Re: Work on a new RNG for OpenSSL
"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.encryption.openssl.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Forgot to add that the adversary would have to compromise not only Intel but also AMD CPUs. Not sure about ARM - but if it implements RDRAND then it must be compromised too, otherwise the enemy victory wouldn be incomplete. ;-) And think of the chips powering mobile devices... Regards, Uri Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 21, 2017, at 20:06, Paul Dale <[email protected]> wrote: > > Uri wrote: >>> It might also use things like RDRAND / RDSEED which we don't trust. >> ... >> From cryptography point of view, it cannot hurt, but may help a lot > > There is a scenario where it does hurt: https://www.lvh.io/posts/2013/10/thoughts-on-rdrand-in-linux.html > > This attack wouldn't be difficult to implement given all the out of order execution and look ahead that CPUs do. It requires a compromised RDRAND instruction changing the behaviour of a subsequent XOR into a copy. Not only would it not be producing random bits but it would remove any randomness from the bits you already have. > > > Pauli > -- > Oracle > Dr Paul Dale | Cryptographer | Network Security & Encryption > Phone +61 7 3031 7217 > Oracle Australia > -- > openssl-dev mailing list > To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
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