Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

GR = Gary Richmond
JD = Jonathan DeVore

JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
     think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
     fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
     will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
     under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.

JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
     there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
     to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
     thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
     use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
     it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).

GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.

If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative terms,
that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a phenomenon,
then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of reasoning,
are basically category three.

Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be "degenerate" in the formal sense
that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties relatively
well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the categorical
question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal scientific means.

Regards,

Jon

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