Re: sharutils: Directory traversal (security issue) in uudecode
Paul Eggert <[email protected]> Sun, 27 Nov 2022 09:30:11 -0800
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.gnu.utils.bugs |
|---|---|
| Organization | UCLA Computer Science Department |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 2022-11-27 07:57, Hanno B=C3=B6ck wrote: > I want to report a security issue in the uudecode commandline tool that > is part of sharutils. POSIX requires the current behavior and it's been that way for ages=20 without actual problems being reported. So one possibility is to merely=20 document the situation. Another possibility is to do as GNU 'tar' does, and warn about dubious=20 file names starting with '/' or '~', while stripping leading prefixes=20 (including anything ending in ".."), while retaining the current=20 behavior if POSIXLY_CORRECT is set. uudecode could steal tar's code to=20 do that.