Re: Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API

IMHO this interface is a way for the user to improve the quality of the randomness it would get from the given RNG, *not* to replace (or diminish) its other sources. My proposal is to abolish this parameter, especially since now it is simply ignored (and IMHO – for a good reason).

That's a fine proposal ... it just can't be implemented until a major release boundary, when our ABI stability policy permits such breaking changes.


And that is fine. The sooner the better, but ABI stability makes sense too. 

 

My main point is:  RAND_add() and whatever similar in purpose interface calls we may define in the future should exhibit the following behavior:

 
Mix the provided randomness into the RNG state *immediately*, and
Keep pulling other sources and mixing them into the state – don’t subtract from the “needed entropy” count the amount you presumably got from the user.


Frankly, the need to provide double entropy argument doesn’t bother me all that much – especially if the value 0 is accepted there. ;-)

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