[] Re: [COG:] Re: Pragmata = Objects?

Jon wrote:

>In Peirce's way of thinking, from the theory of inquiry
>to the theory of signs to the pragmatic maxim, the word
>"object" marks a role in a relation -- object of a sign --
>and the role is more important than all the ontological
>essences that people may try to squeeze out of the word.
>Dewey was especially peirspicacious in articulating the
>relational matrix of objects, signs, and interpretants.

Well, yes, right, and of course, and all that (except that I consider Peirce's theory of inquiry as well as the pragmatic maxim to be parts of his theory of signs, and I haven't quite the confidence in Dewey which you seem to have in this matter, finding Peirce's own explication of the semiotic relationship far superior in virtually every way). 

Let's consider the first diagram in your "Interpretation as Action" paper: http://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html
(the .gif is attached)

In your diagram the s-o-i relationship is given on the left, and on the right some mind (or psyche == the interpreter) grasps (observes, experiences, takes in, etc.) the whole of the triadic relationship (and if you also call THAT intuition an object, then we would seemingly have two objects--and I'm not referring here to the 'immediate' vs the 'dynamic' object, but to an intuitive grasping of the whole being referred to as an 'object'. The 'thing' which 'i' grasps is clearly NOT the same 'thing' as the 'object' itself since the psyche experiences the entire triadic movement, the semiosis (as process). So, in fact, you designate this not with a lower case 'o' but with a lower case 'i', and for good reason.

So, as you wrote, "the word 'object' marks a role in a relation," namely the triadic relationship s-o-i, and I suppose one *could* refer to the apprehension of that relationship as an 'object of apprehension', but I think it may tend to confuse matters given that that other object-as-role (which is complex enough in being both 'immediate' and 'dynamic') would seem to have a special right to the 'object' designation. 

Still, I'm trying to inquire with you and others into this matter (gnox's recent remarks seem to me especially cogent) and so I wouldn't presume to attempt to say anything "definitive" in the matter. Nonetheless, I think we need to be as careful in our terminology here as Peirce was.

So, in a word, the interpreter (psyche in your diagram) experiences (or participates in, or intuits) not an object but a semiotic process, and it seems to clarify the matter a little, perhaps, to refer to that totality--which only *involves* an object--not as itself an object, but exactly as a process, which 'thing' it is. 

Yet, I also agree with you that "the role is more important than all the ontological essences that people may try to squeeze out of the word" 'object' (so long as we confine the term to the object in the semiotic process). I personally think that such a distinction represents “a difference which makes a difference" and ought not be reduced to a matter of "the people who get it already . . . and the people who don't." 

Best,

Gary




---- Original message ----
>Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2009 22:38:52 -0500
>From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>  
>Subject: Re: [CG:] Re: Pragmata = Objects?  
>To: [email protected]
>Cc: "Jon Awbrey's Inquiry Project" <[email protected]>, Arisbe List <[email protected]>, Peirce Discussion Forum <[email protected]>
>
>Nothing new under the sun and all that --
>I'm pretty sure I've said it before in
>all the ways I can think of to say it --
>the people who get it already get it
>and the people who don't still don't.
>
>In Peirce's way of thinking, from the theory of inquiry
>to the theory of signs to the pragmatic maxim, the word
>"object" marks a role in a relation -- object of a sign --
>and the role is more important than all the ontological
>essences that people may try to squeeze out of the word.
>Dewey was especially peirspicacious in articulating the
>relational matrix of objects, signs, and interpretants.
>
>Jon Awbrey
>
>John F. Sowa wrote:
>> Fotis and Jon,
>> 
>> Those words are also derived from verbal roots:
>> 
>> FK> In modern Greek, the meaning is the following:
>>  > (all words in plural)
>>  >
>>  > ???????? == pragmata == things
>>  > ??????????? == antikeimena == objects
>> 
>> In fact, the following three have very similar roots:
>> 
>> Latin 'objectus' -- thrown against
>> 
>> German 'Gegenstand' -- standing against
>> 
>> Greek '???????????' -- lying against
>> 
>> In general, objects are thrown, standing, or lying around
>> or against whatever.  That's true in my house.
>> 
>> JA> But there seems to be, more lately, or perhaps recurringly,
>>> a regression from the hey-days of process, relational, and
>>> systems thinking into ontological particularism, a curious
>>> compromise formation between essentialism and nominalism.
>> 
>> All those 'isms are trying to impose somebody's ideology on life.
>> What I liked about R-W Mann's analysis of the Aristotelian and
>> pre-Aristotelian terminology is his focus on how people actually
>> use language.  He suggests that the sharp distinction between
>> processes and things was invented by Aristotle, and it's a mistake
>> to talk about it as an inevitable "common sense" view.
>> 
>> Whitehead noted that modern physics is more compatible with the
>> views of Heraclitus, who emphasized the flux:  "panta rhei" --
>> all flow.  I translated 'panta' as 'all' rather than 'all things'
>> to avoid forcing a thing-centered view on Heraclitus.
>> 
>> John
>
>-- 
>
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>
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Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Speech Communication
Humanities Department
LaGuardia College 
City University of New York


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