Re: Work on a new RNG for OpenSSL

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.comp.encryption.openssl.devel
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Forgot to add that the adversary would have to compromise not only Intel but also AMD CPUs. Not sure about ARM - but if it implements RDRAND then it must be compromised too, otherwise the enemy victory wouldn be incomplete. ;-)
And think of the chips powering mobile devices...

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 21, 2017, at 20:06, Paul Dale <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Uri wrote:
>>>   It might also use things like RDRAND / RDSEED which we don't trust.
>> ...
>> From cryptography point of view, it cannot hurt, but may help a lot    
> 
> There is a scenario where it does hurt: https://www.lvh.io/posts/2013/10/thoughts-on-rdrand-in-linux.html
> 
> This attack wouldn't be difficult to implement given all the out of order execution and look ahead that CPUs do.   It requires a compromised RDRAND instruction changing the behaviour of a subsequent XOR into a copy.  Not only would it not be producing random bits but it would remove any randomness from the bits you already have.
> 
> 
> Pauli
> -- 
> Oracle
> Dr Paul Dale | Cryptographer | Network Security & Encryption 
> Phone +61 7 3031 7217
> Oracle Australia
> -- 
> openssl-dev mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev

-- 
openssl-dev mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
smime.p7s (application/pkcs7-signature, 4.1 KB) - not displayed
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.