Re: Netowrk connectivity (was: segfault on font ...)
Rogelio M.Serrano Jr. <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.graphics.y.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <67c582bc5edaaa37632723f136540370@master> |
On 2004-05-19 09:22:25 +0800 Andrew Suffield <[email protected]> wrote: > On Tue, May 18, 2004 at 09:15:39AM -0400, Timothy C. Brown wrote: >> When you say "UNIX domain socket" I assume you are talking about an >> AF_UNIX >> socket, > > It's a PF_UNIX socket. AF_UNIX is the type of their address. The fact > that they have the same numeric value on many platforms doesn't make > them interchangeable. > >> SSH doesn't forward these sockets, it creates an >> Xauthority file and forwards the connection over TCP (i'm sure you >> know all >> this already - i'm typing it for posterity, for those of us who >> don't know >> it). > > The above paragraph is wrong in every relevant particular. Every ssh > server I can think of can forward X11 using unix domain sockets. The > clients obviously can do as they please. > > [Skip the lengthly discussion of PF_INET sockets; suffice it to say > that this is an SEP] > >> Anyway - that was my digression. Using TCP should be a possibility; >> let >> us not ignore it because it is "insecure", when realistically *some* >> security >> *must* be implemented in Y, beyond what Xauthority generally >> provides. >> Session cookies are at least a good idea and the client should be >> smart >> enough to re-establish a session (or the server, in the appropriate >> cases). > > I have to wonder what you think .Xauthority does if not precisely > this, at least with the MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 mechanism (some are > considerably more sophisticated, like MIT-KERBEROS-5). It would > provide a perfectly adequete security scheme. > > However, this need not be implemented in Y, should not be, and > probably *will* not be; it's completely the wrong way to go about it, > from the perspectives of security, performance, and > usability. Xsecurity mechanisms other than MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 are > almost never used, and even that is overkill for the scenarios in > which it is used. UID-based authentication over unix domain sockets > should be all we ever need in the server. > Is that why X never put security in the protocol? Is SSH the oinly secure network transport available? How should a security policy implemented with uid authentication then? Is there a super user?