Re: Peirce on Definition and Determination
Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.inquiry |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Re: Jim Willgoose At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8233 Jim & All, The most general meaning of “formal” is “concerned with form”, but the Latin “forma” may mean “beauty” in addition to “form”, so perhaps a normative “goodness of form” enters at this root. The most general meaning of “normative” is “having to do with what a person ought to do”, but a pragmatic interpretation of ethical imperatives tends to treat that as “having to do with what a person ought to do in order to achieve a given object”. Defining logic as formal or normative semiotic differentiates logic from other species of semiotic under the general theory of signs, leaving a niche open for descriptive semiotic, just to mention the obvious branch. This bring us to the question: How does a concern with form, or goodness of form, along with the question of what is required to achieve an object, modify our perspective on sign relations in a way that duly marks it as a logical point of view? Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache _______________________________________________ Inquiry mailing list [email protected] http://stderr.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/inquiry