Re: Peirce on Definition and Determination

Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: https://iulist.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2012-06/msg00002.html
Et: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8223
Et: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.misc.inquiry/3862/focus=8223
Et: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8223

(Sorry, I got fascinated by all the different ways our archives index posts.)

Gary,

I am pressed for time tonight, and hope to discuss this at length somewhere
down the line, but I think the following couple of passages might help to
clarify Peirce's admittedly peculiar usage of “formal” in this context.

• http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Excerpt_1._Peirce_.28CP_2.227.29
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/03/09/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-objective-logic/

Regards,

Jon

Gary Fuhrman wrote:
> Jon,
> 
> Where does Peirce tell us that “formal” is pragmatically synonymous with “normative”?
> 
> Phaneroscopy is “occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron” (CP 1.284) and is not a normative science. Does this not imply the nonequivalence of formality and normativity?
> 
> Gary F.
> 
> } Pai Chang said, “All sayings and writings return to one's self.” What did you mean by that? {
> 
> www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> Sent: June-02-12 11:16 PM
> To: Peirce List
> 
> Note 5 (cont.)
> 
> Re: C.S. Peirce • On the Definition of Logic
> At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/
> 
> Peirce defines logic as “formal semiotic”.  We know “semiotic” is the doctrine or theory of signs, but the current passage leaves us with a promissory note on the meaning of “formal”.  Luckily, though, it is easy enough to find other places where he tells us that “formal”
> is pragmatically synonymous with “normative”, and that puts logic squarely within the normative sciences, as classical tradition always said it ought to be.
> 
> Peirce defines a sign in relational terms, as one role out of three, the other two roles being the role of its interpretant sign and the role of its object.  This is a very different matter from defining an essence, that is, an inalienable, inherent, intrinsic property of a “thing in itself”.
> 
> Peirce is emphatic about the independence of his joint definition from any reference to human cognition, just as normative sciences ought to be orthogonal to descriptive sciences, and yet he insists that his “non-psychological conception of logic” virtually inheres in the general idea of logic, however incognito it many abide there.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon

-- 

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