 4.0 to 3.0"

Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <[email protected]>
Merge-date: Tue Aug 25 11:37:42 2026


  Commit: edbb1ad843b70db5ab2cc76d29720d2c9dceebe7
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/edbb1ad843b70db5ab2cc76d29720d2c9dceebe7
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-25 (Tue, 25 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M apps/lib/vms_term_sock.c
    M crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/armcap.c
    M crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-2k-avx512.pl
    M crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-3k-avx512.pl
    M crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-4k-avx512.pl
    M crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
    M crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
    M crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
    M crypto/bn/bn_add.c
    M crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
    M crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl
    M crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
    M crypto/ct/ct_b64.c
    M crypto/ctype.c
    M crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
    M crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/ec/asm/x25519-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/ec/ec_key.c
    M crypto/evp/exchange.c
    M crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c
    M crypto/hmac/hmac.c
    M crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl
    M crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
    M crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
    M crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl
    M crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
    M crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
    M crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
    M crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
    M crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
    M crypto/sha/sha_riscv.c
    M crypto/x509/by_dir.c
    M crypto/x509/pcy_cache.c
    M crypto/x509/v3_akid.c
    M crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
    M crypto/x509/x509_err.c
    M crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
    M crypto/x509/x_crl.c
    M doc/internal/man3/DEFINE_LIST_OF.pod
    M doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
    M doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod
    M doc/man3/ASN1_aux_cb.pod
    M doc/man3/BIO_s_datagram.pod
    M doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod
    M doc/man3/CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_new.pod
    M doc/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.pod
    M doc/man3/X509_verify_cert.pod
    M doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-ECDSA.pod
    M doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
    M doc/man7/fips_module.pod
    M doc/man7/openssl-core_dispatch.h.pod
    M doc/man7/provider-kem.pod
    M doc/man7/provider-signature.pod
    M include/internal/hashtable.h
    M include/internal/list.h
    M include/internal/quic_ackm.h
    M include/openssl/x509err.h
    M providers/baseprov.c
    M providers/fips/fipsprov.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_chacha20_poly1305_hw.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_ccm.c
    M providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
    M providers/implementations/macs/cmac_prov.c
    M providers/implementations/rands/test_rng.c
    M providers/implementations/storemgmt/file_store_any2obj.c
    M ssl/record/methods/dtls_meth.c
    M ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h
    M ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
    M ssl/statem/extensions.c
    M ssl/t1_lib.c
    M test/ca_internals_test.c
    M test/cmp_protect_test.c
    M test/cmp_vfy_test.c
    M test/crltest.c
    M test/helpers/quictestlib.c
    M test/helpers/ssltestlib.c
    M test/helpers/ssltestlib.h
    M test/list_test.c
    M test/p_test.c
    M test/pairwise_fail_test.c
    M test/pkcs7_test.c
    M test/punycode_test.c
    M test/quic_ackm_test.c
    M test/quic_multistream_test.c
    M test/quic_tserver_test.c
    M test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evprand.txt
    M test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
    M test/recipes/65-test_cmp_msg.t
    M test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
    M test/rpktest.c
    M test/secmemtest.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Copyright year updates


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Aug 25 12:04:29 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: acd068413100ceb350ed3a336478de4b0f284acc
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/acd068413100ceb350ed3a336478de4b0f284acc
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-25 (Tue, 25 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/fips-sources.checksums
    M providers/fips.checksum

  Log Message:
  -----------
  make update


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Aug 25 12:06:23 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 0c5d912057abf47505b4ad455da49fbab99b76f1
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0c5d912057abf47505b4ad455da49fbab99b76f1
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-25 (Tue, 25 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for release of 3.4.7


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Aug 25 12:06:24 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 1bf0a64cd1871781ddd551e2442d04a9af878120
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1bf0a64cd1871781ddd551e2442d04a9af878120
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-08-25 (Tue, 25 Aug 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for 3.4.8


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Aug 25 12:06:31 2026
Release: yes


Compare: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/9a45b708e401...1bf0a64cd187

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